A ‘no deal’ Brexit outcome would justify another referendum
In this game of chicken, the EU may wrongly expect the UK to swerve on ‘Irish backstop’
On practical grounds, I have previously argued that the costs of another Brexit referendum outweigh the benefits: I judged another referendum too divisive. Yet today it is increasingly likely either that no agreement will be reached with the EU or that no deal will be ratified by parliament. Would this change my position? Yes.
I saw no objection in principle to re-running the 2016 vote. The notion of “one voter, one vote, once” is not democracy. Voters are entitled to change their minds, individually and collectively. Moreover, the electorate has itself changed. The grounds were practical: it would be difficult to organise another referendum in time; it could be difficult to get EU agreement to withdrawing the Brexit notification; and the outcome might be to crash out without a deal. Above all, a deeply divided country might emerge yet more divided.
In making this argument, I assumed the prime minister would in the end reach and then pass a withdrawal deal. Such an agreement would mean the UK’s departure was reasonably harmonious. This, in turn, would permit negotiations on a long-term relationship with the EU. It would preserve amicable relations with the UK’s most important partners, apart from the US: the European countries that share both its values and its continent and with whose destiny, for good or ill, Britain’s is inevitably and eternally entwined.
In that context, a terrifying possible outcome of another referendum might be rejection of the deal that has been reached, not a decision to withdraw the Article 50 notification. It would be a decision for “no deal”. That very possibility also underlines a practical difficulty with another referendum: the number of choices. There could well be three: the deal; withdrawal of notification to leave; and no deal. It is possible to organise such a vote. But doing it in a proper way would be unfamiliar and probably unpopular. Furthermore, no clear preference might finally emerge.
Suppose, however, that there was no deal to put before voters. Now there would be just two choices: the “no deal” option and withdrawal of the notification. That would be far simpler.
If there were indeed no deal, it would certainly be because of a failure to agree the “ Irish backstop”. But it would be extremely stupid, for both sides, to fail to reach a deal over this because the outcome of that would be a hard border in Ireland. For the EU’s committed support of Ireland to end with what it seeks to prevent would be crazy. But crazy things happen. In this game of chicken, the EU may expect the UK to swerve, but be wrong.
So, what then? Some argue this would be fine. They are wrong. The UK would lose a highly favourable trading relationship with by far its most important trading partners, plus the EU’s preferential agreements with other countries. It would do so in return for hypothetical (and certainly less favourable) deals with some other countries at some point in the future. It would face a difficult and possibly protracted transition, while the day-to-day organisation of its trade is reshaped. The confidence of those who have invested in the UK on the assumption that it would stay inside the EU single market and customs union would be undermined. The deeper belief that Britain was run by competent adults able to understand their country’s interests would be destroyed.
The UK would, not least, end up relying on co-operation over trade in goods and services, security, justice and many other things with countries whose core project it had abandoned, without an agreement. And yet, we are told, Britain would be well protected against the anger of its partners by the World Trade Organization — which is toothless at best, alas, and is now being turned inside out by the US.
Let us suppose these fantasies do win the day: Theresa May either fails to reach a deal or parliament fails to ratify it, the two possibilities being evidently related. I do not predict this: I have no idea whether a deal will be reached and ratified. But suppose this were the case. Then such an outcome must be put to the people once again. Knowledge that this will happen should concentrate minds in government and parliament.
It is possible that the 52 per cent of voters who chose Leave meant leave, irrespective of the circumstances and costs. But it is also rather likely that many wanted to leave with a withdrawal agreement and at least the possibility of close trading (and other) relationships with the EU thereafter. If “no deal” is the folly that is going to emerge from the processes now under way, then the people deserve to be asked: is this what you really want? If the answer is “yes”, a second time, then so be it.