FT : Beware the Fed on the ides of September

Beware the Fed on the ides of September

Now that the major downside risks from Greece, China and Iran seem to be under control, investors are redirecting their attention to a much more familiar question: will the Fed impart a nasty shock to US monetary policy before the end of the year? The markets have largely ignored the Fed’s machinations since the taper tantrum in the summer of 2013, but they can do so no longer.

Janet Yellen’s testimony to Congress last week clearly signaled that the FOMC is almost ready to announce lift-off in US rates. The ides of September (or, strictly, three days later, at the FOMC meeting on 16 September) now seems likely to be the fateful date that markets have dreaded for years.
Although economic forecasters are expecting a September lift off, this starting date is still not fully priced into Fed funds futures (see Tim Duy.) What really matters, however, is whether the Fed then embarks on a medium term tightening path that persistently surprises the markets in a hawkish direction.
That is what has happened in each of the three previous tightening cycles, which were periods when fixed income traders consistently lost money by taking long positions at the front end of the yield curve. The current market pricing for forward short rates, which remains far below the Fed’s “dots” for the next three years, suggests that there is a strong possibility that this accident could repeat itself in the coming tightening cycle.

For about three decades, it has generally paid for traders to assume that the Fed will deliver a path for short rates that is lower than that built into the forward curve for interest rates at any given time. Maybe that partly reflects the fact that a risk premium is normally priced into forward interest rate curves. But, in addition, interest rates have been on a long run downtrend, with the Fed repeatedly choosing to deliver easier monetary policy than the market has expected. “Never underestimate the dovishness of the Fed” has usually been a profitable motto for traders.
There have only been a few brief exceptions to this rule. As the graph on the right shows, the forward money market curves for short rates (the grey lines) have generally been well above the path for short rates that has actually transpired (blue line), so traders holding long positions in short rate contracts to maturity have made profits.
The exceptions to this rule, however, have come when the Fed has embarked on a path to raise rates, in 1988-90, 1994, 1999-2000, and 2004-07. In those periods, the market did not believe that the Fed was really serious about tightening monetary policy, and lost money by betting on a dovish central bank.
The question now is whether we are entering another of those exceptional periods during which the Fed surprises the markets by tightening more than expected. This depends on two factors: the date of lift off, and the speed of rate increases thereafter.
The date of lift off is still a matter of contention. Recently, the IMFhas argued that it should be delayed until next year, and Paul Krugman has said that the costs of wrongly acting too soon are much smaller than the costs of making the opposite mistake.
For a long while, Janet Yellen seemed sympathetic to this asymmetry of risks, but lately she seems to have shifted her stance. Her recent message has been clearly tilted towards a path for rate increases that is “early and gradual” rather than one that is “later and steep”.
Last week, she went as far as to say that “the economy cannot only tolerate but needs higher rates”. That is an unusually hawkish choice of words for a Fed Chairman who is usually viewed as a dove.
Ms Yellen has been supported in this shift by her main lieutenants, including Stanley Fischer, William Dudley and John Williams. Paul Krugman says that the reasons for this shift are “mysterious”, and certainly they were not fully spelled out in last week’s Congressional testimony, which focused on the usual debates about the labour market and inflation.
But Ms Yellen outlined her underlying case much better in her important speech on the “normalisation” of interest rates on 27 March. She believes that rates are now well below “normal” while the economy is virtually at normal. Here, “normal” for rates is defined as the equilibrium real rate, which Ms Yellen expects to rise as economic “headwinds” diminish in the next few years.
As this blog has argued before, analysis of the Fed’s forecasts shows that it is this rise in the equilibrium real rate, rather than the projections for inflation and unemployment (which are both assumed to be “on target” by next year) that drives the upward path for rates in the medium term.
Ms Yellen continues to argue that the upward path will be “gradual”. In an illuminating interview with the FT on 28 June, William Dudley explained that he interprets this to mean that rates will rise by 25 basis points four times a year, or at alternate FOMC meetings. That would be about half the pace seen in the 2004-07 tightening cycle, but it would still be much faster than the pace currently built into the market forward rates.
Wiiliam Dudley also emphasised that the comment about gradualism should not be regarded as a “pledge”. It is just a central expectation, based on the Fed’s current forecasts for inflation and unemployment. If the economic outcome differs from the forecasts, then so too will the the paths for equilibrium and actual interest rates. That is what the Fed means when it says its actions will be “data determined”.
That uncertainty gives the markets just about enough reason to adopt a much lower path for forward short rates than shown in the Fed’s current view of the future. But, at this stage of the cycle, the markets have often been wrong about the Fed’s readiness to tighten policy, and they may well be making the same mistake again.

