France’s unfolding nuclear umbrella
President Macron’s deterrence initiative puts Germany on a fast-track to UK-level nuclear cooperation
Deterrence gap
Europe’s interest in the nuclear umbrella has been underscored by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its accompanying nuclear threats. At the same time, confidence in the US security guarantee under President Donald Trump has been severely dented.
There are two “paramount risks”, according to an excellent assessment of Europe’s deterrence needs and options by the European Nuclear Study Group of defence experts: that the US abandons its Nato commitments or that it is no longer willing to shoulder nearly all the responsibility for extended deterrence in Europe, given the growing threats in Asia. Together these risks create the danger of a perceived “deterrence gap”, which adversaries might be tempted to exploit.
That means that European states will have to play a bigger role in nuclear deterrence. But who and how? Given the UK already assigns its nuclear weapons to the defence of Nato members, the expectations have centred on France.
Ground-breaking
Macron’s answer is “forward deterrence” — an offer to bring selected partner countries under France’s nuclear protection through strategic dialogue, joint exercises, support missions and ultimately temporary deployments of Rafale fighter jets and their nuclear missiles.
Through these activities France would “fully factor in” the interests of its allies in its deliberations over any nuclear use. There would be no formal nuclear guarantee to other countries and France would retain sole control of its weapons, so the red lines that have defined its sovereign deterrent since the 1960s would remain.
Nuclear experts described Macron’s speech as ground-breaking. I will leave the doctrinal implications to the nuclear boffins — you can read this thread from Bruno Tertrais or this take from Ankit Panda.
I want to focus on three diplomatic and political aspects.
Germany, front and centre
The first is the centrality of Germany to Macron’s nuclear plan. France has initiated discussions with Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Denmark and Sweden as well as the much longer-running and already close cooperation it has with the UK. But it was Germany that was singled out as a “key partner” for the French forward deterrence initiative. France and Germany have set up a steering group for a dialogue on doctrine and cooperation on strategy and German forces will take part in French nuclear exercises later this year.
This puts Berlin on a fast-track to UK-level nuclear cooperation. Merz was looking to France to step up and Macron did. From France’s point of view, it could help cultivate a strategic culture that it believes is lacking in Germany — a legacy of its post-war reckoning and decades of dependence on the US for security. It could also help ease friction between Paris and Berlin and help compensate for the breakdown of their joint project to build a next generation fighter jet, known as FCAS.
Shouldering the burden
There is more to Franco-German defence cooperation than combat aircraft. That is underscored by a second core feature of the Macron doctrine: the importance of what he calls épaulement, best translated as mutual support.
As a complement to the deterrent, Europeans need more of their own capabilities to manage crises before the nuclear threshold is crossed, Macron said. That means early warning systems, expanded air defence systems and long-range conventional missiles.
“For our nuclear deterrence to be strong, every dimension of our conventional capabilities must be strong,” the president said.
Partner countries will have to develop and deploy these capabilities together. The implicit bargain is that Germany and others may shoulder more of the burden for these assets (as for example it is doing on military satellites). French officials insist they are not seeking any European financial contribution for their deterrent, since they are not willing to cede any claim on it.
These mutual support functions are themselves a huge endeavour for Europe and will form a big part of European defence collaboration in the years to come. The ENSG study for example reckons Europe will need to build a stockpile of 15,000 deep precision strike missiles to deter Russia alongside nuclear weapons. The war in Iran has only re-emphasised the importance of long-range strike capabilities.
Muted criticism
The third interesting feature is Macron’s political pitch and the somewhat positive domestic reaction to it. The president’s argument is that dispersing France’s jet-carried nuclear weapons to partner countries and their mutual support can only strengthen France’s deterrent. But there will be no dilution of France’s total control of the bomb.
This balancing act appears to have disarmed Macron’s critics. The reaction from the leaders of the far-right Rassemblement National Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella was muted, which might offer some reassurance to Europeans that France’s new nuclear doctrine will live beyond Macron’s presidency, which ends next year.
“There is no doubt that in the event of an RN candidate’s victory in 2027, or that of any other party, once briefed by the nuclear forces, the new president — male or female — will recognize the operational value of this measure in enhancing the survivability of our deterrence,” noted Etienne Marcuz, associate fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research think tank.
Macron reassured his European partners that France’s deterrent would be complementary to Nato’s. It is too small to substitute for it in any case — Tertrais describes it as “backstop” for Europe. But it remains outside of Nato. FT and Le Monde columnist Sylvie Kauffmann argues that this creates a contradiction that may prove hard to manage in practice as partner countries demand more of a say over how the deterrent is deployed. But Macron’s balancing act has got off to a good start.