>>> EMC IR - confirmed no auction held; qtly divs to be paid subj to board decla

EMC IR: No auction held, spoke with Dell for about a year , more serious discussions about 4 months ago, Also, subject to board approval, intention is to pay divs through close (permitted per MA); MA to be filed tomorrow. Re VMW tracker - on call this morning Dell said committed to maintaining value of VMW - able to buy back either VMW or tracker - was a little vague on exact details of how that would work or timing of when buybacks would start after completion of deal. DISCLAIMER

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>>> EDF finalizes sale of wind farm assets in Portugal

EDF finalizes sale of wind farm assets in Portugal

EDF [EPA:EDF], the listed French electricity group, is finalizing the sale of its wind farm assets in Portugal, several sources said.

Up for sale is the 50% stake that EDF has in several wind farms in Portugal, said two sources close to the situation, while the remainder is in the hands of local investors. SocGen is advising on the deal, which, according to one of the sources, is in the final stages.

EDF declined to comment on this process, although it said that in Portugal it has 507 MW of wind farm operations.

An EDF source in Portugal also declined to comment on the sale, but explained that the 507 MW is under EDF’s renewable energy subsidiary EDF Energies Nouvelles Portugal, which is 100% owned by EDF.

Some of the wind farms in this subsidiary are 100% owned by EDF, while others are shared with local partners, said the source. As an example, the source said EDF has a 50% stake in Empreendimentos Eólicos do Vale do Minho, which has close to 300 MW in operation, one of which is the 240 MW Parque Eólico do Alto Minho I, which at the time it was inaugurated was considered the largest wind farm in Europe.

Bidders said to be involved in the process include Talanx [TLX GR] of Germany and Enbridge [TXS:EN; NYSE:ENB] of Canada, a third source close to the process said. An industry source said that a UK-based pension fund that has been analyzing deals in Spain and Portugal is also a candidate. Enbridge did not respond to requests for comment.

Talanx declined to comment on the process, although a company spokesperson said it is interested in investing in the wind sector in both segments of onshore and offshore. Equity investments as well as debt financing are part Talanx’s strategy to grow the wind portfolio, she said.

In the past Talanx’s geographical focus for investment in wind were Germany and France but now the company is looking at all the EU countries, she said. To date Talanx has no investments in the wind sector in Portugal, she added. In Portugal the company invested in water supply company Indaqua.

She noted that Talanx's first investment in offshore wind was the financing of German farm Gode Wind I in September 2015. This project, which is expected to have a total capacity of 330 MW, requires investment above EUR 1bn, according to a company’s presentation. Talanx Asset Management structured the bond and as anchor investor the company subscribed up to EUR 320m, according to a company’s presentation. Talanx has a total of 220m MW in wind, both operational and in development.

In terms of a potential deal value for EDF's assets in Portugal, the industry source said recent deals in Portugal will serve as a precedent. A second industry source said the market value for operational wind parks in Portugal is around EUR 1.66m per MW.

Recent deals in Portugal include one announced two weeks ago where Magnum Capital Industrial Partners sold Iberwind to Cheung Kong Infrastructure (CKI). The deal valued Iberwind, with 31 wind farms in Portugal with a total of around 685 MW, at around EUR 1bn.

In the same week, Enel Green Power announced it sold its Portuguese company Finerge Gestão de Projectos Energéticos to First State Wind Energy Investments. The total amount of the sale is approximately EUR 900m and includes the repayment of loans granted by the partner Finerge. With the planned segregation of assets that Finerge is involved in in Portugal, it will own wind farms with a total installed capacity of 863 MW, equivalent to a net capacity 642 MW, as reported.

(MS) STAN LN : pushing a Tactical Sell

We believe the share price will fall relative to the industry over the next 60 days. The stock has rallied over 20% from the lows of the last three weeks as sentiment has improved on commodity exposed companies, however, we expect to see negative earnings revisions as revenue expectations are tempered, hampering further outperformance from here. We estimate that there is about a 70% to 80% (or "very likely") probability for the scenario. Estimated probabilities are illustrative and assigned subjectively based on our assessment of the likelihood of the scenario.

Reuters - Finnish companies can skip Q1 and Q3 reports from 2016

Finnish companies can skip Q1 and Q3 reports from 2016


Oct 12 Listed Finnish companies may skip reporting their first- and third-quarter results starting next year if they wish, the Helsinki bourse said on Monday.