(BFW) Greek Bourse Will Not Resume Trading Monday: Spokeswoman


BFW 07/19 16:04 *GREEK BOURSE WILL NOT RESUME TRADING MONDAY: SPOKESWOMAN

Greek Bourse Will Not Resume Trading Monday: Spokeswoman
2015-07-19 16:08:03.842 GMT


By Eleni Chrepa
(Bloomberg) -- Further regulation is needed for Athens
Stock Exchange to start trading again, a spokeswoman for the
bourse says in text message.

* Spokeswoman didn’t know when trading will resume
* NOTE: Trading at Greek bourse was suspended June 29, when
bank holiday was imposed


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(BFW) Germany to Spend EU2.7B on New Roads and Bridges Plan, Bild Says


Germany to Spend EU2.7B on New Roads and Bridges Plan, Bild Says
2015-07-19 11:36:24.519 GMT


By Dalia Fahmy
(Bloomberg) -- Germany will unveil new program to build and
repair highways and bridges on Monday, Bild reports, citing
German Transportation Minister Alexander Dobrindt

* EU1.5b slated for closing gaps on highways; EU700m for new
road construction, EU500m for modernization

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NY Post : Wall Street is scared of crisis: survey

Wall Street is scared of crisis: survey

Wall Street money managers don’t have the intestinal fortitude they once had, according to a recent study.
The chaos in Greece, the bedlam in China and a weakening US economy have spooked the moneymen into a very defensive stance, according to our interpretation of last week’s BofA Merrill Lynch Fund Manager Survey data.
And despite the VIX or fear index closing at 12.02 — a near record low — how fear is measured is part of the underlying scientific analysis of markets.
All stock-market rallies need fuel. Cash is that fuel; it is also the support that cushions any short-term declines in the markets.
One of the surefire ways to measure a money manager’s comfort with the markets is to look at his or her cash levels. High cash levels are indicative of managers who have already sold and are very fearful.
Low cash levels are indicative of managers who have already bought their fill and are very confident in the market’s future.
So the theory is, today’s market is just too scared to go down a lot.
Bank of America Merrill Lynch surveyed 191 money managers with $510 billion in assets. The findings, while merely odd-seeming to the young and less experienced, absolutely confounded many analysts — but to us, it’s a clear signal: Managers are beared up!
Fear was the word in the latest survey. Cash levels jumped to 5.5 percent, the highest level since Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy and the financial crisis in 2008.
Today’s long-only money managers apparently are hampered by their own cowardice. These Chicken Little managers also bought protection — typically in the form of put options.
In fact, the long-only managers in the survey were so squeamish that the highest percentage had purchased protection since February 2008.
With that much cash and that much protection, is it really any surprise that the money managers were under invested as the Dow Jones rallied 550 points?
Taking a contrarian view has proved to be a fruitful investment — while the long-onlys hid under their desks.

(BN) How Does Tesla’s New Mode Stack Up Against Bugatti, Lamborghini?


How Does Tesla’s New Mode Stack Up Against Bugatti, Lamborghini?
2015-07-18 13:24:39.608 GMT


By Hannah Elliott
(Bloomberg Business) -- On Friday Tesla mastermind Elon
Musk announced a new “Ludicrous Mode” for his electric Model S
sedan and the upcoming Model X SUV.
He promised that the new mode—a $10,000 option—would push
the car to 60 miles per hour in 2.8 seconds. He said it will get
the SUV to 60mph in 3.3 seconds.
That’s serious speed, on par with supercars that are
exponentially more expensive. If Musk can pull this off, it’ll
shoot him into the same stratosphere as Bugatti and Koenigsegg.
What’s more, Musk said he’ll launch an all-new Roadster in
four years. That one will have a “maximum plaid” speed mode—a
reference to the cult favorite movie, Spaceballs.
Who knows what max plaid is, but it sounds nuts.
So how does Telsa stack up against other top high-speed
cars in the world, both in terms of 0-60 and price tag?

