After a Dramatic Implosion, Can Unity Software Resurrect Itself?A new CEO hopes to restore faith in a company once beloved by institutions like Sequoia Capital and creators of videogames such as Pokémon Go alike.
In mid-September 2023, Rami Ismail was at his home in the Netherlands when his phone began to buzz, buzz and buzz again. Ismail, a videogame developer who’d become well known for a hit iPhone game, Ridiculous Fishing, often received unsolicited messages from other indie designers, but even so, this was an unusually intense flurry of activity.
Every message asked a variation of the same question: “Have you seen what Unity has done?”
Ismail had spent the past few years as an advisor to fellow developers around the world, counseling them on how they might replicate the life-changing success he had enjoyed. Like Ismail, many of them had built their games using Unity, the game engine that today powers many of the smallest and largest games alike.
Videogame engines—the software used to build games—do not typically inspire passion or anguish, but Unity was different. The co-founders had established the business with a vision that was simple, ambitious and laudable: to democratize game development by making professional-grade tools available to everyone. Working from their native Denmark, they released the first version of their software in 2005, and Unity became one of the first game engines to support the iPhone, making it a go-to tool for mobile developers just as the App Store boom began. As a result, Unity was a darling among tech investors, backed by Silver Lake, Thrive Capital and Sequoia Capital. (Sequoia chief Roelof Boetha still sits on Unity’s board.)
Unity’s popularity derived not only from its mission but also from its generous economic model. For more than a decade, the company allowed smaller developers to use a free version as long as they showed Unity’s logo before the game started, like a studio graphic appearing before a film. Developers whose annual revenue exceeded $100,000 could then purchase a license at a flat cost of $1,500 or $75 a month. With such a low bar to entry, soon almost every indie developer began to build their games with Unity—and larger studios switched from its more expensive rivals. Even Unity-based games that made millions of dollars per month—like Pokémon Go and Genshin Impact—paid a maximum of $3,000 per seat—the cost for each individual user with access to the software.
But in September 2023, John Riccitiello, then Unity’s CEO, made a decision that undid nearly two decades’ worth of goodwill. In the Netherlands, Ismail read an announcement from Riccitiello in disbelief: Without warning, Unity had overhauled its pricing model. Customers would now pay a “Runtime Fee” every time someone installed their games, of as much as 20 cents per download. This fee applied retroactively, affecting previous downloads for games already released. The implications were immense. Genishin Impact, for example, had already been downloaded more than 225 million times. Its developers worried they might face a bill for $45 million.
One of the largest self-inflicted corporate blunders in recent memories was beginning to unfold. Few software companies have enjoyed such passionate customer loyalty as Unity—or have had such a stranglehold over their market. Unity vaporized both almost overnight. Its stock plummeted, falling from nearly $40 to $25 in a matter of weeks. Many of Unity’s highest profile customers announced they would abandon the tool. The company was even forced to temporarily close two of its offices following a “credible death threat.”
The unfolding drama made national headlines and the consequences have been profound and long-lasting, with Unity still struggling today to win back its customers’ trust. The task of resurrection falls now to new CEO Matthew Bromberg, a longtime industry veteran, who recalls marveling at Unity’s self-immolation when it began.
“The first thing that surprised me was just how massive a story it was becoming, how it resonated across culture,” said Bromberg, who was formerly chief operating officer at Zynga. “It was clearly and obviously an unfortunate decision.”
On the day it began, Ismail spoke to several of the developer teams he advised—some who ran four-person teams, others who oversaw more than a hundred employees. To these developers, however, wasn’t merely an “unfortunate” turn of events. It was an extinction-level event. “They’d done the math,” Ismail said. “The new model would instantly bankrupt them.”
