Gapping up: NEOT +82.9%, SRT +15.7%, AMAT +8.6%, AHS +8.1%, ANET +5.7%, AMBC +4.1%, INWK +4.1%, STS +4%, BJRI +3.4%, NVLS +3.3%, CENX +3.3%, ICON +3%, AUY +2.6%, COMM +2.5%, ASML +1.8%, EPE +1.5%, ARMH +1.2%, QCOM +1.1%, GSK +0.6%
Gapping down: TRUE -26.3%, TRN -18.1%, AFOP -14.1%, IMH -10.2%, JWN -8.3%, SXC -7.4%, VFC -6.9%, GBX -6.3%, AEG -5.4%, SAM -5.1%, CRMT -3.8%, AU -3.6%, FLS -3.6%, FCX -3.5%, HMY -3.4%, EQIX -3.2%, FLR -3.1%, ATW -2.9%, SDRL -2.8%, RIO -2.4%, GFI -2.2%, UAN -2.2%, OLLI -2.1%, SUNE -2%, RDS.A -1.9%, TWTR -1.8%, RIG -1.7%, CS -1.6%, MDRX -1.6%, DE -1.3%, NOK -1.3%, LXK -1.2%, AZN -1.2%, ABX -1.1%, MDCA -1.1%, CAT -0.9%, KEYS -0.9%, NEM -0.8%, ARII -0.8%, XBKS -0.7%, ED -0.5%
- Reports Q1 (Jan) earnings of $0.80 per share, $0.10 better than the Capital IQ Consensus of $0.70; revenues fell 14.9% year/year to $4.77 bln vs the $4.86 bln Capital IQ Consensus. Sales included price realization of 2 percent and an unfavorable currency-translation effect of 4 percent. Equipment net sales in the United States and Canada decreased 18 percent. Outside the U.S. and Canada, net sales were down 9 percent, with unfavorable currency-translation effects of 11 percent.
- Deere's equipment operations reported operating profit of $214 million for the quarter, compared with $414 million in 2015. The decline for the quarter was due primarily to lower shipment volumes, the unfavorable effects of foreign-currency exchange and the impact of a less favorable product mix.
- Results decline on weakness in global markets for farm and construction equipment -- all businesses remain profitable.
- Co issues upside guidance for Q2, sees Q2 revs of -8% to ~$6.81 bln vs. $6.66 bln Capital IQ Consensus Estimate.
- Co issues downside guidance for FY16, lowers FY16 revs to -10% to ~$23.2 bln (from -7%) vs. $23.56 bln Capital IQ Consensus; lowers net income to $1.3 bln from $1.4 bln.
- Peers: CNHI, AGCO, TWI, CAT.
Key points:
· After falling 20% from the start of the year to a low in Feb, China (MSCI China) has rebounded 8% in the past 4 trading days, paring its ytd loss to 13% (MXAPJ: -8%). We think the relief/tactical rally may extend, underpinned by a near-term stabilization of key macro factors (China growth, the Rmb, and oil), and an improving risk/reward profile in the equity market given the extent to which risks are being priced.
· While the tactical case has improved, we believe turning strategically positive on China is premature due to various structural and liquidity headwinds, and policy constraints. We stay Market-weight on China in a regional context.
· As such, we advocate a targeted implementation strategy to trade the recovery rally. Ideas include: (1) Most-shorted stocks with reasonable fundamentals; (2) select ADRs for strategic growth, valuation, and positioning/catalyst reasons; and, (3) options strategies in an uncertain and low-conviction world.
Macro: A near-term stabilization of key macro factors
· China growth: Reported January macro data have been mixed so far - the trade numbers came in below expectations, PMIs showed conflicting signals, but the monetary data (new loans, TSF) surprised strongly on the upside. Our read is that underlying demand may still be weak (imports down 19% yoy) now but green shoots are emerging: new loans growth may slow in Feb due to seasonal normalization but the recent surge, including a significant rise in mid/long-term loans (63% yoy, 25% 3ma yoy), potentially points to continued growth or even acceleration in infrastructure investment and a resilient real estate market (mortgage loans), notably in higher-tier cities where inventory months have dropped to about 11 months from the peak of 18 months in Oct 2014.
· The RMB: The topic of Rmb continues to feature prominently in our recent client interactions. The strengthening of the CNY since Feb (although still down 0.4% vs. the USD ytd) and the narrowing gaps between CNY and CNH have certainly helped sentiment. Bearish positions on CNH, proxied by the CNH open interest on HKEx, have dropped possibly due to concerns about PBoC’s intervention and a tighter CNH liquidity pool, and the concerns are being reinforced by the recent interview by Governor Zhou, which carried a hawkish tone against sharp devaluation. The CNH volatility profile has been reset, implying a spike is unlikely in the short term if the central bank is committed to upholding its credibility. On top of these factors, we expect the Fed to stay on hold in its March meeting, which may alleviate downward pressures on the CNY in the near term.
