There are some signs of trouble in emerging markets. And the money at risk now is bigger than ever. The yield spread between high grade emerging markets and US AAA-rated corporate debt has jumped, almost doubling in less than three weeks to the highest level since mid-2012.

MSCI Emerging Markets Index and Yield Spread between High Grade Emerging Markets and US AAA Corporates: 14 March 2003 – Today. Source: US Federal Reserve.
This means that the best credit names in emerging markets have to pay a bigger premium over their US counterparts to get funding. When this spread spikes up and continues above its 200-day moving average for a sustained period of time, it is typically a bad sign for equity valuations in emerging markets, as shown in the graph above. One swallow does not a summer make, but it is worthwhile keeping an eye on this indicator.
As yields go up the value of these emerging market bonds goes down, resulting in losses for the investors holding them. The surge of the US dollar in recent months could magnify these losses: if the bonds are denominated in local currency they will be worth a lot less to US investors; otherwise, the borrowers will now have to work a lot harder to repay those US dollar debts, increasing their credit risk. Any losses could end up being very significant this time around, as demand for emerging markets bonds has literally exploded in recent years.

Average Annual Gross Debt Issuance ($ billions, percent): 2000 – Today. Source: Dealogic, US Treasury. Note: Data include private placements and publicly-issued bonds. 2014 data are through August 2014 and annualized.
As the graph above shows, the issuance of emerging market corporate debt has risen sharply since the depths of the 2008-09 financial crisis.These volumes are very large indeed, and now account for non-trivial portions of investors’ and pension funds’ portfolios worldwide.
As a result, emerging markets corporations are now leveraged to the hilt, easily exceeding the 2008 highs by almost a multiple to EBITDA. And why not? With foreign investors desperate for yield as a result of all the stimulus and money printing by their central banks, they were only too happy to oblige. And they were not alone. Governments in these countries were also busy doing some borrowing of their own, as their domestic capital markets deepened.
[..] foreign investors have also piled into locally denominated bonds of emerging markets governments. Countries like Peru and Latvia now have over 50% foreign ownership of their bonds. [..] But there are big speculative reasons behind the recent money flows going into these countries – which could reverse very quickly should the tide turn. [..]
If investors end up rushing for the emerging markets exit for whatever reason, with this unprecedented level of exposure they might be bringing home much more than a bruised ego and an empty wallet. For one, European banks are hugely exposed to emerging markets. Any impairment to their books would likely make any new lending even more difficult, at a time when there is already a dearth of non-government credit in Europe.
And if emerging economies falter, where will the growth needed to repair Western government and private balance sheets come from? It used to be said that when the US economy sneezes the rest of the world catches a cold. Now it seems all we need is a hiccup in emerging markets.
The US Federal Reserve has pulled the trigger. Emerging markets must now brace for their ordeal by fire. They have collectively borrowed $5.7 trillion in US dollars, a currency they cannot print and do not control. This hard-currency debt has tripled in a decade, split between $3.1 trillion in bank loans and $2.6 trillion in bonds. It is comparable in scale and ratio-terms to any of the biggest cross-border lending sprees of the past two centuries.
Much of the debt was taken out at real interest rates of 1% on the implicit assumption that the Fed would continue to flood the world with liquidity for years to come. The borrowers are “short dollars”, in trading parlance. They now face the margin call from Hell as the global monetary hegemon pivots. The Fed dashed all lingering hopes for leniency on Wednesday. The pledge to keep uber-stimulus for a “considerable time” has gone, and so has the market’s security blanket, or the Fed Put as it is called. Such tweaks of language have multiplied potency in a world of zero rates.
Officials from the BIS say privately that developing countries may be just as vulnerable to a dollar shock as they were in the Fed tightening cycle of the late 1990s, which culminated in Russia’s default and the East Asia Crisis. The difference this time is that emerging markets have grown to be half the world economy.Their aggregate debt levels have reached a record 175% of GDP, up 30 percentage points since 2009.
Most have already picked the low-hanging fruit of catch-up growth, and hit structural buffers. The second assumption was that China would continue to drive a commodity supercycle even after Premier Li Keqiang vowed to overthrow his country’s obsolete, 30-year model of industrial hyper-growth, and wean the economy off $26 trillion of credit leverage before it is too late. [..]
Stress is spreading beyond Russia, Nigeria, Venezuela and other petro-states to the rest of the emerging market nexus, as might be expected since this is a story of evaporating dollar liquidity as well as a US shale supply-glut.
[..[ the Turkish lira has fallen 12% since the end of November. The Borsa Istanbul 100 index is down 20% in dollar terms. Indonesia had to intervene on Wednesday to defend the rupiah. Brazil’s real has fallen to a 10-year low against the dollar, as has the index of emerging market currencies. Sao Paolo’s Bovespa index is down 23% in dollars in 3 weeks. The slide can be self-feeding. Funds are forced to sell holdings if investors take fright and ask for their money back, shedding the good with the bad. Pimco’s Emerging Market Corporate Bond Fund bled $237m in November, and the pain is unlikely to stop as clients discover that 24% of its portfolio is in Russia.
One might rail against the injustice of indiscriminate selling. Such are the intertwined destinies of countries that have nothing in common. The Fed has already slashed its bond purchases to zero, withdrawing $85bn of net stimulus each month. It is clearly itching to raise rates for the first time in seven years. This is the reason why the dollar index has jumped 12% since May, smashing through its 30-year downtrend line, a “seismic change” in the words of HSBC. [..]
World finance is rotating on its axis, says Stephen Jen, from SLJ Macro Partners. The stronger the US boom, the worse it will be for those countries on the wrong side of the dollar.
“Emerging market currencies could melt down. There have been way too many cumulative capital flows into these markets in the past decade. Nothing they can do will stop potential outflows, as long as the US economy recovers.
Will this trend lead to a 1997-1998-like crisis? I am starting to think that this is extremely probable for 2015,” he said.
This time the threat does not come from insolvent states. They have learned the lesson of the late 1990s. Few have dollar debts. But their companies and banks most certainly do, some 70% of GDP in Russia, for example. This amounts to much the same thing in macro-economic terms. Private debt morphs into state debt since governments cannot allow key pillars of their economies to collapse.
These countries have, of course, built $9 trillion of foreign reserves, often the side-effect of holding down their currencies to gain export share. This certainly provides a buffer. Yet the reserves cannot fruitfully be used in a recessionary crisis because sales of foreign bonds automatically entail monetary tightening. [..]
.. these reserves are a mirage. If you deploy them in such circumstances, you choke your own economy unless you can sterilize the effects. [..]
Investors are counting on the European Central Bank to keep the world supplied with largesse as the Fed pulls back. Yet the ECB could not pick up the baton even if it were to launch a blitz of quantitative easing, and there is no conceivable consensus for action on such a commensurate scale.
The world’s financial system is on a dollar standard, not a euro standard. Global loans are in dollars. The US Treasury bond is the benchmarks for global credit markets, not the German Bund. Contracts and derivatives are priced off dollar instruments. Bank of America says the combined monetary stimulus from Europe and Japan can offset only 30% of the lost stimulus from the US.