In London, the news initially caught Saad Choudri, CEO of Miniclip, off guard—but not for long. Miniclip publishes Subway Surfers, one of the most-downloaded mobile games yet released, which runs on Unity. Within hours, his inbox was flooded with messages from industry peers. Some expressed confusion, others fury. All shared the same sense of disbelief: “You hear about something like that, and you think, ‘Wait, hang on. You’ve just changed the unit economics of our business in one fell swoop,’” Choudri recalled. “Without talking to us, without any consultation, without anything at all.” At Miniclip, the potential impact was ominous. “We generate near a billion installs a year,” he said. “And now we had to pay per install? It was just insane.”
At first, Choudri thought there must be a misunderstanding. But as further details emerged, it became clear: Unity was serious. He joined a private chat group—a space where leaders of some of the largest companies in mobile gaming gathered to discuss their response. “We determined that we couldn’t stand for this,” Choudri recalls.
While the CEOs debated what to do, other developers of popular indie games began to publicly express their anger and dismay. Mega Crit Games, developer of a hugely popular deck-building game, Slay the Spire, described the change as a “violation of trust” and vowed to move to a new engine if Unity didn’t immediately abandon the changes. (Mega Crit later did exactly that.) “We have never made a public statement before,” the message concluded. “That is how badly you f*cked up.”
Innersloth, maker of the viral hit Among Us, a game popular with streamers including the rapper Logic and the politician Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, posted: “This would harm not only us, but fellow game studios of all budgets and sizes.…Stop it. WTF?” Another developer likened the change to Adobe charging Photoshop users every time they open a JPEG.
Inside Unity, there was also widespread anger and frustration at a strategy many staff members had argued was unworkable. Ismail spoke to internal staff who expressed “utter defeat and surprise” at the announcement, he told me.
While others took to Twitter to denounce Unity, Choudri chose a different approach. He had a direct line to Riccitiello, who’d long been a controversial CEO. He decided to try to set up a call.
John Riccitiello’s arrival at Unity in 2014 marked the beginnings of a shift in the company’s culture. Riccitiello had previously run publicly traded Electronic Arts, where his chief concerns had been boosting the company’s revenue along with its stock price, even if some strategies—aggressive monetization, “pay to win” mechanics where players could unlock in-game advantages with real money, annualized franchises, and studio closures—angered players of its games. When Riccitiello went to Unity, he brought that focus along, and under his leadership the company became increasingly focused on monetization and expansion beyond games.
Unity did grow rapidly. From 2012 to 2014, the number of registered developers using the software more than tripled to 3.3 million users. And with that growth Riccitiello’s desire for more structure increased. Informal, open channels of communication—like the company-wide email list where employees once discussed Unity’s technical direction—became relics. “Unity used to feel like a European company that was making it big,” Kerry Turner, a developer who joined the company in 2016, told me. “But after a while, the American side of the business wasn’t just ‘on paper’ anymore. That was the company.”
For developers, the more significant shift was in Unity’s focus. Turner worked directly with studios, first on user education and support, then on enterprise contracts—the high-priced service packages Unity sold to major developers, with dedicated support engineers and account managers. During her early years, indie game makers were still a major part of Unity’s customer base. But by 2018, the company had reoriented toward growth areas that had little to do with building a good game engine.Where once Unity’s role had been to provide tools for developers, it was now hiring teams to build projects for clients—including corporations like BMW and other car manufacturers, for whom it provides dashboard technology. Turner remembers this shift as jarring: “When I started, Unity’s slogan was ‘Democratize game development.’ By the time I left, that had been dropped.”
Instead, Riccitiello aggressively expanded Unity Ads, pushing advertising and in-game monetization as key revenue drivers. In September 2020, he took Unity public, raising $1.3 billion in an IPO that signaled the company’s ambitions beyond videogames. The company pursued a string of acquisitions, buying film director Peter Jackson’s animation studio Weta Digital in 2021 to bolster its visual effects capabilities, and merging with digital advertising company ironSource in 2022 to strengthen its hold on mobile ad technology.
But as Unity grew, so did the tensions with its long-term users. In a 2022 interview, Riccitiello dismissed developers who didn’t prioritize monetization as “f*cking idiots.” The comment confirmed what many of Unity’s customers had long suspected: The CEO was profoundly unsuitable to lead a company that had for years championed the art, design and democratization of videogames, not their profitability.