To contact the author on this story:
Hannah Elliott at helliott8@bloomberg.net
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>>> D. Strauss Kahn : To my German Friends...Comment on Greece

To my German friends
Hollande stood his ground. Merkel faced up to those who didn’t want an agreement at any price. It’s to their credit. There is a good chance a plan will be put in place, reducing if not removing the risks of a Grexit. It’s not enough, but it’s welcome.
The conditions of the agreement, however, are positively alarming for those who still believe in the future of Europe. What happened last weekend was for me profoundly damaging, if not a deadly blow.
There are of course those who do not believe in that future, who will be rejoicing. And they are many, from two different camps.
First there are those who are too short-sighted. Those whose nationalism prevents them from seeing beyond their own borders and who vainly ponder upon Europe’s very existence. But who knows what Europe really is? Who knows whence this continent sprang? Was Europe born in the Homeric poems of the IX Century before our time? Was it born in the mud and the mire of the trenches where the bloods of all the world did mingle, blending their colours, brewing their dreams and cross-breeding their ambitions? Was it born even closer to home, and more prosaically, in the laboriously detailed treaties of the European Union? There was no doubt in the mind of Erasmus, who, in 1516, wrote in the Complaint of peace: “An Englishman is the enemy of a Frenchman purely because he is French, and the Briton hates the Scotsman because he is a Scot; the Germans are daggers drawn with the French, the Spanish with both. O the perversity of mankind! Such superficial differences as the name of a country are enough to divide them! Why do they not rather reconcile themselves with all the values they share?”
Then there are those who are too long-sighted. These are capable of seeing beyond their own frontiers, but have chosen not to support the community that is nevertheless closest to them. They turn to others, further West, to which they are willing to succumb. This is what was on Cioran’s mind and the echo of his impotent rage reminds us once more: “How can we count on the awakening of Europe,” he laments, “or on its anger? Its fate and even its revolts are settled elsewhere.”
And then there are those, like myself, who are in neither camp, and it to those that I now speak; to my German friends who believe in the Europe that together we once wanted; those who believe that a European culture exists. Those who know that the countries that define its contours, and of which the history books generally tell only of conflicts, have shaped a common culture that is like no other. A culture not richer than any other, nor more glorious, nor more noble, but no less so either. Forged in this peculiar alloy, a blend of individualism and egalitarian universalism, it embodies and upholds – more than any other – that which the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas calls “citizen solidarity”, when he writes, for example, that “the fact that the death penalty is still in force in other countries is there to remind us what makes our normative consciousness so unique”.
We are the custodians of that culture. There is a long history, an apprenticeship of over tens, hundreds of years, with its successive episodes, at times of pain, of greatness for sure, and conflict also, between us European brothers. We have had to overcome our rivalries, even the most violent, without ever forgetting them. I do not know whether we have emerged stronger from these European trials that helped shape the history of the world; but what I am convinced of, however, is that, through them, we have come to believe in a society built on solidarity. Europe is Michelangelo, Shakespeare, Descartes, Beethoven, Marx, Freud, Picasso. It was they who taught us, like so many others, the shared foundations, balancing nature and culture, the religious and the secular, faith and science, the individual and the community. It is because we share this heritage, because it is so deeply rooted in our collective being, and goes on nourishing the achievements that we have been, are still and will continue to be capable of in the future, that we have been able to put an end to our internal turf wars.
But the demon that makes us repeat our errors of the past is never far away. This is what happened during that fateful weekend. Without entering into detail about whether the measures imposed on Greece were welcome, legitimate, effective, appropriate, what I want to underline here is that the context in which this diktat was issued has created a crippling situation.
