TheChek News Flow

Elon Musk could become the world’s first trillionaire, even without the new Tesla pay package

It can be hard to understand Elon Musk’s reality—especially as he appears to be on track to become the world’s first trillionaire this year.

Even he questions that reality.

For the longest time, Musk has talked about the possibility that we’re living in a computer simulation. And a proof point for him might very well be 2025.

How else could you explain the year the world’s richest man had?

It was a period filled with dizzying turns in politics and business. To the chagrin of his critics, the events of 2025 are propelling him into 2026 with the kind of momentum that could see him remain a potent force in national politics and his net worth reach the Four Comma Club—even before receiving a dime of his new $1 trillion Tesla TSLA -2.59%decrease; red down pointing triangle pay package that shareholders approved last fall.

To be clear, the simulation hypothesis is more sci-fi than science. Think of the movie “The Matrix,” or an elaborate videogame, or a really involved Netflix series that some advanced beings are watching.

Understanding his ideas on the simulation helps shed light onto how Musk is using the power of narrative to sell his rather audacious 2026 goals to investors. Those ambitions include: scaling Cybercab output, “high-volume” production of brain computers and finally achieving full reusability with Starship, the massive rocket being developed for moon and Mars missions.

“I do have this theory about predicting the future, which is that the most interesting outcome is the most likely,” Musk said during a podcast appearance a few weeks ago.

It is an idea rooted in the thinking that if our reality really is a simulation, we would get shut down if we were boring.

“Another way to think of it is like we could be an alien Netflix series and that series is only going to get continued if our ratings are good,” Musk said. “If you apply Darwin to simulation theory then only the most interesting simulations will continue. Therefore, the most interesting outcome is most likely because it’s either that or annihilation.

“So,” he added, “really, we have one goal: Keep it interesting.”

Say what you want about Musk, but he certainly kept it interesting in 2025.

In the past 12 months, we watched Musk ascend to the peak of political power (claiming the title of “First Buddy” next to President Trump in the White House) only to see their special relationship blow up in a spectacular way.

In business, Musk saw Tesla’s market value hit a new high even as its deliveries of electric vehicles fell for the second consecutive year, hurt especially by results in Europe. Investor enthusiasm was buoyed by Musk’s exit from Washington, so much so that they approved a record pay package for their beloved chief executive that could pay out $1 trillion if he successfully achieves a list of audacious goals that would essentially remake the car company into a robotics firm in the next decade.

His rocket company, SpaceX, is flirting with going public this year in what could be a massive initial public offering as Musk talks about his plans to open AI data centers in outer space and a factory on the moon.

His social-media company, X, posted a series of antisemitic posts from his AI chatbot, Grok, that included calling itself “MechaHitler.” It was the sort of public flub that might have derailed any other startup, but it was quickly forgotten as Musk moved on to his next viral moment. He has been working to raise billions of dollars more for his AI company, xAI, that is seeking to rival OpenAI and Google for the future of artificial intelligence.

For Musk, this past year was filled with so many twists and turns that it can be hard to remember them all. It also fits with his theory that the simulation encourages an up-and-down story arc, not a linear one.

“Look at President Trump’s story,” Musk said on the Katie Miller Podcast in December. “It’s more interesting that he lost the intermediate term and then won his second term after that—just like the story arc, initially up then down then resurgent…If you went with my theory that the most interesting outcome is the most likely, then that was the most likely outcome. It was inevitable.”

Even Musk’s own relationship with Trump has followed such a pattern this past year. The First Act was the early days of the White House where Musk seemed to be a constant presence, going after federal spending via his Department of Government Efficiency to the dismay of some. Then came the Second Act: the falling out. Now the Third Act is surprising many: In the wake of the killing of conservative activist Charlie Kirk, Musk appeared to mend fences. And now Musk seems likely to funnel more of his money toward Republicans in the midterm elections this year.

All the while, Musk’s personal fortune has grown to new levels. His net worth surged, more than doubling, to around $726 billion at the end of the year, according to Forbes’s calculations.

That estimate was bolstered by SpaceX seeking a valuation of $800 billion in a secondary share sale, up from a prior valuation of $400 billion. His net worth was further helped by a Delaware Supreme Court ruling in December that overturned a lower court, clearing the way for Musk to receive his contested 2018 pay package, now worth $139 billion for his work as Tesla CEO.

If SpaceX, of which Musk has held around 42%, goes public at a $1.5 trillion valuation, as suggested by Bloomberg News, it is easy to see how his net worth could be worth $1 trillion this year.

This kind of personal wealth is hard to fathom—almost as if we are in a simulation. Maybe that is why Musk has spent so much of his adult life thinking about the topic. He has been talking about it publicly for at least a decade now.

His simulation argument is drawn from looking at the pace of development in our own modern lives: In the span of two generations, videogames have advanced from simplistic graphics of “Pong” to photorealistic, 3-D simulations with millions of players competing simultaneously. To him, it just makes sense that a more advanced society has already gone down this path.

“Given that we’re clearly on a trajectory to have games that are indistinguishable from reality…it would seem to follow that the odds we’re in based reality is one in billions,” Musk said at a 2016 tech conference. “So tell me what’s wrong with that argument.”

More recently, as Musk reminisced on what has occurred in his own life, he has sounded even more certain. “If you were me,” Musk asked, “would you think this is real or a simulation?”

Restaurant chains explore strategy changes as sales slow for food-delivery mainstay

The restaurant industry is trying to figure out whether America has hit peak pizza.

Once the second-most common U.S. restaurant type, pizzerias are now outnumbered by coffee shops and Mexican food eateries, according to industry data. Sales growth at pizza restaurants has lagged behind the broader fast-food market for years, and the outlook ahead isn’t much brighter.

