>>> US Gapping down

Gapping down
In reaction to disappointing earnings/guidance
:
  • CTB -4.9%, FDC -3.8%, MNOV -3.3%, GRVY -2.3%, ARLP -1.7%, HSBC -1.3%
M&A news:
  • LEN -4.5% (CalAtlantic Group (CAA) and Lennar (LEN) announce merger (80% stock and 20% cash), implied value of the stock consideration is $51.34 per share)
Other news:
  • PSTI -14.2% (launches public offering of common stock on TASE)
  • MRK -4.4% (withdrew its European application for KEYTRUDA)
  • MNOV -3.3% (presents additional 'positive' top-line results from the SPRINT-MS Phase 2b Trial of MN-166 in progressive multiple sclerosis)
  • LJPC -2.8% (files for $150 mln mixed securities shelf offering)
  • CLSN -2.6% (continued weakness)
Analyst comments:
  • ACHC -5.3% (downgraded to Neutral from Buy at Mizuho)
  • AMD -3.9% (downgraded to Underweight from Equal-Weight at Morgan Stanley)
  • UAA -3.4% (downgraded to Underperform from Neutral at BofA/Merrill)
  • CENX -3.2% (downgraded to Neutral from Overweight at JP Morgan)
  • GM -2.8% (downgraded to Sell from Neutral at Goldman)
  • M -2.5% (downgraded to Sell from Neutral at Citigroup)
  • JCP -1.3% (downgraded to Sell from Neutral at Citigroup)

Recode.net : Amazon has slashed seller fees to try to improve its grocery select

Amazon has slashed seller fees to try to improve its grocery selection online
The economics of selling low-priced packaged goods online are tough.

Amazon cemented its long-term interest in the grocery industry when it spent nearly $14 billion to acquire Whole Foods earlier this year. Now it’s making a subtler move aimed at improving its own grocery selection online.

Amazon recently told businesses that sell non-perishable grocery items on Amazon.com that it was lowering the fee it charges them on items priced at $15 or less. Amazon previously charged 15 percent on all grocery items, but will now charge only 8 percent on the lower-priced goods for at least the next year.

“To help you list more products and keep prices competitive, we are offering you a limited-time referral fee discount on Grocery products,” the email said, according to a copy forwarded to Recode. “This fee promotion starts at 12:00 a.m. October 15, 2017 (PST), and will run through 11:59 p.m. October 14, 2018 (PST).”

The move could be looked at as a competition-focused one: While Walmart also charges 15 percent across the board for grocery items sold through its online marketplace, its subsidiary Jet.com charges only 10 percent for most non-gourmet packaged foods, according to its website.

Perhaps more importantly, though, the fee reduction also seems like an acknowledgement that it’s difficult for businesses to make a reasonable profit when selling some inexpensive groceries online.

Take, for example, a business that wants to sell a 40-ounce jar of peanut butter that retails for $5.49. The easiest way to make the product eligible for the Prime shipping program is to store it in an Amazon warehouse under its Fulfilled By Amazon — or FBA — program.

But the FBA storage-and-shipping fee alone for this one jar would be about $4.44 — in part because of its weight — and that’s before you factor in the cost for the seller to make or acquire the product as well as Amazon’s 15 percent commission under the previous fee structure. The economics don’t really work.

As a result, sellers and grocery brands have had to come up with alternatives to sell these lower-priced grocery staples through Amazon. One popular option is selling a certain product in a more-expensive bulk pack, as you might find in a Costco or BJ’s Wholesale Club.

Others sell their items at a wholesale price to Amazon, which then funnels the low-priced goods into membership programs such as Prime Pantry or Amazon Fresh.

The Prime Pantry program lets Prime members fill a box full of grocery items but it costs $5.99 per box for shipping. Amazon also sells low-priced grocery items through Amazon Fresh, but that grocery program costs $14.99 a month in addition to the regular $99-a-year Prime membership fee.

Still, Amazon recognizes that there are plenty of Amazon customers that will never pay for either program and it still wants those people to think of Amazon as a grocery destination. The problem is it’ll never win that perception by only selling bulk-size packs.

That’s the context that likely played a big part in Amazon’s decision to lower its fee. (Amazon declined to comment.) The question is whether the reduction is a real solution to the problem.

David Rekuc, the marketing directing for the e-commerce consultancy Ripen eCommerce, is skeptical that it is. While he believes there are some types of grocery items that might become profitable with the fee reduction, Rekuc says FBA fees or the cost for a seller to ship the item themselves still make it difficult to profitably sell a single unit of a low-priced grocery item — despite the lower commission.