· Oil prices: Our commodity strategists expect oil prices to remain volatile and oscillate between $20/bbl and $40/bbl in the near term. They believe the market would not be surprised by spikes to the downside even into the teens as a trendless oil market with significant volatility is now a consensus view with the market positioned as such (particularly given that realized oil volatility has surged to 100%). This suggests that most of the negative impacts from declining oil prices are likely behind us at this point. Fundamentally, our economists estimate that every US$10/bbl fall of oil prices could lift China's GDP by 0.1% as China is a net importer of oil, oil demand (volume) is still rising at 6% pace yoy, and falling oil prices should bode well for the trade balance. Direct impact on equities should be manageable as oil/gas companies now represent 3.4% and 6% of the market's earnings and market cap, although second-order impacts are more dynamic and harder to gauge.
Markets: An improving risk/reward profile
· Context: At the low end of a 'fat' trading range. We have been flagging this trading pattern for quite some time and we still think it helps to frame the potential risk/reward tradeoff in a historical context. In short, HSCEI has dropped 40% since 2010 (MXCN: -22%), but has been operating in a big trading range with 14 noticeable/tradable up and down moves (7 each) during the past 5 years, averaging around 30% in magnitude and 4 months in duration. While technical indicators show that the market is no longer oversold (RSI at 49), cap-weighted valuations are still at the low end of the ranges (more on this below), and the latest snapback is only 30% of the average historical rallies by magnitude.
· Earnings have come down but are not collapsing. Earnings downgrades have shown no signs of abating (17% in past 12 months), driven by the soft underlying activity growth, 40% down in oil prices in the past year, and partly due to the intensifying CNY depreciation expectations (offshore equities are quoted in HKD or USD). However, stripping out the oil and FX factors, 2016 Rmb-dominated earnings have dropped merely 1% ytd.
· Valuations are inexpensive: 2 weeks ago, we examined what is being discounted in equity valuations using different valuation approaches. We still stand by our view that a great deal of macro and sector-specific risk is already being reflected in equity valuations, and select long-term value is emerging if global recession/China hard-landing is not one's base case. Exhibit 6 compares current market valuations vs. the troughs in 2008 and 2011 on a number of popular valuation metrics. Specifically, on a median stock basis (to address the fact that large-cap banks are trading at low headline valuations given the embedded NPL risks), MSCI and HSCEI constituents' forward P/E and trailing P/B are close to or even below the stressed levels during the EU sovereign crisis and GFC.
· Positioning appears light and sentiment stays cautious. Mutual fund positioning data shows that global, GEM, and Asia funds are Underweight HK/China by 149bps, 206bps, and 318bps relative to their respective benchmarks (cum ADRs); HK/China focused funds have seen US$23bn of net redemption ytd (based on EPFR survey which is only a small subset of the full universe); short interest is still close to all-time highs; and the 8% rebound appears triggered more by short-covering than real money buying given how the most-shorted stocks in HK have traded.
Upcoming events/catalysts: Neutral to slightly positive
1. G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting will be held on Feb 26 and 27 where we may get statements about closer collaboration among global central banks;
2. Details on the 13th Five-Year Plan will be unveiled in the upcoming National People's Congress (NPC) meeting in early March, and local government budgets will be approved at the same time;
3. Jan-Feb combined activity data (IP, FAI, retail sales) will not be reported until early March and we think any potentially forceful policy responses (to slowing growth) are more likely to be rolled out after this;
4. The Fed meeting will be on March 15-16 where our economists expect the Fed to stay pat. Also in March, our economists expect further monetary easing to be announced in the ECB meeting although they think the hurdle to additional easing by the BoJ could be high;
5. At the market level, FY15 earnings season will kick off in early March for H shares and we expect an in-line result given lower consensus expectations and a relatively healthy 1Q-3Q earnings run-rate of 79% vs. full-year consensus;
6. On May 31, MSCI will implement the second batch of inclusion for 14 ADRs, which may usher in meaningful passive and active allocations to these names.
Implementation ideas
The abovementioned arguments suggest that some of the necessary conditions for a recovery trade are in place and the risk/reward of going tactically long (or paring shorts) looks sensible. But given the fluidity of global macro factors along the axes of global growth, central banks' policy, oil, and the Rmb, we believe investors need to be specific when expressing this short-term view. We like the following ideas.