“Pizza is disrupted right now,” Ravi Thanawala, chief financial officer and North America president at Papa John’s International, said in an interview. “That’s what the consumer tells us.”

The parent of the Pieology Pizzeria chain filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in December. Others, including the parent of Anthony’s Coal Fired Pizza & Wings and Bertucci’s Brick Oven Pizza & Pasta, earlier filed for bankruptcy.

Pizza once was a novelty outside big U.S. cities, providing room for growth for independent shops and then chains such as Pizza Hut with its red roof dine-in restaurants. Purpose-made cardboard boxes and fleets of delivery drivers helped make pizza a takeout staple for those seeking low-stress meals.

Today, pizza shops are engaged in price wars with one another and other kinds of fast food. Food-delivery apps have put a wider range of cuisines and options at Americans’ fingertips. And $20 a pie for a family can feel expensive compared with $5 fast-food deals, frozen pizzas or eating a home-cooked meal.

Major pizza players are rethinking their businesses. Pizza Hut, Papa John’s and the parent of Papa Murphy’s are considering potential sales, or other strategic moves. Midsize chains including Blaze Pizza and Mod Pizza have closed locations over the past two years as they work to turn around their brands.

California Pizza Kitchen was sold in December to an investor group for under $300 million, according to people familiar with the matter. That is less than the $470 million it sold for in 2011, when the chain went private.

Americans still eat a lot of pizza. Pizza chains generated around $31 billion in sales from their restaurants in 2024, the market-research firm Technomic said. On any given day, around one in 10 Americans will partake of a slice, according to the Agriculture Department. Young people drive much of the consumption.

Pizza’s dominance in American restaurant fare is declining, however. Among different cuisines, it ranked sixth in terms of U.S. sales in 2024 among restaurant chains, down from second place during the 1990s, Technomic said.

The number of pizza restaurants in the U.S. hit a record high in 2019 and has declined since then, figures from the market-research firm Datassential show.

Austin Rowland ate a lot of pizza during the pandemic lockdown, but said he rarely orders it now because he sees better food options. The 26-year-old financial planner sticks with deals on the Domino’s Pizza app when he does.

“I’d feel silly paying 50% to 100% more anywhere else even if I can afford it,” said Rowland, who lives in Georgia.

As growth in pizza sales stagnates, competition between restaurants has intensified. Sales at Domino’s have grown as the pizza chain has rolled out deals such as a $9.99 offering for a large pie with toppings.

At Pizza Hut, U.S. sales at locations open at least a year have declined for eight straight quarters. Moreover, it has hundreds of dine-in locations, which occupy larger footprints, are more costly to operate, and account for a shrinking slice of where people eat pizza.

Chains seek ‘face-lift’

Papa John’s has opened the door to selling the company, though executives said they are focused on a broad turnaround strategy. The chain has spent the past year assessing its business, with executives looking to change everything from its franchising strategy to how it builds its pizzas.

Consumers are becoming choosier, and Papa John’s has to step up its menu offerings and value, said Thanawala, the chain’s CFO. That means offering more side dishes at good prices, including ones baked in the chain’s ovens.

Papa John’s found that its franchisees were cooking pizzas at a range of temperatures, making the quality of the pies inconsistent, Thanawala said. The company is working with restaurant owners to recalibrate their ovens and improve the final product through better pizza builds.

The chain is closing some North American restaurants to focus on boosting sales at locations the company believes are primed for growth. Other locations just need a face-lift, Thanawala said.

“It’s a brand that requires some work,” he said.

The new owners of California Pizza Kitchen are betting that people will keep eating pizza. Success, however, means offering more than the same basic pies people can get from fast-food chains, said Cory Baker, managing partner at Consortium Brand Partners, the firm that bought the pizza chain with other investors.

California Pizza Kitchen aims to highlight its diverse sit-down menu, which includes cedar plank salmon and braised short rib served with pappardelle pasta. The company also wants to expand its sales of products sold in grocery stores.

“There are certain things you can depend on in life, and death, taxes and pizza are among them,” Baker said.

Restaurant chains explore strategy changes as sales slow for food-delivery mainstay

Pizza restaurants are now outnumbered by coffee shops and Mexican-inspired eateries, with sales growth lagging behind the broader U.S. fast-food market.

Pizza’s ranking in U.S. sales among restaurant chains dropped to sixth place in 2024, down from second place in the 1990s.

Several pizza chains, including Pieology Pizzeria, have filed for bankruptcy, and others including Pizza Hut and Papa John’s are considering strategic moves.

The restaurant industry is trying to figure out whether America has hit peak pizza.

Once the second-most common U.S. restaurant type, pizzerias are now outnumbered by coffee shops and Mexican food eateries, according to industry data. Sales growth at pizza restaurants has lagged behind the broader fast-food market for years, and the outlook ahead isn’t much brighter.

“Pizza is disrupted right now,” Ravi Thanawala, chief financial officer and North America president at Papa John’s International, said in an interview. “That’s what the consumer tells us.”

The parent of the Pieology Pizzeria chain filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in December. Others, including the parent of Anthony’s Coal Fired Pizza & Wings and Bertucci’s Brick Oven Pizza & Pasta, earlier filed for bankruptcy.

Pizza once was a novelty outside big U.S. cities, providing room for growth for independent shops and then chains such as Pizza Hut with its red roof dine-in restaurants. Purpose-made cardboard boxes and fleets of delivery drivers helped make pizza a takeout staple for those seeking low-stress meals.

Today, pizza shops are engaged in price wars with one another and other kinds of fast food. Food-delivery apps have put a wider range of cuisines and options at Americans’ fingertips. And $20 a pie for a family can feel expensive compared with $5 fast-food deals, frozen pizzas or eating a home-cooked meal.