“It’s nice to see and it may move the needle a little bit,” he said of the fee discount, “but it won’t fundamentally change [Amazon’s] penetration in grocery.”

>>> MAKOR - Share Class Report

 

October 30, 2017

 

MAKOR - Share Class Report

 

Good morning, 

 

 

Please find attached our latest weekly share class report.

 

 

- Last week, we gained 24 bps on our virtual portfolio, bringing total performance to +48bps for October 2017

 

- We are closing today our position in + VOW3 / -VOW

 

o Position is up close to 250 bps over the past week, due to strong markets (VOW3 quicker than VOW to react for liquidity reasons)

 

- We are also closing our position in the -BMW3 / + BMW. Spread made 160bps  last week, exactly for the same reasons as above …

 

- We are also closing some – RDSA / + RDSB here. Spread is back to 97.7% (2.3% discount of RDSA vs B). Considering possible changes in Dutch withholding taxes, we adopt a slightly more cautious positioning (downsizing a little).

 

 

We are now monitoring the -VOW3 / +VOW (so opposite trade as what we had), if discount of VOW3 tightens further (say 1% to discount)

 

 

Have a great start of the week !

 

 

 

  

  ​     ​     ​

 

Makor Capital

 

11 Menachem Begin St., 26th FL

Ramat Gan 52681
ISRAEL
Tel         +972 3 5453 762

Fax        +972 3 7162 680

 

   

Research Disclaimer

 

This publication has been prepared by Makor Capital Limited (“Makor Capital”) and is intended for professional or qualified investors only. Makor Securities London Ltd (“Makor Securities”)is distributing this material to its clients who are Eligible Counterparties or Professional Clients under FCA Rules. It may also be disseminated to persons who are Investment Professionals within the meaning of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion Order 2005).  In the United States, Makor Capital only distributes this material to major US institutional investors (as that term is defined in Rule 15a-6 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934) and to SEC-registered broker-dealers or  banks acting in a broker–dealer capacity. This material is not intended for distribution to any other persons and should not be redistributed.  If you do not fall into any of these categories you should disregard it.

 

This material is a marketing communication.  It is not investment research and has not been prepared in accordance with legal requirements designed to promote the independence of investment research. It is not subject to any prohibition on dealing ahead of the dissemination of investment research under U.K. law. This material is not a research report and is not intended to be a research report as defined under U.S. securities laws and regulations.  This material is not intended to provide information reasonably sufficient upon which to base any investment decision.   

 

This material does not take into account the particular investment objectives, financial situation or needs of individual clients or other recipients. Before acting on this material, clients and other recipients should consider whether it is suitable for their particular circumstances and, if necessary, seek professional advice. 

 

This material should not be construed in any circumstances as an offer to sell or solicitation of any offer to buy any security or other financial instrument, nor shall it, or the fact of its distribution, form the basis of, or be relied upon in connection with, any contract relating to such action. 

 

In the United States, Makor Capital does not offer securities services to U.S. persons except pursuant to SEC Rule 15a-6 only to major US institutional investors and SEC registered broker-dealers or  banks acting in a broker–dealer capacity. Transactions in the United States must be effected through the U.S. broker-dealer, Oscar Gruss & Son Incorporated. Oscar Gruss & Son has not prepared, reviewed or distributed this material.

 

Some of this material is produced by providers which Makor Securities believes to be reliable, but Makor Securities does not warrant or represent (expressly or impliedly) that it is accurate, complete, not misleading or as to its fitness for the purpose intended and it should not be relied upon as such. 

Opinions expressed will be the current opinions of those producing this material as of the date appearing on this material only. We expect those producing the material in  this publication to update it on a timely basis but can give no undertaking that they will do so and regulatory compliance or other reasons may prevent  them from doing so (or us from disseminating updated material).  

 

Members and employees of Makor Securities London Ltd, employees of Makor Capital, Makor Capital Markets may from time to time have long or short positions in securities, warrants, futures, options, derivatives or other financial instruments referred to in this material. For Makor Securities, this information is set out in our Conflicts of Interest Policy which is available on request.  Policies for the production of research from other research providers are available on request.  Unless otherwise stated, share prices provided within this material are as at the close of business on the day prior to the date of the material.

 

Neither the whole nor any part of this material may be duplicated in any form or by any means. Neither should any of this material be redistributed or disclosed to anyone without prior consent. This material is issued for general information and discussion purposes only. None of  Makor Securities, Makor Capital, Makor Capital Markets accepts  liability whatsoever for any direct, indirect or consequential loss or damage of any kind arising out of the use of all or any of this material. 

