>>> Abertis/Atlantia: counter-bidder ACS talks to KKR, Macquarie, CVC and TCI

Abertis/Atlantia: counter-bidder ACS talks to KKR, Macquarie, CVC and TCI

Abertis [BME:ABE] suitor ACS [BME:ACS], working to table a rival offer for the Spanish infrastructure group, has approached KKR [NYSE: KKR], Macquarie, CVC, and TCI, El Economista reported.
ACS CEO Marcelino Fernandez Verdes said on Friday 28 July that the process will take some time, El Economista said. ACS has until five days before the EUR 16.3bn offer tabled by Atlantia [BIT:ATL] of Italy expires, the Spanish-language paper noted.

ACS will vehicle its offer through the listed German unit Hochtief [ETR: HOT] the report went on to say. Lazard has ACS’ mandate for the transaction.
CVC has just closed a EUR 16bn vehicle for investments in Europe and North America. TCI was ready to bid for Abertis with the Spanish airports group Aena [BME:AENA], an option finally rejected by the government. Macquarie is active in Spain and has just closed the acquisition of the car-park company Empark. Finally KKR has made several significant investments in Spain.

The Spanish government and Abertis significant shareholder La Caixa will back a Spanish offer for Abertis, the paper said.

Potential funds that may take part in ACS’s bid also include GIP and Advent according to the report.

FT : Airbus A380 cuts signal the end of an aviation dream

Airbus A380 cuts signal the end of an aviation dream

The industry fails to capitalise on its ingenuity


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When the dinner trays have been cleared, the aircraft lights turned down and the passengers are asleep or peering at screens, I sometimes reflect on what an inventive species ours is.

Here we are in a long tube, 35,000 feet high, soaring across thousands of miles of land mass and oceans. And while there are some highly qualified people in the cockpit, the plane is largely flying its computer-controlled self.

Last year, aircraft flew 3.8bn passengers, equivalent to more than half the world’s population, and they did so mostly in safety. In 2016, there were 10 fatal airline accidents, with 268 deaths.

It is an astonishing achievement — and I never feel it as keenly as I do on an Airbus A380. This double-decker giant carries more than 500 people and its engines are so quiet that, in the plane’s early days, there were reports that pilots found it difficult to doze during their breaks because they could hear babies crying and toilets flushing.

Yet just 10 years after Singapore Airlines flew the first A380 commercial flight to Sydney, Airbus has announced such a sharp cutback in production that many believe the double decker is doomed.

After saying last year that it was going to reduce the annual production rate of A380s from 27 in 2015 to just 12 in 2018, Airbus last week said that it would cut the number to eight by 2019.

Although Airbus has taken orders for 317 A380s and has delivered 213 of those to airlines, it has not won a new order for more than two years and does not expect any for the rest of this year.

What has gone wrong? Since the 1990s, Airbus has been putting a plausible case for a new superjumbo jet to succeed Boeing’s ageing 400-seat 747s. With newly wealthy travellers from emerging economies itching to see the world, air travel numbers are rising.

Airports are expensive to build and expanding them is often controversial. With the airline industry under pressure to reduce emissions, it made sense to fly people in fewer, bigger, more fuel-efficient modern planes. The A380, Airbus argued, answered that need.

I recall in pre-A380 days looking at the departure board at Johannesburg airport on the day before school holidays ended in the UK. There were five fully loaded 747s taking off for London that night — two British Airways, two South African Airways and one Virgin Atlantic. This looked like a route that could do with bigger planes.

Airbus said the A380 would be crucial for flying passengers on many well-travelled routes and in and out of the world’s big hubs, such as London Heathrow, Hong Kong and Dubai. Airbus forecasted that by 2030, there would be about 1,300 A380s flying.

So why are only a fraction of those in the air today? There are several reasons. Many travellers prefer to fly directly between smaller airports, often on low-cost carriers, rather than change flights at one of the large hubs.

New, smaller aircraft can now fly further, reducing the need for super-large planes. And airline economics are rocky, as they have been throughout much of the industry’s history.