Major pizza players are rethinking their businesses. Pizza Hut, Papa John’s and the parent of Papa Murphy’s are considering potential sales, or other strategic moves. Midsize chains including Blaze Pizza and Mod Pizza have closed locations over the past two years as they work to turn around their brands.

California Pizza Kitchen was sold in December to an investor group for under $300 million, according to people familiar with the matter. That is less than the $470 million it sold for in 2011, when the chain went private.

Americans still eat a lot of pizza. Pizza chains generated around $31 billion in sales from their restaurants in 2024, the market-research firm Technomic said. On any given day, around one in 10 Americans will partake of a slice, according to the Agriculture Department. Young people drive much of the consumption.

Pizza’s dominance in American restaurant fare is declining, however. Among different cuisines, it ranked sixth in terms of U.S. sales in 2024 among restaurant chains, down from second place during the 1990s, Technomic said.

The number of pizza restaurants in the U.S. hit a record high in 2019 and has declined since then, figures from the market-research firm Datassential show.

Austin Rowland ate a lot of pizza during the pandemic lockdown, but said he rarely orders it now because he sees better food options. The 26-year-old financial planner sticks with deals on the Domino’s Pizza app when he does.

“I’d feel silly paying 50% to 100% more anywhere else even if I can afford it,” said Rowland, who lives in Georgia.

As growth in pizza sales stagnates, competition between restaurants has intensified. Sales at Domino’s have grown as the pizza chain has rolled out deals such as a $9.99 offering for a large pie with toppings.

At Pizza Hut, U.S. sales at locations open at least a year have declined for eight straight quarters. Moreover, it has hundreds of dine-in locations, which occupy larger footprints, are more costly to operate, and account for a shrinking slice of where people eat pizza.

Chains seek ‘face-lift’

Papa John’s has opened the door to selling the company, though executives said they are focused on a broad turnaround strategy. The chain has spent the past year assessing its business, with executives looking to change everything from its franchising strategy to how it builds its pizzas.

Consumers are becoming choosier, and Papa John’s has to step up its menu offerings and value, said Thanawala, the chain’s CFO. That means offering more side dishes at good prices, including ones baked in the chain’s ovens.

Papa John’s found that its franchisees were cooking pizzas at a range of temperatures, making the quality of the pies inconsistent, Thanawala said. The company is working with restaurant owners to recalibrate their ovens and improve the final product through better pizza builds.

The chain is closing some North American restaurants to focus on boosting sales at locations the company believes are primed for growth. Other locations just need a face-lift, Thanawala said.

“It’s a brand that requires some work,” he said.

The new owners of California Pizza Kitchen are betting that people will keep eating pizza. Success, however, means offering more than the same basic pies people can get from fast-food chains, said Cory Baker, managing partner at Consortium Brand Partners, the firm that bought the pizza chain with other investors.

California Pizza Kitchen aims to highlight its diverse sit-down menu, which includes cedar plank salmon and braised short rib served with pappardelle pasta. The company also wants to expand its sales of products sold in grocery stores.

“There are certain things you can depend on in life, and death, taxes and pizza are among them,” Baker said.

Danish prime minister says US has no right to annex Arctic island

Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen called on US President Donald Trump and his allies to stop threatening to seize Greenland as tensions flared between the Nato allies following Washington’s intervention in Venezuela.

Trump said on Sunday “we do need Greenland”, and the wife of one of his closest allies posted a map of Greenland with the US flag across the Danish territory on the social media platform X, accompanied by the sole word “soon”.

Frederiksen on Sunday evening made her most significant rebuff of Trump and the US following his comments about the vast Arctic island in an interview with The Atlantic.

She said: “I have to say this very directly to the United States: it makes absolutely no sense to talk about the need for the US to take over Greenland . . . I would therefore strongly urge the US to stop threats against a historically close ally.”

Her comments came after Greenland’s Prime Minister Jens Frederik Nielsen described the map of the Danish territory posted by Katie Miller — wife of Trump’s deputy chief of staff and influential adviser Stephen Miller — as “disrespectful”.

Nielsen said the US rhetoric was “entirely unacceptable” and added: “Enough is enough. No more pressure. No more insinuations. No more fantasies of annexation.”

Speaking on Air Force One later on Sunday night as he flew back to Washington from Florida, Trump repeated that the US needed control of Greenland.

“We need Greenland from the standpoint of national security, and Denmark is not going to be able to do it,” he said, quipping, “I can tell you to boost up security in Greenland, they added one more dog sled.”

Trump added that “the European Union needs us to have it”.

Trump’s military intervention in Venezuela has been portrayed by him and senior US officials as part of a concept of “hemispheric defence” in which America calls the shots throughout the Americas.

US officials have also included Greenland — geographically part of North America but territorially part of Denmark and Nato — in that concept.

Trump has insisted for the past year that the US would take control of Greenland and has accused Denmark of neglecting its territory and Arctic security.

But Frederiksen said on Sunday evening the US had “no right to annex one of the three countries” in the kingdom of Denmark, which also includes the Faroe Islands.

She added the kingdom “and thus Greenland is part of Nato and is therefore covered by the alliance’s security guarantee”.

The Danish prime minister also pointed out the US has a defence agreement with Copenhagen that gives it the right to have a military base on Greenland.

The US has in recent decades significantly scaled back its presence on Greenland, from more than 10,000 soldiers to fewer than 200 now.

But Trump and his vice-president JD Vance have claimed Denmark has failed to look after Greenland’s security, even as Copenhagen has in recent months pledged to spend more than $4bn on boosting it.

Jesper Møller Sørensen, Denmark’s ambassador to the US, responded to Miller’s social media post by saying: “We expect full respect for the territorial integrity of the kingdom of Denmark.”