That the amateurism of the Greek government and the relative inaction of their predecessors went beyond the pale, this I accept. That the coalition of creditors led by the Germans was exasperated by the situation thus created, this I understand. But these political leaders seemed far too savvy to want to seize the opportunity of an ideological victory over a far left government at the expense of fragmenting the Union. Because that is what it comes down to. In counting our billions instead of using them to build, in refusing to accept an albeit obvious loss by constantly postponing any commitment on reducing the debt, in preferring to humiliate a people because they are unable to reform, and putting resentments – however justified – before projects for the future, we are turning our backs on what Europe should be, we are turning our backs on Habermas’ citizen solidarity. We are expending all our energies on infighting and running the risk of triggering a break-up. This is where we are. A Eurozone, in which you, my German friends, would lay down your law with a few Baltic and Nordic states in tow, is unacceptable for all the rest.
The euro was conceived as an imperfect monetary union forged on an ambiguous agreement between France and Germany. For Germany, it was about organising a fixed exchange rate system around the Deutschmark and, through this, imposing a certain ordo-liberal vision of economic policy. For France, it was a matter of rather naively and romantically establishing an international reserve currency equal to the grand ambitions of its elites. We now need to get out of that initial ambiguity, which has become destructive, and get out of its self-centred plans, even if we all know that one only gets out of ambiguity at one’s own cost. This will require a common effort in France as well as in Germany. Both countries face major obstacles along this road. Germany is trapped in a misleading and inconsistent story about how the monetary union works, and which is widely shared by its political classes and people. Conversely, in France, laziness and the latent sovereignism of the economic and intellectual elites is such that there is no story not any
intelligent, renovated vision of the architecture of monetary union that could find popular support. We need to invent this common vision, and fast.
Don’t tell me you expect to save Europe simply by imposing rules of sound management. No one is more committed than I am to respecting the equilibrium; it is what has always drawn us closer together. But you have to build this respect through democracy and dialogue, through reason, and not by force.
Don’t tell me that, if this is the way it is and some don’t want to know, then you will just continue on your journey without them. Falling back on the North will never suffice to save you. Like all Europeans, you need the whole of Europe to survive, divided we are too small. With globalisation we are witnessing the emergence of vast geographical and economic areas which are going to complementing one another and competing with one another for decades, maybe centuries. The zones of influence and alliances that are forming are likely to be long lasting. Everyone can see the North American Plate taking shape. It will cluster around the United States its Canadian and Mexican satellites, and perhaps others further afield. All the signs suggest that South America will be able to achieve some sort of autonomy. In Asia, two or three zones could materialize, depending on whether, in addition to China and India, Japan will be able to attract sufficient solidarity around itself, precisely because it too is too small alone. Africa is awakening, at last, but it needs us. As for the Muslim world, troubled today by the turmoil emanating from a political use of Islam by some, it will probably struggle to find unity within.
Europe could be one of these players, but this is not yet certain. To do so, its ambition must be to come together within the current Union and even beyond. To survive among the giants, Europe will have to bring together all the territories contained between the ice caps of the North, the snows of the Urals and the sands of the South. It means rediscovering its roots and seeing the Mediterranean, in the space of the next few decades, as our internal sea. Historical logic, economic consistency, demographic security, to which I would add – however things may seem – our cultural proximity, born of the dissemination of religions of the Book, show us the way. Amidst all our internal conflicts, we are looking only the North and we are forgetting the South. Yet it is the cradle of our culture. It’s what will bring Old Europe new blood in the form of the young generations. And it is what will make Europe the gateway between East and West. Alexander, Napoleon, our wild colonial ambitions, thought they could build this unity by force of arms. The cruel and despicable method failed, but the ambition had been founded. It still is.
The challenge is sizeable. An alliance between a few European countries, even led by the most powerful among them, will be subjugated by our friend and ally the United States in the maybe not so distant future. There are some who have already chosen that path. Those I said earlier were too long-sighted. But this does not apply to all. And it’s to these others that I am speaking now.
The Europe I hope for must obviously have its rules and discipline for our communal life, but it must also have a political plan that transcends and justifies such constraints. Today this is something everyone seems to have forgotten. Our European model can be a model for all those who refuse to be put into the same mould from across the Atlantic. But to be a model, Europe must have vision, rise above the pettiness, play its role in globalisation and, in a word, continue to shape History

