(TechCrunch) The Promise And Perils Of 3D Printer Popularity

The Promise And Perils Of 3D Printer Popularity

I’ve stopped writing about a few things recently, mostly because of fatigue. First, I’m not that interested in merchants accepting bitcoin – these little blips are primarily PR moves and little else and I just don’t get as wound up about mass adoption of BTC as the true believers. I’m also not interested in covering crowdfunded 3D printers. Same problem: fatigue and little change in the real market or the real conversation.

And this is not to say that I won’t cover your printer, makers. I will. You just better have an amazing story to tell and, luckily, many of you do. But I digress.

Take a look at this article by one Chopmeister. He addresses a number of my main concerns in a very straightforward way. “Each minute you spend learning about 3d printing and 3d printers before you commit to buying one will save you a nerve or two in the long run,” he writes in a bit of tortured but important prose. “Don’t fall for the catchwords.”
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And that’s all these crowdfunded 3D printers are: collections of “catchwords” (buzzwords, that is) strung together on the back of a piece of cheap hardware built by manufacturers eager to cash in on the 3D printing craze. While there are many noble and remarkable efforts in this space and there have been many successes in the space, I worry that many of us fools may soon be parted from our money if we’re not careful (myself included.)

3D printing is about to be commoditized. I would argue that the best commodity printer – the Canon color laser printer of this whole industry – is the Makerbot and the quality and value fall quickly from there from the quite interesting (Zortrax, Monkeyfab, Afinia, Formlabs) to the overly-hyped (Buccaneer, Makibox), to the potentially fraudulent.

So where does that leave the rest of these printers? Nowhere, really. Once larger manufacturers like HP and Dell see a niche they can exploit, they will swoop in an offer a razors and blades solution for the home 3D printer. The reason they haven’t done this yet is manifold. First, before Stratasys bought Makerbot, there was no real market. A few dozen printers were sold per day and the entire market was taken up by home hobbyists who had little interest in dropping a few thousand for a ready-made unit.

Most major 3D printer manufacturers had an odd problem: demand was seemingly huge, and they received more orders than they could comfortably produce. But that was because they couldn’t commoditize the product enough to mass produce and thus depended on local, small manufacturers and even built the items in their offices. They were being drowned by demand but not because they were selling too many printers. They just didn’t have the cash to make those printers quickly enough to satisfy even the small number of orders they received.

A few very good companies avoided this trap early on and are doing quite well. Others buckled under the pressure. My concern is that more and more companies will buckle. Take a look at this excellent piece by Daniel Brown. Brown has estimated that the least expensive 3D printer still costs $300 to make, and most of that is in the rigid metal frame. While the nozzles and the electronics seem like the most expensive parts, they can be churned out en masse while many of these frames and cases are cut at great expense and hand-assembled. A guitar isn’t expensive because of the strings and the machine heads. It’s expensive because it’s expensive to make a body and neck that won’t warp or break. Brown writes:

Here I learned the true costs of building printers as I worked with a venture capitalist wanting to pump money into this business pending my feasibility study. We found out that the cheapest possible cost for a printer 1 off was around $300 or so with a large chunk of this cost being the rigid frame. The costs of this frame could be cut down drastically with larger orders but the other components required gigantic orders to get any reasonable discount. We found that even assuming 10 printers built per week for 6 months, we couldn’t get the raw materials cost below $180. The expensive line items though, were mostly non-negotiable. We could source motors cheaply if we bought a lot but the electronics board, hot ends and power supply have few options to reduce costs by much. This is a critical factor. This cost of $180 however, was assuming we 3D printed lots of components.
Who is great at making cheap frames and cases? It’s not the guys at OrboPrinter++ or RepRapLite SuperFab. It will be Dell and Samsung and Monoprice who create 3D printers for the rest of the world. And when it happens it won’t be pretty for the little guys.

We can also argue whether Samsung will ever release a 3D printer. My engineer brother-in-law sees home 3D printers as hopelessly useless. He works for Honda and they have 3D printers the size of truck trailers spewing out parts. A Makerbot making a Yoda head seems like a frippery.

But this would be like the EIC of Random House laughing at the first (expensive) dot-matrix printers. “We do things so much more efficiently and with an eye for quality,” he’d say, sipping a highball (remember, this is a few decades ago). “Who needs a home printer when they have books you can buy at a store!”

