Rosneft billions fed Kremlin-backed money laundering network
FT investigation shows the state oil group’s hard currency was at heart of Russia’s efforts to circumvent sanctions
Billions of dollars of Rosneft’s foreign earnings were funnelled through a Kremlin-backed money-laundering network, putting the state oil group at the heart of Russia’s efforts to circumvent sanctions and supply its war in Ukraine.
A vast leak from inside A7, a Moscow-backed fintech company, shows that Rosneft-connected traders supplied more than $2bn in vital hard currency to the group, which has paid for battlefield supplies and other imports to Russia.
The documents expose the inner workings of the A7 payment network, which was founded by fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor with extensive Russian state backing. They also explain how Moscow is able to access the currencies needed to participate in the world economy.
A7 aims to enable clients in Russia to make international payments despite being shut out of the Swift system. The company serves small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as vast conglomerates owned by close associates of President Vladimir Putin.
Rosneft, which was only placed under full US sanctions in October 2025, plays a key role in this process by providing the hard currencies that can be spent by A7 outside the country.
The energy group, Russia’s largest oil producer and exporter, is controlled by the state and led by Igor Sechin, one of the country’s most powerful people and a confidant of Putin.
Using forged documents, A7 set up front companies in the names of seemingly unconnected people in other jurisdictions. It then used these entities to make international payments within Swift on behalf of Russian buyers.
The FT has previously identified about 200 such front companies in the document leak, which principally covers a period from late 2024 to August 2025.
A7 filled the bank accounts of these entities by hoovering up export earnings denominated in United Arab Emirates dirhams from 16 Rosneft-linked companies.
This so-called “Coral network” is named after Coral Energy, a now-sanctioned company that trades under the name 2Rivers. Coral Energy was led by Etibar Eyyub and Tahir Garayev, two sanctioned Azerbaijani businessmen.
One A7 staff member referred to Coral as “a Rosneft trader from whom we source renminbi”.
The scale of the Coral companies’ activity as oil traders for Rosneft has previously been exposed by the FT, which identified that entities shipping Russian oil were secretly all sharing a single corporate email server.
Obtaining hard currency for international purchases is a major problem for A7, which tasks dozens of staff with hunting for Russian companies willing to sell their export earnings.
The Coral companies and the other exporters help solve this by depositing their foreign-currency earnings into the bank accounts of the front entities. In return, they are paid inside Russia, mostly via Promsvyazbank, for the currency with roubles.
Each of the 138 dirham transfers from Rosneft-linked oil traders to A7 companies in Dubai was matched by a rouble payment to bank accounts held by Hurus Trade, one of the Coral entities.
These foreign currency payments into the front companies’ bank accounts could then be used by A7 to settle bills on behalf of its customers inside Russia.
A7 took a creative approach to the documentation supporting the transfers, falsifying paperwork to avoid suspicion. The work, which made up a significant part of A7’s daily operations, was known internally as “legend creation”.
In invoices for Hurus, an Algerian port was listed as the “delivery point”, while “fuel oil/mazut” or “grain” were cited as the goods for which the company was allegedly being paid.
While most of the payments were listed as coming from the front entities, there was a transfer of more than 39.9mn dirhams ($10.8mn) described in A7’s ledgers as coming from Coral in August 2025 — a transaction matched by an equivalent transfer in roubles to Hurus.
By that time, both the UK and the EU had sanctioned Coral, which “enables shipments and export of Russian oil, notably from Rosneft”, according to the EU regulation.
Coral’s role in the oil system was known to ordinary A7 staff. In a message exchange, one employee described it as making “30 payments of $20mn-$50mn a day” and planning “to trade $20mn in crypto a day”.
A top A7 manager, Stanislav Lazarev, passed on to colleagues in an internal chat that Rosneft itself was also going to release “$12bn in renminbi” from its own deposits.
In summer 2025, A7 prepared a framework document for a cross-border payments infrastructure plan, which it described as the group’s main product.
The target daily capacity for payments out of Russia was $500mn, with the bulk held in Chinese renminbi. The rest would be in US dollars, euros and dirhams.
According to the document, A7 aimed to maintain a liquidity buffer of at least 20 per cent more foreign currency than it needed, meaning it would not have to race to meet payments.
A7 was heavily reliant on Rosneft’s hard currency. When writing about their operations for June 2025, one A7 manager noted: “Almost the entire volume was and is from Coral (they have several legal entities).”
Two-thirds of the foreign exchange reserves sourced that month came from the Coral companies, according to the leaked files.
While the Rosneft traders were among A7’s largest suppliers of hard currency, they were not the only ones. Several grain traders supplied foreign exchange to A7.
Managers at A7 also repeatedly mention a Dubai-registered company that they call “a trader for Sibur”, Russia’s biggest petrochemicals group. Overall, A7 received at least $22mn in dirhams from this source.
Another source was Evraz, one of Russia’s leading steel and mining groups. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Evraz’s Russian business was separated from its UK parent, in which Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich held the majority stake.
“Sasha [an A7 manager] is suggesting that I take $7mn of Evraz’s earnings to Dubai . . . you’re OK with it?” one of the managers asked Shor, the A7 founder, in a private message.
Conversations between A7 managers also show that they were preparing for a meeting with representatives of Gazprom, the Russian oil and gas group, and discussing the terms of buying export earnings from it.
Such arrangements, while essential to A7, have also benefited the exporters. Rosneft, for instance, has struggled to repatriate its foreign-currency earnings after western sanctions severely restricted most Russian banks’ access to the dollar- and euro-based financial system.
Sanctions directly imposed on the Russian oil company by the US Treasury in October 2025 added another hurdle.
In a sign of the challenges facing Russian exporters in foreign exchange, the documents show that Shor personally met “Coral’s representatives”, whom he said had been “settling transactions in USDT” — a dollar-pegged crypto stablecoin.
Russian authorities have repeatedly cited cross-border payments as one of the key risks facing the economy, which has been strained and isolated by the country’s more than four-year full-scale war with Ukraine.
While A7 and smaller similar platforms have helped keep payments flowing, the elaborate infrastructure required — involving hundreds of employees and companies around the world — has come at a huge cost to businesses.
Explaining Rosneft’s weaker financial performance in 2025, Sechin blamed the lack of a sanctions-resistant system for cross-border payments, saying the situation had led to a “manyfold increase in total payment and conversion costs” compared with before the war.
Coral Energy, now 2Rivers, said it “ceased all trading and commercial activity following the imposition of UK sanctions in December 2024”.
The company denied any relationship with the entities known collectively as the Coral network. It told the FT: “We have no involvement in and no knowledge of the transactions, entities, or conduct you describe.”
“We did not deposit or receive hard currency, roubles, or any other funds through the arrangements you describe,” it said, adding that it had not met or corresponded with Shor, nor settled transactions in crypto.
Evraz Russia declined to comment. The UK-incorporated Evraz said it has been “unable to carry out any operational activity since 2022” due to sanctions.
Rosneft, Sibur and Gazprom did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