When Turner left Unity in 2022, she thought the company had lost the identity that had made it special. She wasn’t alone. Many veteran employees who had believed in Unity’s original mission also began to leave—and with the announcement of the Runtime Fee change, a trickle became a deluge. “As a Unity employee until this morning, I assure you we fought like hell against this, brought up all the points everyone has, were told answers were coming, and then the announcement went out without warning,” wrote Jono Forbes, a senior software engineer at Unity, on Twitter. “Those of us who care are out.”
Two days after the pricing announcement, Choudri was on a call with Riccitiello, trying to understand how Unity had arrived at such a disastrous decision. “Riccitiello started talking about hypercasual games—how studios were using Unity for free, making wildly successful games, and Unity wasn’t seeing a cut,” he explains. “In his mind, they were trying to fix a problem: to get more value out of the engine.” But the way they went about it—retroactive fees and installation-based charges—was a total misfire.
Choudri explained to Riccitiello how the Runtime Fee would impact game distribution in developing markets. In places like India, Africa and Southeast Asia, free-to-play games––titles which make their money, not through downloads, but by upselling digital, in-game items see vast numbers of downloads but generate comparatively little revenue per user. Under Unity’s new model, publishers would pay more in fees to Unity than they were making. The simple result? “Games would no longer be released in those countries,” he said. Unity was built on the idea of democratizing game development—and now it was actively limiting the medium’s reach. “That sunk in, I think,” Choudri recalls. “I could feel the energy shift in John’s tone.”
In the days that followed, Unity’s response to the backlash caused further harm. Behind closed doors, it offered larger mobile studios a deal: If they used its LevelPlay mediation service for their in-game ads, the Runtime Fee would not apply. To many, this revealed the true motivation behind the decision: to strong-arm companies into subscribing to Unity’s ad service.
Rather than reversing course, the company doubled down. To many developers who had outlined the inherent issues with the model, this suggested that the Runtime Fee might be necessary to keep Unity financially stable. The subtext was chilling: If Unity itself believed it was at risk of collapse, then developers had no reason to trust in its future. “Developers choose engines for stability and reliability,” Ismail explained. “It’s a decision that will stick with you for two to three years of your life.”
Shortly after the initial announcement, Unity posted on its social media channels that it would reassess the plan. Within nine days, it announced that it would scrap the most controversial aspects of the fee. But the damage had already been done. Almost 3,000 employees would lose their jobs at the company as part of broader restructuring efforts amid the fallout from the Runtime Fee policy. Within the month, Riccitiello had left Unity and videogames completely. “He didn’t really understand how the mobile ecosystem worked,” Choudri said. “That’s what forced him to have to fall on his sword.” Today he co-runs a company that manufactures Pilates equipment. (Riccitiello did not respond to requests for comment.)
Matthew Bromberg was not looking for a way back into the videogame business when Unity came calling. After years at the top of major studios—Electronic Arts, Zynga—he had stepped back, content to let the industry march on without him.
But when Unity’s board approached him in late 2023, he felt drawn to the challenge of repairing a broken institution, and he took the job. He had done this kind of work before, joining Zynga in 2016 at a time when many had dismissed the once-dominant social gaming giant. Under his leadership, Zynga experienced notable success with titles like Empires & Puzzles and Merge Dragons!, contributing to the company’s highest quarterly mobile revenue at the time. But Unity was not just another company in the gaming industry—it was a pillar. “It’s a foundational company,” Bromberg said. “When Unity does better, the whole ecosystem does better.” From his vantage point, Unity had always been an extraordinary company, one that empowered both small indie teams and billion-dollar franchises, but it had also frustrated him. “There was always this feeling that it could be delivering more value,” he said.
He knew what he was walking into. Among Unity’s core customers, the Runtime Fee announcement only confirmed that the company had abandoned its founding mission. “It was the moment where everyone said, ‘This isn’t the company we signed up for,’” Bromberg said.
