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Negotiations on the future relationship may question the very idea of leaving the EU

In 2018 the real Brexit negotiations begin. The phase one political agreement between the UK and EU — on financial obligations, rights of expatriate people and Ireland — was a preamble. Concluding a formal treaty governing the UK’s withdrawal in March 2019 is the central task. This should establish the agreements of phase one, and many other separation-related issues, in detailed legal texts between the UK and the European Commission, which must be approved by a large majority of member states, and the British and European parliaments, before the exit date.

This will require intensive negotiation between the UK and the EU. It will also involve other governments since the withdrawal treaty will need to address Britain’s future position in agreements between the EU and other countries. We cannot assume that these will roll forward on current terms, and changes could trigger a wider ratification process in parliaments across Europe and beyond.

If the spectre of a cliff-edge Brexit is to be avoided, the withdrawal treaty should be accompanied next year by a political framework setting parameters for the UK’s future relationship with the EU. This represents a dramatic scaling back of the earlier, unrealistic British ambition to negotiate these future terms in full before March 2019 — a highly significant, if little publicised, outcome of December’s Brussels summit.

There will be two main strands in negotiations about the future: the economic relationship and the wider political relationship, including defence, security and foreign affairs.To reach the framework stage, the British government will soon have to make hard choices about the sort of Brexit it wants, notably on links to the single market and customs union, and acknowledge the limits of what is possible. The EU will negotiate, but will not change its own rules to meet British demands. At home, both the withdrawal treaty and the framework agreement will face intense parliamentary scrutiny through the year and in the final “meaningful” vote.

Because of the scale and complexity of what lies ahead, 2018 will kick off with talks on the terms of a transition period, intended to provide as much political and economic stability as possible after the UK legally leaves the EU in March 2019. The European Commission will argue that transition should end in December 2020 to match its budget cycle. The British government will probably argue for a period of two years, while trying privately to persuade its pro-Brexit faction to keep this open ended. As the deadline approaches, both sides will discover more time is required.

The transition, originally billed as a period for bedding in already agreed arrangements between the UK and the EU, has now morphed into the period in which the detail of those arrangements will be negotiated. Unless they can be agreed and implemented in parallel, this means yet a further implementation period will be needed. On even the most optimistic assumption, the process of scoping, negotiation, ratification and implementation of the new relationship will take a minimum of five years from 2018.

Another purpose of transition is to assure businesses that their operating environment will not be dramatically disrupted. But it is now clear that the longer-term trade and regulatory environment will not be defined for some years, and the commission argues that, even if a political agreement on transition is reached early in 2018, there will be no legal certainty until the UK’s withdrawal treaty is formally ratified.

We should expect more turbulence over the year ahead. There will be political strains within the British government. Germany needs a new coalition. The agenda is vast.

We do not yet know what sort of deals on withdrawal and future partnership British ministers will bring to parliament towards the end of the year. As things stand, the best we can hope for is a reasonably ordered formal exit in March 2019, followed by a continuing negotiation as an outside country on the details of our future relationship lasting several years during which we will still be bound by EU rules but have no say in future EU decisions.

By late 2018, we should have a clearer picture of options for the future. We cannot predict how this knowledge will influence public opinion, especially if the British economy shows further signs of stress. If the mood shifts, it will be late, but not yet too late, to change our mind on the whole Brexit project. Meanwhile, this prolonged uncertainty argues for keeping open the option, however difficult, for both the UK and the EU, of trying to delay our formal departure by extending or suspending the Article 50 process beyond March 2019. Once we had left in haste, any repentance would certainly be at leisure.

The writer is managing partner of Flint Global and a former permanent undersecretary at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office