Fast forward a few dozen years and now everyone can print letter quality pages at home, school, and in the office and the business case the Random House exec saw – the replacement of real printing presses by cheap home printers – didn’t come to pass. While he was chortling at inkjets, the industry was excavated out from under him. The same thing can happen with the manufacturers of injection molding systems, jewelry, and even some electronics. It will take a while, but it will happen. And all of this, the endless jostling, the posturing, and the endless noble effort, will reach its ultimate conclusion: the movement of 3D printing industry and the attendant printers as something to be covered every minute of every day to just another piece of hardware in the average home. I can’t wait.

FT : Amazon’s forays into digital media bound to be expensive

Amazon’s forays into digital media bound to be expensive

Group has little choice but to experiment though it may prove expensive
The Twitch Interactive Inc. logo is arranged for a photograph in San Francisco, California, U.S., on Monday, Aug. 25, 2014. Amazon.com Inc. is buying video service Twitch Interactive Inc. for more than $1 billion in its biggest acquisition ever, adding an online gathering place for video gamers, people with knowledge of the plans said. Photographer: David Paul Morris/Bloomberg©Bloomberg
Investors scratching their heads over Amazon’s latest venture into the media and entertainment world can console themselves with one thought: at least it has not yet started investing in football clubs.
That is what Alibaba did this year, as part of a bewildering variety of deals that has taken the Chinese ecommerce company far beyond its core business. Amazon, with this week’s $1bn purchase of Twitch, has gone only as far as eSports – the business of turning video games into an online spectator event. But as with Alibaba, its aspirations are clearly mutating as it evolves beyond ecommerce.

Some of the rationalisations advanced for Amazon’s increasingly diverse plays in digital media have sounded more than a little tortuous.
One view holds that it is all about Prime, the annual subscription service whose main feature is free two-day shipping of purchases. Bundling original digital content and other goodies into a Prime subscription gets more people to sign up for the service, according to this view. Since Prime customers spend far more with Amazon than the average, the ultimate beneficiary is the core ecommerce business.
Forget for a moment that free streaming accounts for Twitch’s rapid growth and that turning it into a largely subscription service would be self-defeating. The idea that Amazon should use digital media as a gigantic loss-leader is both inefficient and out of character.
The rising costs associated with Prime have already led the company to put the price of a subscription up 25 per cent this year, so dreaming up expensive new features for the service does not make a lot of sense. If Prime is a central plank in Amazon’s core business, it would be far more efficient to focus the benefits of a subscription on ecommerce, not bundle in free media content that many Prime customers would not care about.
A similar argument has been made that Amazon is using things like exclusive video to help sell more hardware. Again, the ultimate purpose is deemed to be ecommerce: that content will drive sales of Amazon’s Fire tablets (or TV set-top boxes or smartphones), which in turn will act as platforms for more purchases of other items.

But there are more obvious reasons for Amazon’s digital media push that do not rely on such convoluted logic. Sales of media – video games, books, movies and music, most of it delivered in physical formats – accounted for 27 per cent of its revenue over the past six months.
That $10bn of revenue is also reckoned to be its most profitable. Much of it is now in jeopardy as media consumption turns digital.
Defending – and expanding – its existing stake in the media business calls for new approaches, and is taking Amazon into unfamiliar territory. It has little choice but to experiment. Not all will turn out as well as digital books, where the combination of the Kindle e-reader and app with aggressive price discounting have given it an overwhelming lead.
To the various subscription services it has launched or experimented with, Amazon now looks ready to tap more deeply into an extra source of media revenue: advertising. Twitch, which brings the chance to engage more deeply with a devoted band of online video game viewers, points the way.
This raises a daunting question: can Amazon monetise its users’ attention as effectively as Google, which also talked to Twitch about a possible acquisition before dropping the idea? It has some obvious assets, of which a bank of data about recent purchases is central. As one of the web’s largest product search engines, it also has a wealth of information about what its users may be interested in next.
Learning new tricks like this is taking Amazon into unfamiliar territory where world-class competitors are already entrenched. Besides going up against Google in advertising, it means taking on Apple and Samsung in selling gadgets. If Amazon wants an object lesson in what could lie ahead, it need look no further than a fellow Seattle tech company: Microsoft has spent billions of dollars failing to make much headway against Google in search and Apple in mobile devices.
For Amazon’s investors, it will certainly be expensive. But compared to extremely low-margin ecommerce, some of these investments could become highly profitable businesses in the long run. As always with Amazon, the key questions are: how long will the investment cycle last, and are investors prepared to hang on for the ride?
Richard Waters is the FT’s West Coast managing editor

FT : Telefónica takes lead in Brazil with €7.5bn Vivendi deal

Telefónica takes lead in Brazil with €7.5bn Vivendi deal

Spain’s Telefónica has stormed ahead in the battle for Brazil’s telecoms market, convincing Vivendi to choose its €7.45bn offer for the French group’s Brazilian broadband business.
Vivendi said on Thursday it would enter exclusive negotiations with Telefónica over the sale of its Brazilian unit GVT, shunning a lower offer from Telecom Italia.

