A deal with Iran
Bargaining with the Great Satan
The consequences of the agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme for a Middle East in turmoil
FOUR places: four contrasting snapshots of a relationship. In Lausanne, Iranian and American delegations are ensconced as diplomatic partners at the Beau Rivage hotel: after eight days of talks, they reach agreement greatly limiting Iran’s uranium-enrichment programme in exchange for the gradual lifting of sanctions.
In Tehran, Iranians watch President Barack Obama in the White House explaining the reasons for the deal. It is the first time an American presidential speech has been shown live on Iranian television.
In Tikrit, and the skies above it, the two countries are undeclared allies: the war against the jihadists of the so-called Islamic State (IS) sees America providing air power while Iran marshals the ground forces, especially the Shia militias.
In Yemen they face off as adversaries in a proxy war: America provides intelligence and logistical help to the Saudi-led military intervention to repel the Houthis, Shia fighters backed by Iran.
Which snapshot gets closest to the truth: are America and Iran old-new friends, or fated always to be foes? The answer will colour any judgment on the outline of a nuclear accord reached by Iran and the so-called P5+1 powers—America, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany—in lengthy talks on April 2nd. If the Islamic Republic remains a regional threat, legitimising it as a threshold nuclear state is a high cost to pay for a slightly extended “breakout time” should it decide to cross that threshold. But if Iran is showing a new post-revolutionary responsibility, then the deal is the start of a rapprochement between countries whose rivalry has scarred the region but whose interests may, in at least some places, be aligned.
Provisions about centrifuges, fuel rods and inspection regimes, important as these are, are not the whole story. There is also much history. Iran’s Islamic revolution of 1979 transformed America’s dealings with the Middle East. The departure of the Shah, the triumphant arrival of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the seizure of more than 50 American embassy staff as hostages marks the start of modern Islamic radicalism. It turned America into a permanent military player in the Muslim heartland, and a permanent target of hatred. It was, after all, Iran’s proxies in Lebanon who introduced suicide-bombings to the region, with powerful attacks on American, French and Israeli forces in 1983.
The chain of events to today’s troubles runs thus: seeking to avoid the spread of the revolution, Western and Arab states backed the Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, in the war he launched against Iran in 1980; Western navies patrolled the Gulf to protect oil tankers; after that war ended an emboldened Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990; some of the American forces that led the alliance which removed him stayed in Saudi Arabia to contain Iran and Iraq; that presence was used as justification for al-Qaeda’s attack on September 11th 2001; George W. Bush rashly decided to finish the job that his father had supposedly left undone and invaded Iraq to get rid of Saddam in 2003; the subsequent occupation brought forth a jihadist resistance that transformed itself into today’s IS.
If a nuclear agreement could begin to reverse this baleful dynamic, it could help push the Middle East to the “new equilibrium” Mr Obama talked about to the New Yorker last year. As he told another interviewer, political engagement might also moderate Iran over time.
A secret longing?
His harshest critics think Mr Obama is pursuing a reckless grand bargain to turn Iran into a partner, an arrangement in which America could set aside some of the burden in the region and Iran would take up the role as regional hegemon that it enjoyed in the days of the Shah. Iran’s political and military influence is already palpable across the region, and growing.
America’s military collusion with Iran in Iraq; its reluctance to act against Iran’s Syrian client, Bashar Assad; its silence about the encroachment of Iranian power in Yemen—all this suggests that Mr Obama wants “to encourage and augment Iran’s potential as a successful regional power and as a friend and partner to the United States,” according to a recent article by Michael Doran, a Bush-era Pentagon and National Security Council official. In his enthusiasm, the charge goes, Mr Obama is forsaking long-standing alliances with Israel and the Arab monarchies. Israel’s prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, has no doubt this is the case. He was cheered in America’s Congress last month when he said that a deal in Lausanne would pave Iran’s path to a bomb. Iran had already “devoured” four Arab capitals—Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and Sana’a. The Yemeni adventurism, he argued, could let Iran threaten the entrance to the Red Sea, as well as the entrance to the Gulf which it already overlooks, thus putting its fingers on two of the world’s naval choke-points.
Arab leaders are quieter about making such points, but agree with them wholeheartedly. According to a leaked diplomatic cable, in 2008 King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia was already urging America to attack Iran and “cut off the head of the snake”. In March the Saudis cast off their usual caution and took on the snake, or at least its tail, in Yemen. They are leading a ten-member coalition of Sunni states that is bombing the Houthis.
The Muddled East strategy
A less hostile interpretation of Mr Obama’s actions is possible, and more persuasive. Mr Obama was elected promising to reduce America’s role in the Middle East, and sees no evidence that changing tack would actually do much good. Thus his decision to withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan; his “lead from behind” policy in Libya in 2011; and his reluctance to strike Syria in 2013 without congressional approval.
