What Putin really wants to do in Syria
Why the Russian president he reinforces its military presence in Syria? To defend Europe against Daech, as he said recently? To sustain a threatened dictatorship, as Westerners dread? These official objectives illustrate the talent of Russian leaders for "diplomatic marketing" but should not obscure the structural objectives of Russia, less ideological and more focused.
Europeans and Americans are worried about the current Russian military involvement in Syria. A mobile control tower installation and expansion of runways at the military airport of Latakia, landing 200 troops of marines, sending a dozen armored vehicles and attack helicopters, barracks for the development of least 1000 soldiers, all these movements suggest at once direct involvement of Russian troops, an extra boost in the arms race between Sunnis and Shiites and a new food to the conflict which have 250 000 people dead and four million displaced.
These discrete and claimed first initiatives today are primarily designed to ensure a Russian military facility against the advance of the front: "hardware and technical support point" of Tartous, granted to the USSR in 1971 reinvested by Russia from 2009. Materially modest (two floating docks) this military infrastructure is essential for the Black Sea Fleet: it allows the ships to return to Sevastopol and relentlessly so without crossing the straits. Facing the American sixth fleet and whatever the Russian-Turkish relations, Tartous a permanent presence in the eastern Mediterranean accompanied by a military airfield and listening posts as close to the Middle East. The annexation of the Crimea in 2014 to sending troops to Syria today, through the naval agreement with Cyprus in February 2015, Russia pursues a defensive secular goal: preserve its naval power in warm seas .
Russia also wants to maintain an important outlet for its military-industrial complex while its economy is in recession (-4.2% of GDP in the second quarter). Syria is a longstanding customer since 1956 and large ($ billion contracts). On average, exports to Syria are estimated to constitute 10% of Russian defense exports. Russia now wants to avoid a repeat of the 2011 Libyan scenario which saw disappear one of its largest customers, maintain its trade balance but also provide assurance to potential customers in the region: Russia honors its contracts and is an alternative supplier Westerners for sophisticated defense systems. At a time when the Russian defense exports to Iran resumed with the contract on air defense missiles SS-300 PMU-1, this market signal will be well received in the region and beyond.
Intervene in Syria is an internal measure: Moscow seeking as always to offset its difficulties by additional patriotic pride; she hears perhaps, as argued by the historian Thomas Gomart, to set its own 2200 Caucasian jihadists away from Russia. But mostly it continues outside his confessional identity politics and the entire interior: to promote Orthodoxy (religion of 41% of the population) face strong Russian Muslim minority (15%). In Syria, although Moscow supports course the Assad regime but it is mainly of Russian policy ....
Finally, Russia wants to strengthen its alliance with Iran, which plays a central role in ground operations against Daech. She and other international reaps benefits: point passivity of Europeans unable to deal with the causes of migration, give the good antiterrorist role to the General Assembly of the United Nations. Rather than Assad dictatorship weakened, Russia wants to encourage especially the Shiite power (re) -émergente in the region.
She wants Russia a "crusade" against the Sunni jihadism? Probably, but the commitment of hundreds of Russian soldiers, as requested by Damascus will not be able to distinguish the face of tens of thousands of jihadists. Solidify "international league" dictatorships? Perhaps, but the fate of Putin, hugely popular, is not directly linked to Al-Assad. What Russia wants Syria is simply defending its clients, its allies and its facilities in the region. In short, Syria, Russia defends its national interests to military and financial cost rather modest. Vladimir Putin, for the occasion, less than Realpolitiker ideologue.
Cyrille Bret teaches at Sciences-Po Paris, co-directs the geopolitical site EurAsia Foresight