Tracy (Chi)

• Pentagon-Driven Strategy: The operation was a military-led necessity to address existential threats, while the "oil narrative" served as domestic political cover.
• Mineral Security: The real prize is the Orinoco Mining Arc; the U.S. moved to break China’s monopoly on critical minerals (coltan, tantalum) essential for weapons.
• Adversary Expulsion: The goal was to dismantle the "Adversary Trifecta": Chinese supply chains, Iranian drone factories, and Russian military advisors.
• Geographic Threat: Iran’s drone manufacturing and Russia’s air defense integration in Venezuela created an "intolerable" threat within strike range of Florida.
• Timing vs. Resource: The 2026 timing aligns with China’s 2025 mineral export bans, not oil production levels, which have remained degraded for years.

The Real Reason the Pentagon Approved Venezuela: Critical Minerals and Adversary Expulsion

Understanding the Decision Architecture

Before examining the strategic calculus behind the January 3, 2026 military operation in Venezuela, it is essential to understand who actually makes decisions of this magnitude. In the American national security apparatus, the Pentagon does not await presidential direction on major military operations. The Pentagon assesses threats, evaluates strategic priorities, and determines when military action crosses from option to necessity. The president then executes what the military establishment has already decided is required.

This is not constitutional theory. This is operational reality. When the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and theater commanders present a unified position that a specific threat configuration demands military response, civilian leadership approves or faces the political consequences of overriding the uniformed military on national security grounds. Trump’s public statements about oil and his claim that Venezuela’s resources will benefit the United States represent the political narrative constructed to sell the operation domestically. The Pentagon’s determination that adversary presence and critical mineral vulnerabilities required kinetic action represents the actual decision calculus.

The targeting package, operational timeline, force structure, and strategic objectives were determined by military planners based on threat assessment and capability requirements. The decision to strike was made when the Pentagon concluded that the convergence of Chinese resource control, Iranian weapons manufacturing, and Russian military integration exceeded acceptable risk parameters. Trump’s role was to authorize what had already been deemed militarily necessary and provide political cover through public messaging about drugs and oil.

This matters because the oil narrative, while politically convenient, obscures the actual strategic imperatives that drove Pentagon approval. Understanding what the military establishment determined was worth the largest US operation in Latin America since 1989 requires looking past presidential rhetoric to threat assessments and capability vulnerabilities that define Pentagon planning.

The prevailing narrative surrounding the operation centers on oil and narcotics trafficking. This framing is politically convenient but strategically incomplete. Yes, the Pentagon has approved military operations for oil before. Iraq 2003 stands as definitive proof that oil access, regional control, and maintaining petrodollar hegemony can justify kinetic action, regardless of whatever WMD theater gets constructed for public consumption.

But Venezuelan oil in 2026 does not meet the strategic threshold that Iraqi oil did in 2003. Iraq represented control of Middle East oil flows at a critical chokepoint, leverage over global pricing through OPEC’s largest reserves, petrodollar system maintenance, and prevention of a regional hegemon controlling Gulf supplies. Venezuela represents collapsed production (700,000 barrels per day versus Iraq’s potential 3+ million), Western Hemisphere location with no chokepoint control, degraded infrastructure, and a country already sanctioned and marginalized from global markets.

If this were purely about oil, the operation would have happened in 2019 during the Guaidó crisis when production was higher and infrastructure less damaged. The timing in 2026 corresponds to when critical minerals became the Pentagon’s top priority ($7.5 billion allocation), when China restricted rare earth exports (April 2025) demonstrating willingness to weaponize supply chains, when Chinese buyers achieved operational control of Venezuelan mining operations, when IRGC drone manufacturing facilities became operational, and when Russian military advisers reached comprehensive integration with Venezuelan forces.

What justifies this action, from a Pentagon strategic perspective, is the convergence of three existential threats from America’s three primary adversaries. China has embedded operational control into critical mineral extraction that feeds weapons manufacturing. Iran has established drone production facilities within strike range of the continental United States. Russia has deployed military advisers and integrated air defense systems in the Caribbean. Venezuela represents the only location where all three adversaries operate simultaneously. The oil is secondary. Breaking Chinese supply chain dominance, eliminating Iranian manufacturing capability, and expelling Russian military presence are primary.

The Department of War has allocated $7.5 billion under the One Big Beautiful Bill Act specifically for critical minerals, with $1 billion already deployed to stockpile antimony, bismuth, cobalt, indium, scandium, and tantalum. This is not economic policy. This is national security infrastructure. The United States is 100% import reliant for 12 critical minerals and over 50% reliant for 28 of the 50 minerals classified as essential to national security. These materials are not interchangeable. They cannot be substituted. They form the irreducible foundation of modern weapons systems.

China controls between 60% and 95% of global processing capacity for most critical minerals. More critically, China processes 91% of rare earth elements globally. When the Pentagon needs neodymium for permanent magnets in missile guidance systems, or tantalum for capacitors in radar equipment, or cobalt for superalloys in fighter jet engines, those materials pass through Chinese refineries. This creates a chokepoint that Beijing demonstrated willingness to exploit when it imposed export restrictions on rare earths in April 2025 as retaliation for US tariffs.

The Pentagon’s stockpiling initiative targets the exact materials found in Venezuela’s southern mining regions. Tantalum, derived from coltan ore, received $100 million in procurement funding. Antimony secured $245 million. Cobalt warranted $500 million. These are not market purchases. These are strategic reserve acquisitions designed to ensure weapons production continuity during supply chain disruption. The fact that Pentagon allocated this funding demonstrates that critical minerals have been elevated to the same strategic priority tier as ammunition and fuel.

Hugo Chávez understood what he possessed when he announced in 2009 that Venezuela held vast reserves of coltan, which he termed “blue gold.” He explicitly connected it to African conflicts, noting wars fought over this mineral used in “long-range rockets.” The Orinoco Mining Arc, spanning 111,843 square kilometers across Bolívar and Amazonas states, contains documented deposits of coltan (tantalum ore), cassiterite (tin ore), rare earth elements, bauxite, gold, and speculative lithium reserves.