Telegraph : BT's Patterson: Why splitting the company is without merit

Link : http://bit.ly/1CJwOnM

BT's Patterson: Why splitting the company is without merit

Gavin Patterson says he will make “a strong case for the status quo” despite the challenges gripping the sector

If Gavin Patterson, the chief executive of BT, is worried then he is a fine actor. Even as Ofcom announces it is considering stripping his company of control of its best asset – the national telecoms network – he reclines in a leather armchair in his office and maintains a posture so relaxed he looks as though he might slide on to the floor.
Nevertheless, the suggestion by the regulator, with Sky, TalkTalk and Vodafone cheering it on, that BT could be forced to sell off Openreach, the £5bn-a-year wholesale business behind Britain’s broadband infrastructure, has not gone down particularly well.
In telecoms industry jargon, a potential split of BT is termed “structural separation”, as opposed to the current regime of “functional separation” that obliges Openreach to wholesale to BT’s rivals on equal terms to its own retail business.
“I don’t know what problem structural separation is meant to solve,” says Patterson, 47, who took the top job at BT two years ago and has been at the company more than a decade.

“The risk as well if we do follow this path is that the business gets separated and you’ll never be able to put it back together. It would be one way, and there are no successful examples of this anywhere round the world.”
Sky and TalkTalk argue that a split would curb BT’s growing power in the market and deliver better service from Openreach, which has a poor, albeit improving, record on fault repairs and new line installations.
Patterson concedes Openreach needs to improve its performance on service, but knows he has an arsenal of weapons with which to discourage Ofcom from forcing a sale.
He threatens a legal quagmire and a resulting decade of under-investment in Britain’s internet infrastructure, and problems with filling the £7bn black hole in BT’s “monster pension fund” – a liability ultimately underwritten by the taxpayer. An independent Openreach, a business that would produce highly reliable cash, would also be a target for private equity owners, claims Patterson.
“At the end of it, and if we’re meant to be looking at the next 10 years, what do you want to look back on?” he asks, in an apparent aside to George Osborne and Sharon White, the recently installed chief executive of Ofcom. “Do you want to see the UK still at the forefront of the internet economy, with the most developed online economy in the world by some definitions? Or do you want to look back at 10 years of litigation and arguments?”
The Cheshire-born executive rejects suggestions that BT’s ownership of the national network and the cash it produces gives BT and unfair advantage over rivals. Instead, he claims, Openreach and its infrastructure benefit from being tied to the company’s other businesses.
“Openreach benefits from being part of the wider BT group, it’s not the other way round. Its rivals seems to be framing it as somehow Openreach funds the BT group. It’s quite the opposite.
“Openreach benefits from the balance sheet of the BT group, the scale of research and development in BT, and from the ability to ensure there is a customer who will buy its services.”
BT’s next investment in Openreach will be “ultrafast broadband”, using so-called G.fast technology pioneered in its own labs. It will mean another capital outlay “on the same sort of magnitude” as the £3bn spent on superfast broadband, but Patterson will not sign the cheque until Ofcom has ruled out structural separation.
It is a form of ransom of the digital economy, which will need higher internet access speeds and quality as the demand for data balloons, but Patterson is unapologetic.
“With some regulatory certainty, we will be incentivised,” he says. “With the alternative – down the path of separation – we won’t have that certainty, so it won’t make sense. It’s what our shareholders would expect and it’s not an unreasonable position to take.”
The motives of Sky, run by his Surrey neighbour and fellow Procter & Gamble alumnus Jeremy Darroch, and TalkTalk, run by Dido Harding, in calling for the split of BT are questionable, he suggests. Patterson also attacks their record on investment as compared with BT’s £3bn spending on superfast broadband upgrades over the past five years.
“People forget five years ago, Dido, Jeremy and others who are arguing that Ofcom should push for separation. These are the people who said the country does not need fibre, their customers don’t need fibre. The hypocrisy is quite staggering,” he says.
“It’s not that there aren’t issues, I’m not saying that. There are things we could do better. But it seems the risk is we don’t look at this in the whole and become obsessed with one component of the market, which is the component that works the best.”
As well as putting the structural separation of BT formally on the regulatory agenda, Ofcom’s publishing of the discussion paper last week on the next decade of the communications market dealt a blow to the company effort to curb Sky’s dominance of the pay-TV market. The watchdog said it will look at how the distribution of television affects the market for bundles of communications services, but stopped short of a full review of how Sky is kept in check.
Patterson is disappointed, but not giving up. He wants the creation of an Openreach-like structure for content, ensuring that all providers can access sport and films on the same terms.
“Ofcom could, and in fact I think they should, have gone further on pay-TV. They’ve not been clear enough,” Patterson complains.
“We get intense scrutiny and regulation and there has been innuendo and accusation that we are somehow prioritising our own retail units, which have a 33pc share of the market. Contrast that with virtual zero-touch regulation in TV where Sky have 64pc market share.
“You can argue the toss on the nuances of the differences between the two, but at a fundamental level that’s the elephant in the room.”
The Ofcom process is just the latest iceberg Patterson must circumnavigate in a year that has already included a record-breaking Premier League rights auction, where BT managed to emerge without paying much more for a similar share of matches, in contrast to Sky which paid throughout the nose to maintain its dominance.
There has also been a triennial reassessment of its pension deficit and merger mania in the telecoms sector, kicked off by BT’s own takeover of EE.The landmark deal is under scrutiny from the Competition and Market Authority, but Patterson is confident it will go through.
“We think the case is a strong one. There is no reduction of competition. We’re a committed wholesaler. EE is the biggest mobile wholesaler and we’ll stand by that and build on it.”
BT’s return to the mobile market heralds the arrival of “converged” services that allow subscriber to buy internet connectivity packages that are is agnostic to whether they are on a fixed line or mobile network. Patterson says the company is still working through how such services will work, but it ongoing talks between Vodafone and Liberty Global aimed at combining the mobile operator UK network with Virgin Media, the cable operator, indicate his £12.5bn bet on EE was right.
Again, the biggest challenge if the deal goes through will be service. Both BT and EE score worse than most of their rivals for retail customer service. Patterson says it is a “perception challenge”, although more call centres will come back on shore.
“It’s not to say we don’t have an operational challenge, but I think the perception is that there are concerns in that area. I think we’ve got our work cut out to really demonstrate that service is at the heart of this.”
One consequence of the deal will be Deutsche Telekom, one of the current owners of EE, taking a 12pc stake in BT and a seat on the board. It is widely seen in the industry as a potential prelude to German takeover of Britain’s former state monopoly, as part of an expected cores-border telecoms consolidation in Europe. Patterson is already preparing for the next wave of mergers.
“BT is a very attractive business for a number of reasons. It has a consistent track record on delivering its promises on investment and financial results.
“So if there is a consolidation, I think we can play a role somewhere. It could be that we’re the consolidator. It could be someone decides they would like us to be part of another group.
“Do I think consolidation of this next 10-year period is inevitable? I think it’s a high likelihood that Europe goes from 400-odd providers to something a lot less. I hope we don’t go to the low numbers you see in the US because that is not good for choice and competition.”
The next few months though are about a battle at home and despite the changes gripping the sector, Patterson says he will make “a strong case for the status quo”.