The change, part of an EU-wide directive change, is aimed at reducing companies' administrative burden. The enabling law is yet to be confirmed by the Finnish parliament but due to come into force in November.
"Mandatory interim reports for three and nine months will be relinquished. Thus, a listed company has a chance to decide its reporting procedure taking into account sector-specific conventions and expectations of shareholders," the bourse said in its letter to companies.
It added that companies may also continue to publish all quarterly reports, or to move into more concise reporting for the first and the third quarter

(Le Monde) What Putin really wants to do in Syria

What Putin really wants to do in Syria

Why the Russian president he reinforces its military presence in Syria? To defend Europe against Daech, as he said recently? To sustain a threatened dictatorship, as Westerners dread? These official objectives illustrate the talent of Russian leaders for "diplomatic marketing" but should not obscure the structural objectives of Russia, less ideological and more focused.
Europeans and Americans are worried about the current Russian military involvement in Syria. A mobile control tower installation and expansion of runways at the military airport of Latakia, landing 200 troops of marines, sending a dozen armored vehicles and attack helicopters, barracks for the development of least 1000 soldiers, all these movements suggest at once direct involvement of Russian troops, an extra boost in the arms race between Sunnis and Shiites and a new food to the conflict which have 250 000 people dead and four million displaced.
These discrete and claimed first initiatives today are primarily designed to ensure a Russian military facility against the advance of the front: "hardware and technical support point" of Tartous, granted to the USSR in 1971 reinvested by Russia from 2009. Materially modest (two floating docks) this military infrastructure is essential for the Black Sea Fleet: it allows the ships to return to Sevastopol and relentlessly so without crossing the straits. Facing the American sixth fleet and whatever the Russian-Turkish relations, Tartous a permanent presence in the eastern Mediterranean accompanied by a military airfield and listening posts as close to the Middle East. The annexation of the Crimea in 2014 to sending troops to Syria today, through the naval agreement with Cyprus in February 2015, Russia pursues a defensive secular goal: preserve its naval power in warm seas .
Russia also wants to maintain an important outlet for its military-industrial complex while its economy is in recession (-4.2% of GDP in the second quarter). Syria is a longstanding customer since 1956 and large ($ billion contracts). On average, exports to Syria are estimated to constitute 10% of Russian defense exports. Russia now wants to avoid a repeat of the 2011 Libyan scenario which saw disappear one of its largest customers, maintain its trade balance but also provide assurance to potential customers in the region: Russia honors its contracts and is an alternative supplier Westerners for sophisticated defense systems. At a time when the Russian defense exports to Iran resumed with the contract on air defense missiles SS-300 PMU-1, this market signal will be well received in the region and beyond.
Intervene in Syria is an internal measure: Moscow seeking as always to offset its difficulties by additional patriotic pride; she hears perhaps, as argued by the historian Thomas Gomart, to set its own 2200 Caucasian jihadists away from Russia. But mostly it continues outside his confessional identity politics and the entire interior: to promote Orthodoxy (religion of 41% of the population) face strong Russian Muslim minority (15%). In Syria, although Moscow supports course the Assad regime but it is mainly of Russian policy ....
Finally, Russia wants to strengthen its alliance with Iran, which plays a central role in ground operations against Daech. She and other international reaps benefits: point passivity of Europeans unable to deal with the causes of migration, give the good antiterrorist role to the General Assembly of the United Nations. Rather than Assad dictatorship weakened, Russia wants to encourage especially the Shiite power (re) -émergente in the region.
She wants Russia a "crusade" against the Sunni jihadism? Probably, but the commitment of hundreds of Russian soldiers, as requested by Damascus will not be able to distinguish the face of tens of thousands of jihadists. Solidify "international league" dictatorships? Perhaps, but the fate of Putin, hugely popular, is not directly linked to Al-Assad. What Russia wants Syria is simply defending its clients, its allies and its facilities in the region. In short, Syria, Russia defends its national interests to military and financial cost rather modest. Vladimir Putin, for the occasion, less than Realpolitiker ideologue.
Cyrille Bret teaches at Sciences-Po Paris, co-directs the geopolitical site EurAsia Foresight 