 

The services, securities and investments discussed in this material may not be available to, nor are suitable for all investors. Investors should make their own investment decisions based upon their own financial objectives and financial resources and it should be noted that investment involves risk, including the risk of capital loss. Past performance is no guide to future performance. In relation to securities denominated in foreign currency, movements in exchange rates will have an effect on the value, either favourable or unfavourable.

 

All investors. Investors should make their own investment decisions based upon their own financial objectives and financial resources and it should be noted that investment involves risk, including the risk of capital loss. Past performance is no guide to future performance. In relation to securities denominated in foreign currency, movements in exchange rates will have an effect on the value, either favourable or unfavourable.

 

Entities

 

Makor Securities London Ltd is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct

Authority (FCA registration number 625054) 

 

Makor Capital, company number 514456466, is incorporated in Israel and is a 100% held

subsidiary of Makor Holdings Pte Ltd incorporated in Singapore. 

 

Makor Capital Markets SA, company number CH-660.2.999.011-0 is incorporated in Switzerland

and is also a 100% held subsidiary of Makor Holdings Pte Ltd.

 

 


Having trouble viewing this email? Click here


This email was sent to mhalimi@makor-capital.com by Research@Makor-Capital.com

Update Profile/Email Address | Unsubscribe | Report abuse


 

Smoove email marketing

 

(Citi) Consumer : Upgrading to Overweight

* Upping the Retailing industry group to an Overweight stance and trimming Consumer Durables & Apparel to Underweight appears to have confused some investors given similar end market business drivers. The October 13th SIGN (Sector & Industry Group Navigator) report highlighted several changes in strategic stances including a divergence in the Consumer Discretionary sector with which clients have struggled since the shifts were perceived as contradictory. However, bottom-up analysis and constituency may be the key missing ingredients toward understanding the moves.

* The Retailing group's current market cap essentially is weighted to half ecommerce now versus traditional brick and mortar operators. For instance, the world's largest etailer accounts for more than a third of the S&P 500 industry group's constituency, while the best-known independent media streaming company comprises another 7%, and the biggest online travel company attains roughly 8%. Earnings estimate revision momentum also is supportive of a more positive view as are proprietary valuation metrics.

* The Durables & Apparel group is not as intriguing when considering falling revisions and unattractive valuation criteria. Homebuilders in particular look poised to underperform and pricing pressure remains for apparel due in part to distribution channel changes. In addition, share price momentum data and beta levels are different in this segment.

* Important business drivers such as more jobs and likely wage increases should sustain consumption activity not to mention greater wealth as net worth has climbed to new records, dragged higher by appreciating securities holdings plus a sharp recovery in home prices. Improving consumer fundamentals should not be construed as a "carte blanche" to buy everything that has exposure to some newfound purchasing power. Indeed, worry about Autos still seems appropriate beyond a near-term hurricane-related sales bounce.

* Consumer Staples have undergone substantive profitability weakening for 20 years as big box discounters began the trend that Internet retailers have jumped on more recently. The pressure of pricing has been in place for a good while and, at the same time, advertising expenditures to generate plus sustain brand awareness have continued on. Hence, lower relative valuation simply reflects poorer corporate profit margins.

WSJ : CVS Bid for Aetna Followed a Long Hunt

CVS Bid for Aetna Followed a Long Hunt
The drugstore giant’s monthslong search for a deal partner included informal talks with Anthem and UnitedHealth

CVS Health Corp.’s CVS -5.89% bid for Aetna Inc. AET -3.07% is the culmination of a wide-ranging hunt by the drugstore giant for a deal partner, highlighting a broader effort among health-care companies to find new avenues of growth by combining diverse businesses under one roof.

The Woonsocket, R.I., company has been examining different deal possibilities for about six months, according to people familiar with the matter. CVS approached Anthem Inc. ANTM 2.14% about potentially buying the health insurer, and discussed a combination with UnitedHealth Group Inc., UNH 1.65% the people said. In both cases, the talks were preliminary and informal.

CVS is now focused on sealing a deal with Aetna, though the hurdles to an agreement are formidable and, if there is one, it may not come until closer to year-end, the people said.

Big companies are rushing to integrate different lines of health-care businesses, aiming to squeeze out costs and use their bulk to bolster leverage with suppliers.