(BFW) Greece Accord Conditions Are ‘Alarming’: Dominique Strauss-Kahn


Greece Accord Conditions Are ‘Alarming’: Dominique Strauss-Kahn
2015-07-19 09:54:27.145 GMT


By Angeline Benoit
(Bloomberg) -- Conditions “positively alarming for those
who still believe in the future of Europe,” former head of IMF
says in link on his Twitter page.

* EU will suffer from divisions, become weaker versus the U.S.
* “Europe must have vision, rise above the pettiness, play
its role in globalization and in word, continue to shape
history”
* NOTE: Strauss-Kahn Inches Back Onto France’s Political Scene


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Thomas Mulier

(ZeroHedge) Pension Shocker: Plans Face $2 Trillion Shortfall, Moody's Says

Pension Shocker: Plans Face $2 Trillion Shortfall, Moody's Says
 
Last month, in "Cities, States Shun Moody's For Blowing The Whistle On Pension Liabilities," we highlighted a rift between Moody’s and some local governments over the return assumptions for public pension plans.
To recap, when it comes to underfunded pension liabilities, one major concern is that in a world characterized by ZIRP and NIRP, it’s not entirely clear that public pension funds are using realistic investment return assumptions. The lower the return assumption, the larger the unfunded liability. After 2008, Moody’s stopped relying on the investment return assumptions of cities and states opting instead to use its own models. Unsurprisingly, this led the ratings agency to adopt a much less favorable view of state and local government finances and as WSJ reported, rather than admit that their return assumptions are indeed unrealistic, local governments have opted to drop Moody’s instead. 
The debate underscores a larger problem in America. Almost half of the states in the union are facing budget deficits.
Underfunded pension liabilities are one factor, but the reasons for the pervasive shortfall vary from plunging oil revenues to plain old fiscal mismanagement. The pension issue gained national attention after an Illinois Supreme Court decision threw the future of pension reform into question and effectively set a precedent for other states, sending state and local officials back to the drawing board in terms of figuring out how to plug budget gaps. One option is what we have called the "pension ponzi" which involves the issuance of pension obligation bonds. Here is all you need to know about that option: 
'Solving' this problem by issuing bonds is an enticing option but at heart, it amounts to what one might call a "pension liability-bond arbitrage." The idea is to borrow the money to plug the pension gap and invest it at a rate of return that's higher than the coupon on the bonds, thus saving money over the long-haul. Of course, much like transferring a balance on a high interest credit card onto a new card with a teaser rate (or refinancing a high interest credit card via a P2P loan) this gimmick only works if you do not max out the original card again, because if you do, all you've done is doubled your debt burden. As it relates to pension liabilities, this means that what you absolutely cannot do is use the cash infusion as an excuse to get lax when it comes to pension funding because after all, that's what caused the problem in the first place.
And here's a look at how pervasive the problem has become:
Make no mistake, America’s pension problem isn’t likely to be resolved anytime soon and in fact, with risk-free rates likely to remain subdued even as equity returns face the possibility that the beginning of a Fed rate hike cycle could trigger a 1937-style equity meltdown (bad news for return assumptions), and with investors set to demand higher yields on muni issuance thanks to deteriorating fiscal circumstances, the financial screws may be set to tighten further on the country’s struggling state and local governments. Bloomberg has more:
The cost to American cities for their cash-strapped pension funds is starting to look a lot worse, and it’s not because the stock-market rally may be losing steam.