When he has acted, it has been to stave off disaster at minimum cost. So he ordered air strikes, with a small ground presence, to halt the march of IS when it seemed Baghdad might fall. And he has come close to a deal that may substantially delay, but will not necessarily halt, Iran’s nuclear ambition. By supporting the Saudis in Yemen, he proves that he is not beholden to Iran.
On this analysis the blame for Iran’s increased power goes not to Mr Obama’s caution, but to his predecessor’s toppling of Saddam and the Taliban with insufficient thought of the consequences. Gary Samore, a former Obama administration nuclear negotiator, reckons that Mr Obama’s strategy is “a reflection of the crazy, mixed-up Middle East. He is trying to muddle through a mess of unresolvable problems, most of which are the consequence of the Arab spring.” Unwilling to commit troops, the only option is “to let them fight it out, and occasionally place his thumbs on the scale.” Now that Iran is fighting IS, and Saudi Arabia the Houthis, Mr Obama’s attempt to let the countries of the region deal with their problems might seem vindicated—though it condemns many to untold violence which may well turn against America, or its interests.
It is certainly true that, in the aftermath of the occupation of Iraq and the Arab spring, the region is a bloody mess. Some compare the agonies of the region to Europe’s calamitous Thirty Years War: a bewildering conflict involving religion, meddling outsiders and great cruelty.
There are four Arab civil wars under way—Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen—with multiple divisions over religion, ideology, ethnicity and class. The sectarian rift—in which Iran supports the Shias and their allies, while Saudi Arabia backs at least some of the Sunnis—has become more pronounced. It is most apparent in Iraq, where the government is dominated by Shias and is closely aligned with Iran; most Sunni areas have been taken over by IS jihadists.
In Syria President Bashar Assad’s Alawite minority sect, regarded as an offshoot of Shia Islam, dominates the government and is propped up by Iran and is Lebanese proxy, Hizbullah. The Syrian rebels are mostly Sunni and but fragmented into myriad groups, among them IS, Jabhat al-Nusra (affiliated to al-Qaeda) and many more. Many of the rebels are supported by America and Sunni states in often murky relationships.
In Yemen the link between the Houthis (followers of the Zaydi branch of Shia Islam) and Iran (devotees of the Twelver branch) is perhaps least clear. The former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, a Zaydi who is now allied with the Houthis, was previously backed by Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, Syria has drawn a red line in Yemen and all sides now see it as the newest battleground between Sunnis and Shias. That said, the first Saudi intervention after the Arab spring, in 2011, was on behalf of the Sunni monarchy in Bahrain, where the Shia-majority population was demanding more democratic rights.
Where there is no sectarian divide and Iran does not play a role, the Sunni powers are often divided among themselves, particularly over the role of political Islam. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates support the Egyptian strongman, Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi, against the Muslim Brotherhood, which is backed by Turkey and Qatar. The same two groupings support rival governments in Libya. But in Yemen they have all united to confront the Houthis. The rise of Iran has even pushed the Sunni Arab regimes closer to Israel.
Iranian pragmatists like to boast of their country’s growing influence, even as they claim that its belligerence is a response to Western and Arab pressure. Nevertheless, a nuclear deal, says Hossein Mousavian, a former Iranian diplomat, “will make Iran less aggressive”, and strengthen moderates around President Hassan Rouhani, whose primary concern is to revive the sanctions-crippled economy. Some think Mr Rouhani might even succeed the ailing Ayatollah Khamenei as Supreme Leader. For now, though, Mr Khamenei is adamant that a deal will not lead to a rapprochement with America: “No way!” he told a crowd of students chanting “Death to America” last month.
A nuclear deal might over time help to moderate Iran. But it also might increase the region’s instability. One risk is that Iran will cheat, or that hardliners will test the limits of the commitments. Another is that Mr Obama may be prevented by a sceptical Congress from delivering the relief from sanctions that he has promised, or that his successor will repudiate the deal.
Freed from some sanctions, and perhaps feeling immune from an American (or Israeli) military strike, Iran might be emboldened to extend its reach even further, an option which Mr Khamenei might see as a way to mollify hardliners. Or perhaps America’s allies, feeling estranged, will turn more aggressive. In Israel, there is renewed talk among military officers of bombing Iran’s nuclear sites at the first sign of a violation. John Bolton, a hawkish former Bush administration official, has urged Israel to attack soon. Saudi Arabia and the other Arabs might do more to confront Iran, perhaps by trying to strengthen rebels in Syria that have made recent gains. Saudi Arabia has given notice that it will seek to match whatever uranium-enrichment capability Iran is allowed to keep—legally, of course. It lacks skilled engineers, but it might be able to buy the know-how from, say, its close ally, Pakistan (whose scientists sold centrifuge designs to Iran and Libya). Turkey is unlikely to want to be left behind. So a nuclear deal designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons might instead promote the proliferation of nuclear threshold states. Some argue that America should extend its nuclear umbrella to its Middle Eastern allies to reassure them.
Negotiating the nuclear agreement might be the easy part for Mr Obama. Harder will be the task of selling the deal to sceptics at home and in the region. Harder still might be to manage the political and military fallout.