What assets does China have in Venezuela, and what could happen with Maduro gone?
US move calls into question China’s future financial commitments in Latin American country, potentially hurting Beijing’s regional strategy
Amid prolonged international sanctions imposed on Venezuela, Chinese enterprises stood out as some of the few willing to pour resources into the South American country’s turbulent economy.
However, Saturday’s capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro by US forces – just hours after Maduro met with Chinese diplomats to reaffirm their strategic partnership – raises concerns about the future of such investments.
In this explainer, we examine the portfolio of Chinese assets in Venezuela and how they might stand to be affected by a US takeover.
What investments does China have in Venezuela?
Energy projects form the bedrock of China’s presence in the country, with state-owned giant China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) operating several key joint ventures.
Venezuela holds what is recognised as the world’s largest proven oil reserves, primarily in the central Orinoco Belt, located in the East Venezuela Basin along the Orinoco River.
PetroSinovensa, a joint venture established in 2008 by CNPC and Venezuela’s state-owned PDVSA, develops the extra-heavy crude of this territory – a significant portion of which is shipped directly to China to service Venezuela’s sovereign debt.
And while new state-led investments slowed during the height of US sanctions, with the stock of investment from China declining in the past few years, some private-sector initiatives continued to forge ahead.
In August, private firm China Concord Resources Corp began developing two Venezuelan oilfields as part of a 20-year deal signed in 2024. With a planned investment of US$1 billion, the project aims for a production capacity of 60,000 barrels per day by late 2026.
Telecommunications is another critical pillar of the bilateral relationship, with Chinese giants becoming the dominant providers for operators across the country. Huawei Technologies, which secured its first major contract with the Venezuelan government as early as 2004 – a US$250 million deal to improve the nation’s fibre optic infrastructure – continues to support the country’s 4G networks.
ZTE, meanwhile, was pivotal in developing the Homeland Card, a national ID system that serves as the primary way for citizens to access state subsidies and social programmes.
Venezuela’s strategic role in China’s Belt and Road Initiative has also led to notable infrastructure investments by Chinese interests. However, new projects stagnated in recent years as the Latin American nation’s economic crisis deepened.
For instance, with Venezuelan exports minimal, a port project was repurposed as an oil facility to help service some of its debts to China, according to a 2024 report by the Mercator Institute for China Studies.
How might these investments be affected?
While a pro-US regime is unlikely to resort to heavy-handed nationalisation or the direct confiscation of Chinese assets – moves that would risk spooking the Western investors needed to restore the country’s economic credibility – it is likely to announce a review of Maduro-era contracts, said Cui Shoujun, director of the Centre for Latin American Studies at Renmin University.
“They might allege that joint ventures between Venezuela and China, such as PetroSinovensa, are unconstitutional,” he added, noting that this could lead to the revocation of preferential terms for Chinese companies, diluting Chinese equity or introducing American giants – such as oil major Chevron – as new controlling stakeholders.
Joint ventures, including PetroSinovensa, have already been asked by PDVSA to reduce crude production, according to a Reuters report on Sunday.
Analysts caution that the telecommunications sector is particularly vulnerable. Xu Tianchen, senior China economist at the Economist Intelligence Unit, noted how these Chinese investments may now raise national security concerns.
“Companies like Huawei and ZTE have been deeply embedded in Venezuela for years, and a pro-US government is likely to order the dismantling or banning of core communications equipment provided by Chinese firms,” Cui said.
What could this mean for Beijing’s regional influence?
The unfolding events threaten Chinese ambitions in Latin America, an important emerging market that has historically served as a key source of commodities and a strategic testing ground for Beijing’s global influence.
“Any successor to Maduro is likely to choose to work with the US to secure his or her survival, and this will come at the cost of existing Chinese interests,” Xu said, noting that Latin American governments will adopt a more cautious attitude towards Chinese strategic investments as US influence increases.
From China’s perspective, Cui predicted that investments in the region will increasingly be directed to countries with better security conditions and stronger rule of law – where regime changes do not threaten the validity of commercial contracts – shifting from large-scale infrastructure projects to initiatives in areas such as agriculture, new energy sources, and consumer goods to reduce geopolitical sensitivities.