 

Houston was warned by Moody’s Investors Service this month that it may be downgraded because of mounting retirement bills, the latest municipality put on notice as the company ignores bookkeeping gimmicks that let cities mask the size of their debt for years. The approach foreshadows accounting rules for even top-rated issuers that are poised to cause pension shortfalls to swell as new financial reports are released.

 

"If you’re AAA or AA rated and you’ve got significant and visible unfunded pension obligations, you’ve only got one direction to go in terms of rating, and that’s potentially down," said Jeff Lipton, head of municipal research in New York at Oppenheimer & Co. "It’s the presentation on the balance sheet that is now going to drive urgency."

 

Cities that shortchanged pensions for years are under growing pressure to boost their contributions, even after windfalls from a stock market that’s tripled since early 2009. Janney Montgomery Scott has said growing retirement costs are "the largest cloud overhanging" the $3.6 trillion municipal-bond market, where investors are demanding higher yields from borrowers under the greatest strain.

 

That was on display this week for Chicago, whose credit rating was cut to junk by Moody’s in May because of a $20 billion pension shortfall. The city was forced to pay yields of almost 8 percent on taxable bonds maturing in 2042, about twice what some homeowners can get on a 30-year mortgage.

 

Estimates of the pension-fund deficits facing states and cities vary, depending on the assumptions used to calculate the cost of bills due over the next several decades. According to Federal Reserve figures, they have $1.4 trillion less than needed to cover promised benefits.

 

Officials have been able to lower the size of the liability by counting on investment earnings of more than 7 percent a year, even after they expect to run out of cash. New rules from the Governmental Accounting Standards Board require a lower rate to be used after retirement plans go broke. Many reported shortfalls will grow as a result.

 

Moody’s, which in 2013 began using a lower rate than governments do to calculate future liabilities, has estimated that the 25 largest U.S. public pensions alone have $2 trillion less than they need. Cincinnati and Minneapolis are among cities Moody’s has since downgraded.

 

The California Public Employees’ Retirement System, the largest U.S. pension, this week said it earned just 2.4 percent last fiscal year, one-third of the annual return it projects. The California State Teachers’ Retirement System, the second-biggest fund,gained 4.5 percent, compared with its 7.5 percent goal.
In short: America is facing a fiscal crisis at the state and local government level and it appears as though at least one ratings agency is no longer willing to suspend disbelief by allowing officials to utilize profoundly unrealistic return assumptions in the calculation of liabilities. This means downgrades and as for what comes next, we'll leave you with a recap of Citi's vicious "feedback loop".
From Citi
How does a downgrade create a feedback loop? 

 

Payment induced liquidity shock
For many issuers’ credit contracts, a drop to a speculative grade rating acts as a payments trigger. For instance, the issuer may have commercial paper programs and line of credit agreements as a part of its short term borrowing program and a rating downgrade could qualify as an event of default for these borrowing arrangements. This enables the banks to declare all outstanding obligations as immediately due and payable.

 

A rating downgrade could also force accelerated repayment schedules and penalty bank bond rates on swap contracts and variable-rate debt agreements.

 

Thus, as a result of the rating action, an issuer could face increased liquidity risk at an unfortunate time
when it is working to navigate its way out of a fiscal crisis.