Coltan is essential for manufacturing tantalum capacitors used in every advanced electronic system, including military communications equipment, missile guidance computers, and radar systems. Rare earth elements enable the permanent magnets required for precision-guided munitions, aircraft actuators, and electromagnetic systems. Cassiterite provides tin for solder in all electronics assembly, including defense systems. Bauxite feeds aluminum production for aerospace applications.

These are not theoretical deposits. Investigative reporting documented Chinese buyers operating directly at mining sites in Bolívar state. The Venezuelan government established official collection centers in Los Pijiguaos and Morichalito in 2023 specifically for cassiterite, coltan, nickel, rhodium, and titanium. The Maduro regime designated these as strategic resources for commercialization, meaning state control over extraction and export, with Chinese buyers integrated into official operations from the start.

The supply chain from Venezuelan mines to Chinese refineries operates through both formal and informal channels, with Chinese buyers exercising operational control at the extraction source. Minerals extracted in the Orinoco Arc move by river and air transport to Colombian border towns, then to Bogotá for smelting into refined bars. These materials are relabeled under incorrect tariff codes, transforming raw ore into processed ferro-tantalum or other classifications that obscure origin. Final export occurs through Colombian ports at Santa Marta and Buenaventura, destined for Chinese processing facilities.

Once Venezuelan minerals blend with Colombian or Brazilian ore in these intermediary steps, tracing origin becomes effectively impossible. This laundering mechanism allows Venezuelan minerals to enter legitimate global supply chains, including those feeding US defense contractors. The result is Pentagon weapons systems potentially incorporating materials extracted under Chinese buyer supervision in Venezuelan territory, then processed in Chinese refineries controlled by Beijing.

Chinese buyers do not operate at arm’s length through market transactions. They coordinate directly at the mining sites with both Colombian guerrilla groups (ELN, FARC dissidents) who control physical security and Venezuelan state security (SEBIN) who facilitate transport using official government vehicles. One miner described seeing Chinese operatives and ELN commanders “eating together, buying material together, and getting off the helicopter together.” This is not commercial activity. This is integrated operational control where Chinese buyers work directly with armed groups and state officials to extract strategic minerals.

The Venezuelan government’s establishment of official collection centers in Los Pijiguaos and Morichalito created state sanction for Chinese operations. These are not informal smuggling networks. These are officially designated strategic resource commercialization centers where Chinese buyers coordinate with Venezuelan state mining corporation CVM. China has positioned itself to control Venezuelan critical mineral output at the source, ensuring materials flow to Chinese processing facilities regardless of sanctions or formal government policy.

China’s 2025 export restrictions on rare earths, imposed as retaliation for US tariffs, intensified global competition for alternative sources and demonstrated Beijing’s willingness to weaponize critical mineral supply chains when convenient. Western nations seeking to diversify away from Chinese processing looked to Venezuela, only to discover Chinese buyers already controlled extraction operations. This is strategic encirclement where China dominates both global processing infrastructure and alternative source extraction. Venezuela represents one of the few significant sources of coltan, rare earths, and related minerals outside direct Chinese territorial control, but Chinese operational presence at the mining sites makes these resources effectively Chinese-controlled despite Western Hemisphere location.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed in December 2025 what intelligence services had documented for years. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps maintains an “anchor presence” in Venezuela, with Hezbollah operating alongside. This is not diplomatic liaison. This is operational infrastructure.

Documented Iranian weapons transfers to Venezuela since 2020 include Mohajer-6 unmanned aerial vehicles with 2,000 kilometer operational range, sufficient to reach any target in Florida. Venezuela has publicly displayed these systems in military parades from 2021 through 2023. The Alma Research and Education Center, an Israeli defense research organization, catalogued the specific systems and noted that “IRGC operatives stationed in Venezuela can target US assets or navy ships in the Caribbean or directly attack American soil.”

More concerning than individual weapons transfers is Iran’s decision to outsource drone production to Venezuela. Manufacturing facilities now exist on Venezuelan territory capable of producing offensive drones domestically. This represents permanent Iranian military-industrial presence in the Western Hemisphere, not temporary weapons sales. An October 2020 IRGC cargo flight from Tehran to Caracas was met by approximately 10 container trucks and 40 personnel upon landing. Then-State Department official Elliott Abrams warned that “transfer of long-range missiles from Iran to Venezuela is not acceptable to the United States and will not be tolerated.”

The Iranian presence includes Zolfaghar-class fast attack boats armed with CM-90 anti-ship missiles, the export version of Iran’s Nasr system. These missiles have 55 mile range and travel at 760 miles per hour using active radar guidance. Venezuelan Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López was filmed touring the CM-90 workshop at Puerto Cabello. These are not defensive capabilities. These are area denial systems designed to threaten US naval operations in the Caribbean.

Hezbollah networks in Venezuela extend beyond weapons to include fundraising, logistics, and operational planning infrastructure. These networks have operated for years in the tri-border region of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, as well as on Venezuela’s Margarita Island. The concern is not that Hezbollah will disappear if Maduro falls. The concern is that these networks provide Iran with persistent intelligence, financial, and operational capabilities in the Americas that survive regime changes.

From a Pentagon perspective, the existence of Iranian drone manufacturing facilities 1,200 miles from Miami, combined with demonstrated willingness to transfer missile systems and Hezbollah operational infrastructure, represents an intolerable threat posture. This is not about narcotics. This is about adversary power projection capability within strike range of the continental United States.

Over 120 Russian troops operate in Venezuela under Lieutenant General Oleg Makarevich, leading what Ukrainian intelligence identifies as the “Equator Task Force.” This is not symbolic presence. Makarevich is the same general who commanded the operation to destroy the Kakhovka Dam in Ukraine, causing catastrophic flooding. His deployment to Venezuela leading a rotational advisory mission indicates Moscow’s assessment of strategic importance.