For CVS, a deal would be a bulwark against the threat of competition from Amazon.com Inc., which is exploring a move into the pharmacy business.

CVS already manages pharmacy benefits for employers and insurers, while also selling medicines through its own drugstores. Adding Aetna will expand its reach on the health-care payer side, giving it oversight over all aspects of health-care spending as a medical insurer itself. It will likely accelerate CVS’s existing efforts to remake its stores into health centers more akin to clinics, pushing it deeper into the health-care provider space. It will also lock in Aetna’s 22 million members as customers.

“You have the basis for a less expensive delivery system, at places where employees actually go,” said Robert Galvin, chief executive of Equity Healthcare, which negotiates contracts with health insurers on behalf of companies owned by big private-equity firms, including Blackstone Group , where he is an operating partner. “The diligence is going to be, what does this mean to an employer? Will it lower costs and improve care?”

UnitedHealth is already far down the road of integration. It is the parent of the largest U.S. health insurer and a major pharmacy-benefit manager, as well as a rapidly growing stable of doctor practices and outpatient surgery centers. Humana Inc., which owns its own pharmacy-benefit manager, has talked about going deeper into providing health care to members in their homes. Anthem, which sold off its PBM in 2009, now plans to start a new one in 2020.

For insurers, the tack is partly a reaction to the death of a previous round of deals; Anthem’s acquisition of rival Cigna Corp. and Aetna’s effort to buy Humana both ran aground earlier this year after losing antitrust cases. Cross-industry combinations like a CVS-Aetna deal would likely avoid much of that pushback because they are far more vertical than the insurer-insurer mergers would have been. Analysts said the two companies’ overlap is limited, largely coming in Medicare drug plans.

The insurance companies are facing off against pharmaceutical makers and hospital systems, which themselves have been merging and acquiring doctors, strengthening their hand in pricing negotiations and improving their ability to capture lucrative services. Insurers want to try to move care such as the infusion of specialty drugs away from hospitals and into other settings where costs can be far lower—in CVS’s case, perhaps eventually a MinuteClinic or home-based offering.


“Employers are looking for more comprehensive solutions to solve the big health-care management challenges,” said Nadina J. Rosier, a practice leader at Willis Towers Watson. They also want “a more seamless experience for the member.”


During an earnings call in May, Aetna CEO Mark T. Bertolini said that Aetna and CVS, which already have a contract for pharmacy-benefit services, were “trying to fundamentally rethink how we could work closer together, both on just the pharmacy side but also on the local care delivery that could go on in the community, given that CVS has 9,000 stores within 3 miles of 80% of the American public.”

He said Aetna believed “we need to get closer to home and closer to the community to help people…versus waiting for them to show up maybe once a year at the doctor to get information about how they’re doing.”


But the bottom-line question will be whether the bulked-up CVS can offer better economics than existing insurers and PBMs. “It’ll all depend on the math,” said Jim Winkler, a senior vice president at Aon PLC. “It will depend on the terms of the deal you can put in front of an employer and how transparent as an entity you are willing to be.”

Integration also carries significant risks, analysts say.

A deal with Aetna would be large—the insurer has a market value of nearly $60 billion—and CVS would need to pay for it largely with stock, and a recent decline in the drugstore owner’s shares makes that more expensive. The valuation gap between the two companies has narrowed significantly since they began talking and at about $70 billion, CVS market capitalization is currently less than $15 billion above Aetna’s.

Should the two companies agree to a deal, the new entity is expected to be run by CVS Chief Executive Larry Merlo, the people said.

Pulling together such large entities involves huge operational challenges, with big employers and other clients reluctant to subject patients to disruption.

Also, there is friction as companies seek to expand their role in the health-care food chain. In the case of CVS, it is seeking to own a company that competes against health insurers that it wants as clients. Its clinics may seek to draw patients away from hospital systems that prescribe the drugs its stores sell, and that Aetna needs in its contracted networks to serve members.

For insurers considering using CVS as a pharmacy-benefit manager, ownership of Aetna would be “problematic, there’s no question of that,” said Vicky Gregg, a former health-insurance CEO who is now a partner in a health-focused private-equity firm. “You definitely do get a competitive disadvantage, because they are always going to price more favorably to themselves.” Also, insurers are nervous about sharing detailed data with a competitor, she said.

The most immediate question for CVS on that front will be its deal to service Anthem’s new PBM. In a statement, the insurer said that during its evaluation process, “we considered various strategic possibilities and prioritized flexibility in developing our contract to maintain the ability to adapt to a changing and dynamic marketplace if appropriate.”