 

 

Knock-on rating downgrade risk
In some instances, rating agencies may disagree on an issuer’s creditworthiness which could result in a split level rating for a prolonged period. But a drastic rating action by one main rating agency (either Moody’s or S&P) which knocks the issuer’s debt to below investment grade could force the other rating agencies to follow with a similar downgrade. While the other rating agencies might feel that underlying credit fundamentals of the issuer do not merit a sub-investment grade rating, their rating action could be dictated by negative implications due to the liquidity pressures posed by the first downgrade to junk status. Recently, S&P downgraded a credit as a result of Moody’s rating action that stated that its rating action reflected its view that the issuer’s efforts “are challenged by short-term interference” that prevents a solid and credible approach to resolving their fiscal problems.

 

Shrinking buyer base
Many investors have mandates to buy investment grade debt only and a fall to speculative grade status could cause existing investors to liquidate the holdings of the fallen credit and shrink the universe of buyers.

 

Rising issuance costs
In many cases the issuer may have been working diligently to reduce its exposure to bank credit risks in the event of a ratings deterioration (for e.g. shifting its variable-rate GOs and sales tax paper to a fixed rate by tapping its short-term paper program then converting it into long-term debt) but the unfortunate timing of the downgrade will make this task much more challenging as a shrunken buyer base for an entity’s debt, quite naturally, translates into a higher cost of debt.
A higher cost of debt exacerbates liquidity problems and thus the feedback loop could continue to gain traction.

(ZeroHedge) The Greatest Collapse In The History Of The VIX Index

The Greatest Collapse In The History Of The VIX Index

The extraordinary market intervention by China in response to their declining market, coupled with further ‘kick the can down the road’ policies by the EU regarding Greece, resulted in the greatest collapse in the history of the VIX index(which is still ongoing as I write). Over the past five days and counting the VIX has fallen -40% from 19.97 to 12.11. To gain perspective on moves in volatility Artemis ranks consecutive drawups and drawdowns (peak-to-trough or trough-to-peak %  moves by day) in the VIX index and models them as a power law distribution.  While the concept may be obscure to grasp at first the ramifications of the analysis are enlightening.
What is a power-law distribution? The distributions of a wide variety of physical, biological, and human phenomena follow what is known as a power-law distribution. Examples include earthquakes, deaths in war and terrorism, populations of cities, solar flares, word frequencies in language, movie box office receipts… and financial asset price movements up and down over multiple days.
Supernormal Power-Law Violations: When you rank events from the above natural and human phenomena the vast majority of observations follow the power-law distribution perfectly- however the violations of the function are the most interesting. Power-law violations are true  black swans or supernormal observations because their results contain a degree of reflexivity that outside the boundary of what would be expected from an exponential growth function. Examples of supernormal violations in power laws across other phenomena include death counts in WWII ranked among all wars, box office receipts of the movie Titanic, the 9.2 Magnitude 1960 Chilean Earthquake, the population of Tokyo, the 1987 Black Monday Crash, and the 9/11 terror attack in NYC.
 
For volatility we define a Supernormal Volatility Collapse (Drawdown) as a multi-day decrease in spot-VIX index that violates power law distribution and is indicative of self-reflexivity in markets and unknown unknown events. These occur 1 out of every 920 drawdowns or 0.1087% of the time. Supernormal VIX collapses show returns below an expected power law distribution line since the extreme speed of collapse meets the fact that volatility is bounded by zero. 
 
The graph below shows data points representing the rankings of VIX peak-to-trough declines (y-axis  = % drawdown in vol over consecutive days & x-axis = ranking ).
As with most natural events – the vast majority of VIX drawdowns neatly follow the power law distribution function represented by the white line. The supernormal vol drawdowns to the lower left of the graph represent the mostextreme violations of that power law (black swans) whereby the speed of collapse meets price constriction of implies due to the zero bound of volatility. They are the 9.2 earthquakes, 9/11s, and Titanics of VIX drawdowns.
 
We would like to highlight:
  • The ongoing decline in the VIX starting last week (and still going) is the largest supernormal volatility collapse in VIX history
  • 3 of the largest  supernormal VIX collapses have occurred in the last year alone
  • The top 7 ranked power law violations have ALL occurred during the regime of monetary easing between 2010 and today
In summary, over the past 2 years, we have been experiencing a quantifiable ‘outlier’ or ‘black swan’ decline in the VIX every 6 months as evaluated against history.
 
I can only point to government intervention as the core reason. I firmly believe that this moral hazard produces a hidden leverage and “shadow market gamma” that at some point will result in a sustained volatility outlier event in the opposite direction.