Russian advisers provide training across multiple domains including infantry, drone operations, special forces, military intelligence, signals intelligence, armor, aircraft, artillery, and domestic surveillance. They are positioned in Caracas, Maracaibo, La Guaira, and Aves Island. This is comprehensive military-to-military integration, not limited technical assistance.

Venezuela’s military operates Russian-supplied Sukhoi Su-30 fighters armed with Kh-31 anti-ship missiles, the same systems that forced US Navy planners in the 1990s to develop specific countermeasures due to their speed and sea-skimming flight profile. Venezuelan air defense includes S-125 Pechora, Buk-M2E, and thousands of Igla-S surface-to-air missile systems positioned near oil facilities, radar sites, and naval approaches. While aging, these systems remain capable of threatening helicopters and lower-flying aircraft.

Russian radar arrays and Chinese communication relays create what military planners term a “contested electromagnetic spectrum.” US forces cannot assume undetected operations or unjammed communications. This is anti-access area denial infrastructure in the Caribbean, 1,200 miles from American territory. Russian cargo flights continue delivering military equipment. Venezuelan officials have requested assistance refurbishing Su-30 fighters and acquiring 14 additional missile systems from Moscow.

The strategic calculation from a Pentagon perspective is straightforward. Russia is establishing military infrastructure, training networks, and operational familiarity in America’s strategic backyard exactly as the United States has done in Russia’s near abroad. The difference is proximity. Venezuelan territory sits far closer to the continental United States than Ukraine sits to Western Europe. If the Pentagon tolerates Russian military advisory missions in Venezuela, complete with signals intelligence training and air defense systems, it accepts adversary power projection capability in the Western Hemisphere.

The Pentagon has absolutely approved military operations for oil before. Iraq 2003 stands as definitive proof. The Gulf wars were fundamentally about oil access, regional control, and maintaining petrodollar hegemony, regardless of the WMD narrative constructed for public consumption. So the question is not whether Pentagon acts for oil. The question is why Venezuelan oil in 2026 does not meet the strategic threshold that Iraqi oil did in 2003.

Iraq represented multiple converging strategic imperatives. Control of Middle East oil flows at the critical Persian Gulf chokepoint through which roughly 20% of global oil supply transits. Leverage over global pricing through the second-largest proven reserves in OPEC. Petrodollar system maintenance by ensuring oil transactions continue in dollars. Prevention of a hostile regional hegemon controlling Gulf supplies that could weaponize energy access against Western economies. Iraqi oil production potential exceeded 3 million barrels per day with room to expand significantly. The infrastructure, while damaged by sanctions, remained fundamentally intact and capable of rapid restoration.

Venezuela in 2026 presents none of these conditions. Production has collapsed from peak levels of 3 million barrels per day to approximately 700,000 barrels per day due to sanctions, mismanagement, and lack of investment. The infrastructure is severely degraded and would require tens of billions in reconstruction before reaching previous output levels. Venezuela’s location in the Western Hemisphere provides no chokepoint control. The country has already been sanctioned and marginalized from global markets for years. There is no scenario where Venezuelan oil becomes critical to global supply when the United States possesses the largest proven domestic reserves, plus ready access to Canadian heavy oil, Saudi and UAE production, and expanding shale capacity.

The timing reveals the actual priorities. If this were primarily about oil, the operation would have occurred in 2019 during the Guaidó crisis when production stood at roughly 1 million barrels per day, infrastructure was less damaged, and international support for regime change was stronger. The operation in January 2026 corresponds precisely to when critical minerals became the Pentagon’s top funding priority with $7.5 billion allocated, when China imposed rare earth export restrictions in April 2025 demonstrating willingness to weaponize supply chains, when Chinese operational control of Venezuelan mining reached full integration, and when IRGC drone manufacturing facilities became operational on Venezuelan soil.

The targeting pattern confirms this. Strikes hit Fort Tiuna military complex, Miranda Airbase, La Guaira port, telecommunications infrastructure, and presidential facilities. These are command and control targets designed for regime removal and military degradation. Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA reported that production and refining operations continued normally with no damage to key facilities. If oil were the primary objective, refineries and production infrastructure would have been priority targets for either seizure or destruction. They were not touched.

Trump’s public statements about running Venezuela and controlling oil production serve domestic political messaging. The American public understands oil. The narrative has been established since Iraq. Framing the operation around oil control provides simple, familiar justification that requires no explanation of tantalum supply chain vulnerabilities or IRGC manufacturing infrastructure. But Pentagon planners do not work from public narratives. They work from threat assessments and strategic vulnerability calculations.

The Pentagon approved this operation because Venezuela presented a convergence of strategic threats from all three major US adversaries that exceeded the threshold for military action, with each adversary establishing operational presence that created compounding strategic vulnerabilities.

China embedded operational control at Venezuelan mining sites where critical minerals essential to weapons manufacturing are extracted. Chinese buyers coordinate directly with armed groups and state security, not through arm’s length market transactions. These materials flow through laundering networks to Chinese processing facilities that control 91% of global rare earth refining capacity. China demonstrated willingness to weaponize this supply chain dominance through April 2025 export restrictions. The result is complete Chinese control from extraction through processing of materials that feed into Pentagon weapons systems, with that control exercised on Western Hemisphere territory.

Iran established drone manufacturing facilities on Venezuelan territory with 2,000 kilometer strike range covering Florida and the entire Caribbean. This represents permanent Iranian military-industrial presence in the Western Hemisphere, not temporary weapons transfers. Combined with Hezbollah operational networks for intelligence and logistics, anti-ship missile systems, and fast attack boats, Iran has created offensive capability 1,200 miles from continental United States. Sanctions and diplomatic pressure failed to eliminate this infrastructure over multiple years.