He spent his first months on the job listening. He flew across the world, meeting with developers—not to defend Unity’s past decisions but to feel the heat of their anger firsthand. What he found was not just resentment but disappointment—developers wanted Unity to succeed, but they no longer trusted its leadership. “You can’t run a business where you’re at war with your customers,” he said.
The mistake, Bromberg concluded, had been fundamental: Unity had tried to force developers into its broader ecosystem with a pricing model that felt like a punishment rather than a service. “The idea was, ‘Here’s this big charge that you probably don’t want to pay, but if you use our other services, you don’t have to pay it,’” he explained. “But you can’t create value that way. That’s not fundamental.” The response was swift, brutal and, in Bromberg’s view, justified. “Of course, people aren’t going to respond well to that,” he said. “It’s not substantive.”
A year after Unity announced those changes, Bromberg announced that Unity was fully retracting the Runtime Fee and reverting to its previous subscription-based model. Before he made a public announcement Bromberg called the CEOs of several other major partners to tell them the news personally. Miniclip’s Choudri was impressed: “I was quite emotional when he told me, because it felt like for once, a major company could be brave enough to step back from a disastrous situation.”
Bromberg committed to a more deliberate approach to software development, with a focus on stability. Unity 6, the latest version of the engine, released in October 2024, would be a stable platform developers could rely on long term. “We’re not going to rush to Unity 7,” he said. “Most of our customers will be on Unity 6 for the next 10 years, so we’re going to make it better, not abandon it for the next version.” The first update to Unity 6—due to release later this month—he said, is the most stable version of the engine ever released, a direct response to years of complaints about frequent, disruptive updates.
Bromberg believes these changes have already proven effective. “We’re already in a fundamentally different place with our customers than we were back then,” he said. According to Bromberg, subscriptions have started to grow again, while the non-games side of the business—providing tools to car-makers, and retail partners—has grown by fifty percent.
But even as Unity has stabilized, skeptics remain among its video game customers. Many indie developers, once Unity’s most ardent supporters, have sworn off the engine entirely, moving to Godot, an open-source alternative, or Unreal, Unity’s longtime rival, made by Tim Sweeney’s Epic Games. “Nobody trusts Unity anymore,” Ismail said. “If Unity could be so desperate for money that they would risk blowing up 15 years of goodwill, then no matter who leads it, no matter what happens—there is a proven risk they could fall over or do something similar again.”
And even among developers who haven’t abandoned Unity yet, many say they’re preparing for the day they might have to––despite the best efforts of Bromberg and his team.“The Venn diagram of developers I know who use Unity and the developers I know who are evaluating Unreal or Godot—it’s close to a perfect circle,” Ismail said. Unity’s most powerful partners feel skittish as well. “We now don’t feel comfortable knowing that we’re so beholden to one company,” Choudri told me.
Bromberg perhaps underestimates the scale of the continued unease many in the industry feel about Unity, 18 months after the disaster. “There are probably a couple of folks who are still upset,” he admits. “That’s OK. We’ll just keep working at it, and eventually we’ll turn them around.” For now, Unity remains in recovery mode, but Bromberg knows that at some point, the company will need to shift from damage control back to growth––although mergers and acquisitions are for now seemingly not part of that strategy.
The challenge will be finding a way to keep sight of the company’s mission and regaining the trust of the developers who made Unity what it is—a balancing act his predecessor failed to manage. “It’s critically important that the whole ecosystem is healthy and that the tools are accessible to everybody,” Bromberg said. “Because at the end of the day, our company is about that creative spark, creating something beautiful and new, and how…you bring that to the world.”
“They say trust takes years to build and seconds to break,” said Ismail. “You’d be hard-pressed to find a sequence of events more perfectly aligned to shatter the goodwill Unity had built over decades.” In his view, Unity’s monetization proposal is not just one of the biggest mistakes the company has made—it ranks among the most damaging missteps in videogame history. “On the scale of historical games industry f*ck-ups, Unity’s 2023 monetization proposal sits near the top.”