Profits at Emirates, the aviation star of recent years and the biggest buyer of A380s, fell 82 per cent over the past year, hit by travel restrictions in the US, terror attacks in Europe and a weak oil and gas industry in the Middle East.

If the A380 fails to live up to Airbus’s hopes, it will not be the first time that the aircraft industry’s technical ingenuity has fallen foul of the sector’s difficult economics.

Concorde, the supersonic aircraft, began flying in 1976 and was grounded in 2003. It was an elegant bird that could cross the Atlantic in less than four hours. For business travellers, or anyone who preferred to spend time at their destination rather than in the air, it seemed an obvious next step. Yet only BA and Air France flew Concorde and no one could find a way of making it pay.

Although there are plans for a new supersonic plane, there is still no replacement for Concorde. It is hard to think of another industry which has failed to capitalise on a technology it mastered more than 40 years ago.

Thomas Enders, Airbus chief executive, insisted last week that the A380 had a future and that the company would use the production downturn to make the aircraft even more attractive to customers. Perhaps orders will boom again one day. More likely, Airbus’s superjumbo will be, like Concorde, a limited edition. For all of its achievements, the aircraft business sometimes falls short of its dreams.

>>> National Retail Properties beats by $0.02, beats on revs; raises FY17 core F

National Retail Properties beats by $0.02, beats on revs; raises FY17 core FFO guidance (39.95)
  • Reports Q2 (Jun) core FFO of $0.64 per share, $0.02 better than the Capital IQ Consensus of $0.62; revenues rose 11.2% year/year to $145.55 mln vs the $142.83 mln Capital IQ Consensus. AFFO for Q2 was $0.65 per share.
  • Co issues in-line guidance for FY17, sees core FFO of $2.46-2.50, excluding non-recurring items, vs. $2.48 Capital IQ Consensus Estimate and vs prior guidance of $2.44-2.48. AFFO for 2017 is expected to be $2.50-2.54.
  • "National Retail Properties enjoyed another impressive quarter, driven by our healthy portfolio, our selectively underwritten acquisitions, and our flexible, low leverage balance sheet, all of which has positioned us to raise our guidance and, as previously announced, to raise our common dividend for the 28th consecutive year, a record matched by only three other REITs and less than 90 public companies in the United States."

>>> Simon Properties beats by $0.03, reports revs in-line; guides FY17 FFO in-li

Simon Properties beats by $0.03, reports revs in-line; guides FY17 FFO in-line
  • Reports Q2 (Jun) funds from operations of $2.47 per share, $0.03 better than the Capital IQ Consensus of $2.44; revenues rose 3.5% year/year to $1.36 bln vs the $1.37 bln Capital IQ Consensus
    • Growth in comparable FFO per diluted share for the three months ended June 30, 2017 was 7.6%
    • Total portfolio NOI growth for the three months ended June 30, 2017 was 5.0% and was 5.3% for the six months ended June 30, 2017
  • Co issues in-line guidance for FY17, sees FFO of $11.14-11.22 vs. $11.21 Capital IQ Consensus Estimate