Russia deployed over 120 military advisers under a general who commanded major operations in Ukraine, providing comprehensive training in signals intelligence, drone operations, special forces, and domestic surveillance. Russian radar arrays combined with Chinese communication relays create contested electromagnetic spectrum in the Caribbean. Russian air defense integration and ongoing weapons deliveries create adversary military infrastructure within operational range of American territory.

These are not separate threats that happen to coexist in the same geography. These are integrated operations where Chinese communication systems support Russian radar arrays, where Iranian weapons manufacturing benefits from Chinese supply chain infrastructure, where Russian military training enhances Venezuelan capability to protect Chinese mining operations and Iranian production facilities. The three adversaries are mutually reinforcing each other’s operational effectiveness on Venezuelan territory.

The operation targeted all three threats simultaneously. Regime removal eliminates the political framework that invited and protected Chinese resource capture, IRGC manufacturing presence, and Russian military integration. Military strikes degrade Iranian drone production infrastructure and Venezuelan offensive capabilities supported by Russian systems. Capture of Maduro and key officials disrupts the corrupt networks that facilitated Chinese buyer access to mining sites, IRGC weapons transfers, and Russian adviser deployment.

Post-operation control allows the United States to reconfigure mineral extraction under conditions that prevent Chinese processing monopolization, dismantle Iranian manufacturing facilities, and expel Russian advisers. This is not about seizing resources for profit. This is about denying all three major adversaries access to strategic assets and removing their combined military presence from the Western Hemisphere in the same way that Iraq was about ensuring oil flows remained under conditions favorable to US strategic interests.

The oil narrative persists because it provides simple explanation for public consumption and builds on established precedent from Iraq. The reality is more complex and more threatening. Venezuela became the only location in the Western Hemisphere where all three major US adversaries established simultaneous operational presence. China controlled critical mineral extraction essential to weapons manufacturing. Iran manufactured offensive weapons systems within strike range of American territory. Russia integrated military advisory missions and air defense systems.

This convergence transformed Venezuela from a problematic narco-state into a strategic threat that exceeded the Pentagon’s tolerance threshold. Critical minerals are the foundation of modern weapons systems in the same way that oil access was foundation of 20th century military operations. Chinese monopolization of processing creates supply chain vulnerability that sanctions and market mechanisms cannot resolve, equivalent to hostile control of Persian Gulf chokepoints. Chinese operational control at extraction sites in the Western Hemisphere represents strategic encirclement. Iranian drone manufacturing 1,200 miles from Miami represents unacceptable adversary power projection. Russian military integration provides intelligence capabilities and force projection platform.

The Pentagon approved Iraq for oil because controlling Middle East energy flows was strategically critical in that context. The Pentagon approved Venezuela for critical minerals and adversary expulsion because breaking Chinese supply chain monopolization while eliminating Iranian and Russian military presence is strategically critical in this context. Both operations share the same logic. Secure access to irreplaceable strategic resources. Deny adversaries leverage over critical supply chains. Remove threats to American military capability and homeland security.

Trump talks about oil because voters understand oil and the narrative has been established since Iraq. The Pentagon planned this operation around breaking Chinese resource control, eliminating Iranian manufacturing capability, and expelling Russian military presence because generals understand strategic vulnerabilities in contemporary threat environments where China, Iran, and Russia operate as coordinated adversaries. The oil narrative is theater.

Private equity firms sell assets to themselves at a record rate

So-called continuation vehicles set to account for a fifth of sales by the sector in 2025

Private equity firms sold companies to themselves at a record rate this year, making use of a controversial tactic to hold on to assets as managers struggled to find buyers or list their investments.

Roughly a fifth of all PE sales this year involved groups raising money from new investors to acquire businesses from their older funds, up from 12-13 per cent the previous year, said Sunaina Sinha Haldea, global head of private capital advisory at Raymond James.

Such transactions sell assets already owned by a PE group to so-called continuation vehicles — newer funds also managed by the firm. The tactic enables PE firms to return cash to investors in older funds, but has prompted concerns about potential conflicts of interest.

“This year is set to break all records,” added Sinha Haldea, predicting that the final figures for 2025 would show $107bn in such sales, up from $70bn last year.

Skip Fahrholz, who oversees such transactions in Europe at investment bank Jefferies, concurred that the global total for the year for sales involving continuation vehicles would be close to $100bn.

The use of the structure has boomed in recent years as buyout firms have struggled to secure the valuations they want from external buyers or public markets, choosing instead to hold on to investments in hope of fetching more in the future.

In a deal valuing the company at €15bn, European private equity house PAI Partners sold part of its stake in Froneri, an ice cream group that includes brands such as Häagen-Dazs in the US, to a continuation vehicle for the second time.

Vista Equity Partners, New Mountain Capital and Inflexion also used multibillion-dollar continuation funds to sell down some of their largest investments.

Sinha Haldea said such transactions had become “a popular and effective win-win-win liquidity solution in a stressed exit environment, where exit values are still recovering from 2024 lows”.

The structure is attractive to buyout firms because such deals generate extra management fees and potentially lucrative future performance fees from companies in ageing funds.

Per Franzén, chief executive of Sweden’s EQT, which has yet to use a continuation vehicle, said recently that he wanted to begin such deals to generate extra fees on some of the firm’s holdings. 

But some backers of PE funds such as pension funds are concerned that in such transactions the same buyout firm is on both the sell and buy sides of a deal.

Some investors fear firms could underplay the value of the assets being transferred, to the detriment of the original fund backers being offered an exit.

PE managers say they offer their original backers the chance to roll their stakes into the new fund and that new investors help set the price at which assets are transferred.