Telefónica plans to fold GVT into its existing Brazilian mobile business Vivo, already the country’s wireless market leader, setting the Spanish group up to be the dominant telecoms operator in Brazil.
More than 40m Brazilians have entered the middle class over the past decade – equivalent to four times the population of Portugal – turning the Latin American country into an essential market for global telecoms companies.
However, a recent growth slowdown in the mobile market has prompted a frenzy of consolidation among the industry’s largely foreign players and forced them to branch out into pay-TV and broadband – GVT’s focus.
For Vivendi, the sale of GVT also represents a pivotal moment in the company’s history. It would complete the French group’s transformation over the past year from a sprawling conglomerate into a pure media and entertainment group. It also marks a dramatic change in fortunes for the Paris-based company after it failed to find a buyer for GVT last year.
Telefónica’s sweetened offer includes €4.7bn in cash and a 12 per cent stake in the combined Brazilian entity. Under the deal, Vivendi can exchange one-third of that stake for a 5.7 per cent stake the Spanish group owns in Telecom Italia – an option it will probably choose, according to a person close to the deal.

The Spanish telecoms group had previously approached Vivendi with an offer worth about €6.7bn, but improved the bid as news emerged that Telecom Italia, which likewise has a large presence in Brazil, had submitted a rival offer.
Telecom Italia’s offer represented a total enterprise value of €7bn, consisting of a €1.7bn cash component, 16 per cent of Telecom Italia’s share capital and a 15 per cent stake in its TIM Brazilian operation.
But Vivendi said that it had opted to enter negotiations with Telefónica “in the light of the group’s strategy and in the best interests of its shareholders”.
Vivendi said it considered Telefónica’s offer “particularly attractive” because it would generate a capital gain for Vivendi of more than €3bn.
“The other conditions of the offer, limiting to a strict minimum the risk of executing the operation as well as Vivendi’s commitments after the sale, are totally in line with Vivendi’s objectives,” Vivendi added.
Telefónica’s victory will be closely scrutinised by Brazil’s antitrust body, Cade, which has voiced growing concern over the frantic wave of dealmaking in an industry vital to the country’s economic and social development.
It also presents a dilemma for Brazil’s Oi, which indicated on Wednesday that it is considering an acquisition of Telecom Italia’s Brazilian business.

(ZH) 6 Reasons Why ECB Will Avoid QE As Long As Possible (And Why The Fed Di


6 Reasons Why ECB Will Avoid QE As Long As Possible (And Why The Fed Did It)


Yields on European sovereign debt have collapsed in recent months as investors piled into these 'riskless' investments following hints that the ECB will unleash QE (at some point "we promise") and the economic situation collapses. However, Mario Draghi has made it clear that any QE would be privately-focused (because policy transmission channels were clogged) and the appointment of Blackrock to run an ABS-purchase plan confirms that those buying bonds to front-run the ECB may have done so in error. As Rabobank's Elwin de Groot notes in six simple comments that he expects continued "procrastination" by the ECB over sovereign QE even after dismal economic data - and in doing so, exposes the entire facade behind The Fed's QE.

 

Six reasons why the ECB will delay Sovereign QE as long as possible (via Bloomberg)
1) Legal constraints, or risk that ECB will be challenged in court for tinkering with “debt monetization”

 

2) ECB and national central banks would expose balance sheets to heightened credit and duration risk

 

3) QE may not deliver sufficient “bang for the buck” as bund yields are already low

 

4) Unclear whether program would have much impact on real economy

 

5) QE disturbs efficient allocation of resources

 

6) Risk of creating bubbles in asset prices
Perhaps it is time for the Fed to read those last 3!!
*  *  *
So buying sovereign bonds in the view that the ECB will be the big bid for you to sell to in the future at any price you like appears to be "wrong" and with the massive positioning apparent in the market this could be a problem. In fact - if one were to try to trade an ABS-QE, it is the ABS risk premium compression alone that should be traded... (as we noted here, real borrowing costs remain extreme)
These are "market" rates... i.e. what real risk is being priced at away from the hand of Draghi...