>>> Pandora Media: Color on Quarter --> -4.60% in Pre-Mkt @ 8.54 190k traded

Pandora Media: Color on Quarter (8.95)
  • RBC Capital Mkts lowers their P tgt to $10 from $15. Pandora posted a mixed Q2 with better than expected Revenue & EBITDA but weaker Key Metrics (Listeners, Hours, Paid Subs). Pandora lower its FY17 Revenue guide to reflect Ticketfly sale, closing of NZ/Australia ops, and a de-emphasis of Subscription revenue. Firm sees P in midst of a major product, mgmt, and strategy transition.
  • Stifel tgt cut to $12 to reflect a more modest near-term growth outlook, but maintain our Buy rating on Pandora shares. notes Pandora topped 2Q revenue / profitability forecasts but lowered the top end of its full-year revenue outlook as the co is taking a more measured approach to promoting its subscription products after rethinking its marketing strategy. Pandora confirmed the closure of its ad-supported businesses in Australia and New Zealand as the company tightens its focus on the valuable U.S. market. Pandora expects trends in its advertising business to improve in 2H:17, coinciding with its launch of (arguably long overdue) programmatic video/audio buying capabilities in 3Q/4Q.
  • FBR & Co notes Pandora is a transitional company. To that end, the 2Q17 transition was encouraging. Advertising, the new focus, delivered healthy upside. That offsets less subscription than we had assumed, as subscription is being de-emphasized.
  • Dougherty notes the strategic investment from SiriusXM (SIRI, Unrated) has led to a wholesale housecleaning of the mgmt team and likely shift in strategic direction away from On Demand and back toward the legacy Ad-supported business. It that vein, Q2 benefitted from 24% Y/Y growth in Ad RPM, which drove a revenue beat. However, the path to sustainable profitability remains clouded and until a new CEO is put in place and the strategy clarified they are going to remain on the sidelines.
  • Needham notes P reported 2Q17 revenue of $377mm, 8% above our estimate, and an Adjusted EPS loss of $0.21, much better than our Adjusted EPS loss projection of $0.31. However, it was a noisy quarter that included a $155mm write-off of goodwill and termination costs owing to of the closing of P's only 2 international markets (Australia and New Zealand) and the sale of Ticketfly. P's strategy pivots have proven very expensive for P shareholders. In 2Q17 Sirius XM purchased $480mm of Series A preferred stock, convertible into P's common shares at $10.50/share. The initial closing was for $158.6mm on June 9th, with the balance set to close in 4Q17, after regulatory approval. P sold Ticketfly to Eventbrite for $200mm ($150mm in cash plus a $50mm convertible note), that should close this month.
  • Canaccord Genuity tgt to $14 form $15; BAML tgt to $7.50

>>> Royal Caribbean beats by $0.04, reports revs in-line; guides Q3 EPS above co

Royal Caribbean beats by $0.04, reports revs in-line; guides Q3 EPS above consensus; guides FY17 EPS above consensus (113.08)
  • Reports Q2 (Jun) earnings of $1.71 per share, $0.04 better than the Capital IQ Consensus of $1.67 and above prior guidance of $1.60-1.65; revenues rose 4.3% year/year to $2.20 bln vs the $2.19 bln Capital IQ Consensus.
  • Co issues upside guidance for Q3, sees EPS of approx $3.45, excluding non-recurring items, vs. $3.30 Capital IQ Consensus Estimate.
  • Co issues upside guidance for FY17, sees EPS of approx $7.35-7.45, excluding non-recurring items, vs. $7.25 Capital IQ Consensus Estimate and vs prior guidance of $7.00-7.20.
  • "Our brands are executing beautifully, keeping the business in an exceptionally strong position...Strong close-in demand for cruise bolstered the quarter, and we see further uplift for the balance of the year, positioning us well for the Double-Double and beyond."
  • Gross Yields were up 10.2% on a Constant-Currency basis. Net Yields on a Constant-Currency basis increased 11.5%, exceeding prior guidance due to strong close-in demand driving higher pricing and occupancy.

(ZH) SocGen: "Low Vol Can Misprice High Yield By Up To 30%"

SocGen: "Low Vol Can Misprice High Yield By Up To 30%"

Yesterday it was Bank of America, today's it's SocGen's turn.
As we've repeatedly stated in the past, not a day seems to pass without some broker, investor, sellside analyst or pundit (this website certainly included) opining on i) how low the Vix has fallen, ii) how much lower it will fall, and iii) how the inevitable surge will lead to unpleasant consequences.
Today, that distinction goes to one of our favorite SocGen analysts, Andrew Lapthorne, who observes the recent run up in global stocks (the MSCI World is now higher for 8 months in a row, its best run since 2003 and 4th longest monthly winning streak on record), and points out that "these long positive runs are not actually harbingers of impending doom; of the five winning runs over seven months or more for MSCI World since 1969, returns were still positive a year later. So there is little to fear from a run of gains per se."
It's not all rainbows and unicorns though, because as Lapthorne points out, such ‘winning' streaks help suppress risks, while volatility, implied or realised - for whatever reason remains very low. As the chart below shows, realised 60-day volatility on both the index and at the individual stock level is bouncing around its historical lows. Realised volatility is 40% lower than its historical average, while volatility on average stocks is significantly lower than it has been historically. Asset price confidence, Lapthorne says, is therefore at record highs.
"So why does all this matter", the SocGen strategist asks rhetorically, and answers:


