Germany’s defence dilemma exposed by fighter deal
Choice of Tornado replacement will affect European industry and US strategic alliance
How serious is Germany about raising defence spending and becoming a more muscular military power? The world may be about to find out.
Any day now, the defence ministry in Berlin is expected to announce how it intends to replace the Luftwaffe’s ageing fleet of 85 Tornado fighter jets, in a deal worth many billions of euros. For a country that finds itself constantly under attack for skimping on defence spending, the investment will be headline-grabbing.
Yet money alone does not explain why the decision is likely to be controversial. At heart, the decision on a new aircraft will be a choice between Germany’s two most important strategic alliances — Europe and the US.
“What you buy determines who your closest partner will be in the coming decades,” says Christian Mölling, a defence analyst at the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin. “But it also marks a crucial decision about the future of our defence industry: will the emphasis be on European or transatlantic co-operation?”
In practical terms, the decision will be between the Eurofighter, which is built by Airbus and other European groups, or one of three US-made warplanes: the F-35A, the F-15E or the F/A-18E/F.
Buying at least some planes from the US must look politically tempting. In recent years, President Donald Trump has lashed out at Germany for two reasons above all: Berlin’s comparatively miserly defence expenditure, and the bulging trade deficit between the two countries. The acquisition of a few dozen US aircraft would help on both fronts, and could make Nato’s next summit less uncomfortable for Chancellor Angela Merkel.
Advocates of a European solution, however, have no time for this logic and say European companies are perfectly able to produce a military aircraft that suits Germany’s need. Buying American, they argue, would be a terrible signal for the future of Europe’s defence industry, at a time when Germany and France are jointly committed (at least on paper) to develop and build a super-modern next-generation “future combat air system” after 2035. For that project to see the light of day, European governments will need to preserve knowhow and production capabilities at home — not farm them out to the US.
That ambition would be undercut, some believe, even in a scenario where the Luftwaffe splits its order, buying both the Eurofighter and a US aircraft.
Still, most experts predict that is precisely what Berlin will do. Depending on the relative size of the contracts, this mixed approach may even enable the government to keep all sides sweet.
There is one additional pitfall, however. One of the German Tornado fleet’s tasks is to carry and deploy US nuclear weapons stationed at Büchel, western Germany, as part of Nato’s “nuclear sharing” arrangement. Any replacement would have to do the same and be certified to do so by the US. In the case of the Eurofighter, that certification may not be easy to obtain, casting doubt over Germany’s ability to uphold a key element of Nato’s nuclear deterrence.
Ultimately, though, the how of the decision may be as important as the what. German leaders have promised for years that the country is ready to step up and take more responsibility in the field of security and defence. Here is a chance for Ms Merkel and the German military establishment to come out and explain three uncomfortable truths: why Berlin needs to spend billions of additional euros on defence; why a strong European defence industry is in Germany’s national interest; and why the country’s armed forces have a role to play in the field of nuclear deterrence.
It is the kind of hard-nosed conversation that German politicians and the German public have a long history of avoiding. The looming Tornado decision will show what — if anything — has changed.