 

And so - smart money will be selling government bonds and buying any and every ABS-backed asset they can find in an effort to monetize the ECB's risk compression. The question is - who wil be the first seller?

NY Post : Struggling Caesars in talks to restructure debt

Troubled Caesars Entertainment, America’s largest casino chain, is in talks with its senior creditors to restructure it massive debt load, The Post has learned.
The talks are likely aimed at reaching a deal that would give the senior debt holders positions in the two newly created pieces of Caesars that hold the most promising assets — including its online gaming business, sources said.
Gregg Klein, an analyst at Imperial Capital, wrote in a report Wednesday that the “restructuring [which is in the works] could possibly be headed to a bankruptcy filing.”
Such a move, which may only affect some of the brick and mortar casinos, “would create significantly negative headlines and potential risks that we think would put pressure on the stock.”
As a result, Klein lowered his price target from $17 to $9.
Caesars shares fell 2.3 percent on Wednesday, to $13.38.
The net loss attributable to Caesars nearly doubled to $852.9 million in the first half of 2014, while casino revenue dipped, falling 5.3 percent to $2.7 billion in the period.
Meanwhile, Caesars’ debt pile is growing. The company’s long-term debt hit $24.2 billion at the end of June, up from $20.9 billion in December.
Caesars owners Apollo Global Management and TPG Capital last year split the chain into three companies — including one with faster-growing online assets and another with troubled brick-and-mortar casino operations.
The most troubled piece includes two of Caesars’ Atlantic City casinos, Bally’s Atlantic City and Caesars Atlantic City. Those are two of the eight casinos that are now operating overall in faltering Atlantic City.
There is reason for Caesars to get the restructuring done sooner rather than later, sources said.
Caesars owes its junior creditors, including David Tepper’s Appaloosa Management, $400 million in December. While it can make the payment, Caesars might want to finish the debt restructuring beforehand so it does not give that $400 million to those creditors, but instead to senior creditors who support the restructuring, a source close to the situation said.
At the same time, Caesars is trying to move control of its profitable rewards program out of the brick and mortar side of the business. It operates more than 50 casinos under the Bally’s, Caesars, Harrah’s and Horseshoe brands.
The company did not return emails or calls for comment.

>>> Repsol no longer interested in buying Talisman outright

Repsol no longer interested in buying Talisman outright -

Talks between Repsol and Talisman Energy of Calgary, Alberta have hit a rough patch to the extent that the Spanish suitor is no longer interested in pursuing an outright takeover, according to a newswire report.

Reuters on Wednesday cited two unidentified sources familiar with the situation as saying that Repsol, which was previously open to possibly acquiring Talisman in its entirety, is no longer open to doing so. Another source familiar with Repsol's strategy noted in the article that discussions between the two companies have stalled.

According to the article, Talisman announced last month that Repsol had contacted the Canadian company about potentially pursuing transactions. One of the sources said in the article, however, that Repsol is wary about the Canadian company's North Sea holdings in Norway and the UK. These projects, according to the article, have regularly come short of production targets and have hurt Talisman's stock valuation. Since the majority of the North Sea assets are part of a joint venture arrangement with Sinopec in China, a move to exit the area likely would not be accomplished quickly.

According to the article, a spokesperson at Repsol opted not to comment, and Talisman was unable to comment by press time.


Source Newswire Round-up

>>> CVS Caremark's USD 2.2bn bid for DPSP rejected, negotiations continue

CVS Caremark's USD 2.2bn bid for DPSP rejected, negotiations continue 

CVS Caremark (NYSE: CVS), the Rhode Island-based US drug store chain, continues to negotiate to buy Drogarias DPSP, the second-largest drugstore chain in Brazil, Exame reported.

CVS is not desisting from buying DPSP after its bid of about BRL 5bn (USD 2.2bn) in August was rejected through Banco Espirito Santo and Morgan Stanley, the representatives of the owners of DPSP, the fortnightly business magazine reported without giving a source.

CVS and DPSP didn’t respond to an opportunity to comment, according to Portuguese-language Exame.

CVS, one of the largest US drugstore chains, bought control of Drogaria Onofre, Brazil's eighth-largest drugstore chain in sales, in early 2013, as reported.
Exame