How long can Iran keep firing missiles?
Five analysts assess Tehran’s capacity to sustain barrages against Israel and Gulf states
Night after night, the skies from Tel Aviv to Dubai erupt in sirens, streaks of light, flashes slowly blooming and fading in mid-air, and occasionally explosions on the ground.
As the missile war in the Middle East grinds on — with waves of US and Israeli air strikes on Iran met with daily retaliatory barrages — it has increasingly become a test of sustainability.
Iran’s early massive missile attacks have given way to a slower tempo of launches and smaller salvos since the US and Israel launched their war against the Islamic republic on February 28.
But it remains unclear how long Tehran can maintain the launch rates — and how long Israel and Gulf states can keep stopping the missiles with interceptors.
The FT asked five experts on Iran’s capabilities to assess how long the conflict could last.
Tom Karako, Center for Strategic and International Studies:
Iran’s ability to sustain its current level of drone and missile retaliation hinges largely on the effectiveness of US and Israeli strikes targeting its launch systems, infrastructure and command networks. Declining rates of missile launches suggest that these operations are disrupting Iran’s capabilities and forcing more cautious stockpile management.
While Tehran may be holding some advanced systems in reserve — as suggested by a reported intermediate-range ballistic missile launch towards the Diego Garcia military base in the Indian Ocean — doing so carries a “use it or lose it” risk. At the same time, Iran may be deliberately prolonging the conflict to impose political costs and pressure Washington into disengagement.
Although reduced launch rates imply a diminished ability to overwhelm defences, Iran probably retains the capacity to conduct complex, co-ordinated attacks. That could strain defences, particularly if interceptor stocks are depleted in key locations.
The extent of the surviving missile force, including those in underground facilities, remains uncertain. Nevertheless, Iran’s near-term ability to replenish its arsenal appears limited.
Danny Citrinowicz, Institute for National Security Studies:
Iran may lack the capacity for massive salvos, but its current approach appears to be a strategy designed to endure rather than overwhelm. This reflects long-term planning: Iran appears to be deliberately rationing its missile and drone use, recognising the conflict is likely to be prolonged. At the current tempo, it probably has enough missiles for several more weeks.
Rather than relying on large-scale barrages, it is sustaining pressure through smaller but continuous attacks — limited missile strikes on Israel, waves of drones and frequent short-range missile launches towards Gulf states.
Even a small number of strikes could hit critical energy and infrastructure targets. This poses a particular challenge for Gulf countries and gives Tehran disproportionate leverage.
Sascha Bruchmann, International Institute for Strategic Studies:
Iranian missile barrages are still largely subdued, especially when compared to the initial three days of the war. Interception rates remain very high. Iran used more cluster warheads against Israel. In some cases, these warheads split before intercept and the Israeli air defences did not engage every fragment. This results in numerous videos of munitions impacting, especially in densely populated areas of Tel Aviv, which can shape the perception that Iran is able to penetrate defences or land more hits. Each hit is amplified, celebrated and exaggerated.
Overall, interception rates remain high for the Gulf as well. Riyadh was targeted during a high-level political meeting but intercepted all missiles. The impression given by researchers on the ground is that very high interception rates continue. Successful missile attacks occurred this week but remain rare. In addition to a missile war, there is a propaganda war to influence target audiences in the Gulf and Washington.
Lynette Nusbacher, former intelligence adviser to the UK government:
The Iranians appear to be launching missiles as quickly as they can, within the constraints of concealment, moving, fuelling the liquid-fuelled munitions and pressing the launch button.
Every launch reveals a firing point location to American or Israeli target acquisition, and likely attracts an attack, and that, rather than inventory control, is what governs rates of fire.
There are credible estimates that the Iranians have 1,000 to 1,500 ballistic missiles in inventory, plus cruise missiles and drones, as well as a store of transporter-erector-launchers in reserve and fuel for their liquid-fuelled munitions.
If they are able to continue launching from hardened shelters at their current reduced rate, they could easily keep going another week or two. If the Iranians used their less effective systems early in the current campaign, they’ll have longer range and more accurate missiles in inventory.
Some of Iran’s more up-to-date missiles are solid fuelled, which makes them quicker to launch and more reliable. This could already be making each Iranian attack more potentially deadly.
Jim Lamson, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies:
Iran’s ability to sustain its current level of retaliation remains highly uncertain, largely due to limited visibility into its remaining stockpiles.
While Tehran has recently deployed more advanced medium-range systems such as the Sejjil and Haj Ghasem, it has not yet used some newer or more sophisticated platforms, including the Fattah-2 hypersonic glide vehicle, suggesting certain capabilities may not yet be operational or are still being held in reserve — albeit likely in limited numbers. Similarly, additional short-range missile types could be introduced as the conflict continues.
However, Iran’s capacity to replenish its arsenal has been significantly degraded by US and Israeli strikes, which have damaged production facilities and critical supply chains for key components such as motors, propellants and guidance systems.
Although some short-term assembly may be possible using stockpiled parts, overall production capability appears severely constrained.