But investors used to backing funds on the strength of their managers rather than analysing assets may lack the skill set or capacity to evaluate individual companies.

Sovereign wealth fund Abu Dhabi Investment Council recently sued US private equity firm Energy & Minerals Group for what it claimed was an attempt to short-change investors on the sale of its stake in a company to a continuation vehicle.

The Abu Dhabi fund alleged EMG had undervalued Ascent Resources when planning to sell the gas driller to itself in a deal that would have increased the buyout firm’s ownership and restarted its ability to earn fees on the group.

EMG ended up halting the deal. Multiple investment groups have since offered to buy Ascent.

Continuation deals used to be seen as an option of last resort for more troubled companies that could not be sold. But the vehicles have also recently been used as a way to keep hold of strongly performing companies.

Investors in private equity funds still favour traditional asset sales.

Consultancy Bain & Co, considered an authority in the industry, recently found that almost two-thirds of investors in private equity funds would prefer companies to exit holdings conventionally through sales or initial public offerings.

Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt is getting into the AI and data center race with his new startup, and he’s betting on rural West Texas and a failed railroad turned oil giant to help him build enough power to light up 7 million homes.

chmidt’s new Bolt Data & Energy is taking the one-stop shop approach for hyperscalers’ land, power, and water needs for their data center campuses. Bolt has teamed up with Texas Pacific Land, a little-known oil and gas player with a long history and a $20 billion market cap that happens to offer 882,000 acres of West Texas land—more acreage than Rhode Island—with easy access to natural gas and renewable energy resources. Oh, and the company just so happens to have its own water services business for oil and gas that can translate to help for thirsty data centers as well.

“Energy is the main constraint in scaling AI. If we want to keep America competitive, we have to solve this problem. Bolt was created to address this challenge,” Schmidt said in an emailed interview with Fortune. “We realized that combining my technical expertise with TPL’s unrivaled land, abundant water, and access to low-cost energy could create the infrastructure needed to meet the virtually infinite demand for compute.”

Having literally co-authored the book on AI—The Age of AI: And Our Human Future, in 2021, a year before the launch of ChatGPT—Schmidt sees the age of AI and advanced robotics as the “Fourth Industrial Revolution.” He believes data center campus developers such as Bolt are necessary to compete with China in the global AI race.

“Our platform begins with West Texas’ abundant natural gas but is designed to transition to renewable and clean energy, with nuclear power also included in future plans,” Schmidt said. “By integrating land, power generation, and data centers, we can create a scalable, resilient infrastructure capable of meeting the growing global demand for compute. Our goal is to ensure AI develops responsibly, supports American competitiveness, and delivers technology that benefits humanity while minimizing climate impact.”

Schmidt, 70, served as Google’s CEO for a decade, from 2001 to 2011, and then continued as executive chairman of Google and then Alphabet through 2017 and as technical advisor until 2020. He’s stayed plenty busy since, though. He’s also now the CEO of aerospace manufacturer Relatively Space, and cofounder of the non-profit that organizes the AI+ Expo for National Competitiveness.

Schmidt is the chairman of Bolt, and he cofounded it with Investors Todd Meister and Allan Tessler, who is a major investor in Texas Pacific Land. To date, Bolt has raised $150 million in initial capital, with TPL contributing a $50 million investment, including right of first refusal to supply critical water resources to the new data center projects.

“We felt like we wanted to capture more of the value chain than just a land lease or a water contract, so that’s why we actually invested in Bolt,” Texas Pacific Land CEO Ty Glover told Fortune. “When you’re looking at who you might want to partner with in a space that you’re not an expert in, then who better than a titan of that industry like Eric Schmidt.”

To understand how Texas Pacific Land came by such a massive acreage holding, it helps to look back at its history of more than 150 years.

The railroad failed for a variety of financial reasons, but it resulted in the formation of the Texas Pacific Land Trust to manage the railroad’s acreage. That acreage became quite valuable when the Texas oil boom took hold in the Permian Basin more than a century ago.

Texas Pacific has been publicly traded for almost 100 years, but it existed as a sleepy trust collecting oil and gas royalties until 2021, when an investor feud resulted in the trust converting into a much more proactive corporation.

“Coming from a failed railroad to a gorilla in the oil and gas space and now entering the AI space is exciting. It’s a new frontier for us and for West Texas,” Glover said.

As legacy data center regions like Virginia get saturated with facilities, the frontier regions such as West Texas are going be more attractive, Glover said, with easier regulatory environments and more sparse populations.

“Our hope is we’re moving dirt on projects within the next couple of years,” he said. “What’s attractive about TPL is we can really scale this. You can build multiple, multi-gig data center campuses with one owner. Just like in other industries, scale really matters here.”

Schmidt said Bolt plans to start with one anchor customer and grow from there. He name-dropped many potential anchors: Google, Microsoft, Meta, Amazon, Oracle, OpenAI, Anthropic, xAI, Palantir, and even the White House’s new Genesis Mission for AI.

Bolt is taking a bespoke approach similar to that of Texas-based AI power startup Fermi, backed by former U.S. energy secretary and Texas governor Rick Perry. Fermi launched an IPO in October before it had even started collecting revenue and quickly surged to a $16 billion market cap, though its value has since plunged to $5 billion at the end of 2025. However, Bolt is staying private and not banking on public investor interest in the AI boom.

The plan is to start with natural gas-fired power and grow to 1 gigawatt capacity, Schmidt said, then build more campuses as the power generation sources expand to include wind, solar, and battery power and, eventually, nuclear power over time. The goal is to grow to 10 gigawatts of power—enough to electrify about 7 million homes—on Texas Pacific Land acreage.

“We’re taking a different approach from traditional data center models that lease space and buy power from the grid. By vertically integrating energy ownership with advanced data infrastructure, we can design a platform that is both efficient and resilient,” Schmidt said.