Don’t dismiss the mini-middle powers
Qatar, Oman, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan hold leverage in crucial areas
Middle powers have been having a moment since Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s Davos speech in January. There has been much excitement about countries such as Canada, India, Brazil, South Africa and Mexico and whether they can restrain great powers or build coalitions as the rules-based order weakens. Many governments have rushed to claim the middle-power title.
But there are also countries that cannot set the wider international agenda but can still make a difference. These might be described as “mini-middle powers”: states with limited overall power but real leverage in a few areas: energy, transport routes, regional security, mediation, finance, technology, geography or access to actors that larger states struggle to reach. What matters is not simply having one of these advantages, but being able to use it.
Qatar and Oman are diplomatic mini-middle powers. Qatar has turned gas wealth, finance and access to hard-to-reach actors into an outsized diplomatic role. Oman relies on discretion, strategic position and the ability to keep channels open between adversaries. For both, mediation is not just a diplomatic role but a source of leverage.
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan hold leverage when it comes to geography and infrastructure. Azerbaijan exports energy, sits on east-west trade routes and carries weight in South Caucasus politics and security. Kazakhstan’s oil, uranium and its position between Russia and China give it influence beyond the region. Uzbekistan’s demographic weight as Central Asia’s most populous country and central location give it growing leverage in regional trade and diplomacy.
The Middle Corridor shows how this works. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are central to this Asia-Europe route, while Uzbekistan is strengthening its links to the corridor. It is more cumbersome than the northern route through Russia, but it gives governments and businesses an alternative. The three are also developing a Caspian green-energy corridor that could carry Central Asian renewable power through Azerbaijan, connecting with the planned Black Sea electricity cable to Europe.
Yet discussion of the South Caucasus and Central Asia is still framed too often as a contest between Russia, China and the west. That misses how many countries in the region operate. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan maintain relationships in several directions because geography, trade and security make exclusive alignment risky.
Thus they work with Russia, China, Turkey, the EU and the US while seeking to preserve room for manoeuvre among them. Qatar and Oman have close security ties with Washington but keep channels open to US rivals — allowing them to resist pressure from any one side. After Russian air defences brought down an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger jet in December 2024, Baku’s response was unusually blunt given the imbalance in power. It demanded that Moscow accept responsibility, punish those at fault and pay compensation, while keeping the broader relationship intact. Russia later acknowledged the role of its air defences in causing the crash and agreed to pay compensation.
The mini-middle powers’ influence is strongest when others need something they control. Azerbaijan’s oil and gas matter more when buyers are looking for alternative supplies. The Middle Corridor has gained from disruption to trade through Russia, yet governments along the route know that if western business with Russia resumes, some freight may shift north again. For Qatar and Oman, mediation becomes more valuable when the parties themselves are no longer talking. These countries will not set the terms of the next international order. But those who seek to shape it will often depend on their routes, resources or diplomatic access. Larger powers will find it hard to succeed without their co-operation.