(Le Monde) Ce que Vladimir Poutine veut vraiment faire en Syrie

Ce que Vladimir Poutine veut vraiment faire en Syrie

Pourquoi le président russe renforce-t-il son dispositif militaire en Syrie ? Pour défendre l’Europe contre Daech, comme il l’a récemment déclaré ? Pour pérenniser une dictature menacée, comme les Occidentaux le redoutent ? Ces objectifs officiels illustrent le talent des dirigeants russes pour le « marketing diplomatique » mais ne doivent pas occulter les objectifs structurels de la Russie, moins idéologiques et plus circonscrits.
Européens et Américains s’inquiètent de l’actuelle implication militaire russe en Syrie. Installation d’une tour de contrôle mobile et agrandissement des pistes de l’aéroport militaire de Lattaquié, débarquement de 200 soldats d’infanterie de marine, envoi d’une dizaine de blindés et d’hélicoptères d’attaque, aménagement de casernements pour au moins 1 000 soldats, tous ces mouvements laissent présager tout à la fois un engagement direct des troupes russes, un élan supplémentaire dans la course aux armements entre sunnites et chiites et un nouvel aliment au conflit ayant fait 250 000 morts et 4 millions de déplacés.
Ces initiatives d’abord discrètes et aujourd’hui revendiquées sont d’abord destinées à garantir une installation militaire russe contre l’avancée du front : le « point d’appui matériel et technique » de Tartous, concédé à l’URSS en 1971 et réinvesti par la Russie à partir de 2009. Matériellement modeste (deux quais flottants), cette infrastructure est militairement essentielle pour la Flotte de la Mer Noire : elle permet à ses vaisseaux de faire relâche sans regagner Sébastopol et donc sans traverser les détroits. Face à la VIème flotte américaine et quelles que soient les relations russo-turques, Tartous assure une présence permanente en Méditerranée orientale assortie d’un aérodrome militaire et de postes d’écoute au plus près du Moyen-Orient. De l’annexion de la Crimée en 2014 à l’envoi de troupes en Syrie aujourd’hui, en passant par l’accord naval avec Chypre en février 2015, la Russie poursuit un objectif défensif séculaire : sauvegarder sa puissance navale dans les mers chaudes.
La Russie veut également maintenir un débouché important pour son complexe militaro-industriel alors que son économie est en récession (-4,2 % de PIB au 2e trimestre). La Syrie est un client historique depuis 1956 et important (contrats en milliards de dollars). En moyenne, les exportations vers la Syrie sont estimées constituer 10 % des exports de défense russes. La Russie veut maintenant éviter la répétition du scénario libyen de 2011 qui avait vu disparaître un de ses plus gros clients, préserver sa balance commerciale mais aussi donner des assurances à ses clients potentiels dans la région : la Russie honore ses contrats et est un fournisseur alternatif aux Occidentaux pour des systèmes de défense sophistiqués. À l’heure où les exportations de défense russes vers l’Iran reprennent avec le contrat sur les missiles de défense antiaérienne SS-300 PMU-1, ce signal de marché sera bien perçu dans la région et au-delà.
Intervenir en Syrie est aussi une mesure d’ordre intérieur : Moscou cherche comme toujours à compenser ses difficultés par un surcroît de fierté patriotique ; elle entend peut-être aussi, comme le soutient l’historien Thomas Gomart, à fixer ses propres 2 200 djihadistes caucasiens loin de la Russie. Mais surtout elle poursuit à l’extérieur sa politique confessionnelle et identitaire toute intérieure : promouvoir l’orthodoxie (religion de 41 % de la population) face à la forte minorité musulmane russe (15 %). En Syrie, Moscou soutient bien sûr le régime Al-Assad mais elle fait surtout de la politique… russe.
Enfin, la Russie veut renforcer son alliance avec la République Islamique d’Iran, qui joue un rôle central dans les opérations au sol contre Daech. Elle engrange ainsi d’autres bénéfices internationaux : pointer la passivité des Européens incapables de traiter les causes des migrations, se donner le beau rôle antiterroriste à l’assemblée générale des Nations Unies. Plutôt qu’une dictature Al-Assad affaiblie, la Russie veut surtout favoriser la puissance chiite (ré)-émergente dans la région.
La Russie veut-elle une « croisade » contre le djihadisme sunnite ? Sans doute, mais l’engagement des quelques centaines de soldats russes, tant demandé par Damas, ne pourra pas faire la différence face aux dizaines de milliers de djihadistes. Solidifier une « ligue internationale » des dictatures ? Peut-être, mais le destin de Poutine, immensément populaire, n’est pas directement lié à celui d’Al-Assad. Ce que la Russie veut faire en Syrie, c’est tout simplement défendre ses clients, de ses alliés et de ses installations dans la région. En somme, en Syrie, la Russie défend ses intérêts nationaux à un coût militaire et financier somme toute modeste. Vladimir Poutine est, pour l’occasion, moins idéologue que Realpolitiker.
Cyrille Bret enseigne à Sciences-Po Paris, codirige le site de géopolitique EurAsia Prospective

(CS) Zodiac - initiate with OP - PT €29

Looking beyond the current turbulences
■ We initiate on Zodiac Aerospace with an Outperform rating and a
EUR29 target price. We believe the current challenges offer a good entry
point into a growth story focused on an attractive end market (cabin interiors).
■ Stock down 19% YTD following production issues: Troubles started to
emerge in the seats business in 2014, with delays in deliveries and failed
certifications, culminating in a FY14/15 sales announcement that included a
profit warning of a 40% drop in operating income. We believe the root cause
was a loss of operational control after a period of strong growth (revenues
rose 2.3x from 2009/10 levels).
■ The business model does not appear to be broken: The difficulties in the
seats business have negative financial and commercial consequences that
cannot be underestimated. But we believe that Zodiac will emerge stronger
from what we view as a growth crisis. Management is implementing remedial
structural changes across the group, which we think should lead to a full
industrial and financial recovery by end-FY2016/17.
■ Catalysts: FY14/15 results on 24 November, Q1 sales on 15 December.
■ Valuation: Zodiac's operating profit of EUR500-600m, excluding the seats'
troubles, should rise to c.EUR1bn by 2020E, which we believe is not priced
in. The market appears to be pricing in the company's current challenges, a
perceived lack of visibility and a loss of credibility after three consecutive
profit warnings. We arrive at a target price of EUR29, based on a 2017E/18E
SOTP valuation and earnings returning to normalised levels. At our TP,
Zodiac would trade on an adjusted EV/EBIT multiple of 9.9x 2017/18, at a
15% discount to its historical average of 11.8x. On Credit Suisse HOLT®,
the warranted price is EUR33 and the stock reads as Contrarian.