Well again, low price volatility in itself does not predict much, but it can create mispricing. In particular, high confidence as to what an asset is worth can lead to underestimating the potential downside risks, which happens almost mechanically in high yield debt markets where asset volatility informs part of the pricing model. The implication is that high yield credit could be 30%+ mispriced as and when volatility moves back to average.
Meanwhile, headwinds are emerging, most notably in Europe where the common currency has continued its strong move upwards, rising a further 3.4% during July, leaving the currency 12% higher this year. This is good news for owners of euro-denominated assets but harder for euro-based investors who have seen the MSCI World decline 5% from its end-March high. According to SocGen, the strong euro is yet to really impact the latest earnings season, though it should be "manna from heaven" for US companies with overseas earnings.


Still, it is starting to be factored in price-wise - Germany was a notable decliner during July, with the DAX30 now down c. 6% from its recent peak 30 trading days ago.
In retrospect, if this is the most severe warning that one of the market's most prominent skeptics can muster, it is perhaps not surprising why everyone is now officially rushing into stocks, and as Schwab reported on its latest conference call, "new accounts are at levels we have not seen since the Internet boom of the late 1990s, up 34% over the first half of last year... cash levels for our clients had fallen to about 11.5% of assets overall, now, that's a level that we've only seen one time since the market began its recovery in the spring of 2009."
Perhaps the old saying that it is only when nobody can see any risks, that the real risks emerge, will be proven true once again...

FT : Noble Group: third degree treatment

Noble Group: third degree treatment
The valuation of illiquid assets adds to the trading group’s woes

Investors are accustomed to the valuation problems exotic derivatives create in banks. It comes as more of a shock to find traders of commodities such as oil or iron, burdened with positions that are hard — some would say impossible — to value. Last week, Singapore’s Noble Group announced losses of $1.7bn for the second quarter and attributed the majority to impairments and reserves for so-called “Level 2 and Level 3” assets.

Simplistically, Level 1 assets have market prices, the worth of Level 2 assets can be extrapolated from those, while valuing Level 3 assets involves heavy guesswork. After the crisis, big banks had to add capital for Level 3 assets — or dump them. JPMorgan, for example, reduced Level 3 assets by four-fifths to $24bn in six years to the end of 2016. They now account for just 3.7 per cent of the bank’s total assets at fair values. The proportion at Noble was a quarter.

Last week’s loss included provisions for all $660m of its Level 3 assets. Critics have pointed to Noble’s accumulation of profits on commodity-based contracts in the five years to 2014. During that time, the company booked non-cash fair value gains of $4.6bn. Yet cumulative net income in the period was only $2.4bn. That may be because of large cash losses elsewhere. Another explanation could be that the non-cash gains were offset by losses on “readily marketable inventory”, as physical commodity stockpiles are known.

Cash outflows were a cumulative $1.5bn between 2009 and 2014. These were financed in part with new borrowings. Net debt was $2.7bn in March. Noble aims to cut that via the sale of the rest of its North American gas and power business. Moody’s says the group had $1.2bn of cash in March, but faces $2.1bn in debt maturity over 12 months.

The shares have fallen 96 per cent since 2014. Noble’s accounts are unclear and its finances are messy. Investments in Level 3 assets are implicated in the group’s problems. Regulation has reduced the financial complexity of banks only for it to balloon elsewhere. Noble is unlikely to be the last non-bank to struggle with the resulting woes.