· Heavily shorted stocks with reasonable fundamentals: We screen for a list of HK- and US-listed, Buy-rated stocks with the highest short-interest to market cap/turnover ratios in Exhibit 8 for potentially more short-covering-driven upside.
· 'New China': ADRs: We think the theme of 'New China', which consists of mainly technology, healthcare, and select consumer companies, remains the most exciting, and strategically compelling, story in the Chinese stock markets. Particularly, we favor Chinese ADRs because: a) they (proxied by the MXOCN index) have corrected in similar magnitude as the 'Old China'-dominated HSCEI index (both -15% ytd) which faces various structural challenges; b) valuations have retreated: 24.8x P/E (-0.5.s.d), PEG at 0.7X (HSCEI also at 0.7X); c) the May inclusion is a visible catalyst, and the current price setup is reminiscent of the 3Q pullback and 4Q recovery ahead of the first-tranche inclusion in Dec 2015; d) our positioning analysis shows that GEM funds are currently underweight China tech sector by 100bps relative to the benchmark, and will be underweight by over 300bps when the May inclusion kicks in; and, e) the recent resurgence of ADR privatization deals should provide a fertile hunting ground for event-driven investors and is arguably sentiment-boosting for the rest of the universe.
· Options: China ADR call-spreads, HSCEI short-dated calls: We believe buying optionality via outright calls or call-spreads makes sense given their asymmetric exposure (limited downside risk) against a backdrop where macro/policy uncertainty is high, investors' conviction level is low, and sentiment shifts could be rapid. We highlight 2 ideas: 1) We like call-spreads on our China ADR basket (GSCBADR4) which contains 14 China ADRs which were included in MSCI in last December. We recommend 4-month (June expiry to capture the ADR catalyst in May) 110-125% call-spreads on GSCBADR4 for indicatively 3.4% premium which offers a max payout of 4.4X; 2) For HSCEI, we prefer buying short-dated outright calls. While short-dated implied vol on HSCEI has risen meaningfully with 1-mo ATM implied vol trading at 36v (vs. 22v at the start of the year), it’s still trading below realized vol and short-dated call-wing skew doesn’t offer any meaningful cost savings. HSCEI 1-month expiry 8500 strike calls indicatively cost 2.2%. The structure breaks even at 6.2% from current levels and could offer potential returns of 330% on premium invested if HSCEI reverts to its ytd highs.
Option Risks: Buyers of 8500 strike calls risk losing entire premium if HSCEI stays below 8500 by expiry while buyers of 110-125% call-spreads on China ADRs risk capped upside if the basket rallies more than 25% by expiry or risk losing premium if it stays below 10% by expiry.
Strategic case unchanged; Stay Market-weight
The tactical case has improved, but we believe turning strategically positive on China is premature. Key reasons are:
· China is still going through a ‘bumpy growth deceleration’ process which keeps corporate earnings under pressure, especially for stocks in the 'Old China' space. Our EPS growth of 2% and 7% for 16E/17E for MSCI China is in line with/ 5pp below I/B/E/S consensus;
· Our base case still calls for the Rmb to moderately weaken vs. the USD by 7% by the end of this year (although only slight depreciation vs. the CFETS basket), and the Fed to raise rates 3 times this year. As such, pressures relating to the ‘impossible trinity’ suggest that capital outflow remains a challenge and may continue to weigh on investor sentiment;
· Structural reforms, especially those which are more consequential to equity returns (e.g. SOE reforms, capital markets liberalization), have been progressing slowly. Macro-wise, the surge in new loans/TSF may boost cyclical growth but make macro deleveraging down the road potentially more difficult and painful;
· We believe we are still at the early stage of the NPL cycle (our banks team forecasts NPLs potentially reaching 9%) and it may take 5-6 years for banks to absorb potential losses, thereby constraining strategic upside for Chinese banks, which account for 43% of the HSCEI index cap;
· China A has performed better than most expected since returning from the Chinese New Year holidays (+3.8%, but still down 18% ytd) but we think concerns about leverage and liquidity risks, notably the stock collateralized loans (Rmb1.1tn loans, 4% facing margin call risk, assuming LTV ratio at 35%), could resurface when market momentum moderates.
All in all, we stay Market-weight on Chinese equities, and reiterate our end-16 target of 58.5 for MSCI China, implying 13% potential upside from current levels.
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Barcap :2015A results were below at EBITA but better at EPS thanks to taxes (somewhatone-off in nature). These results are a sideshow however to 2016E where
management was supposed to give us some indications on Canal+’s big
restructuring. Apart from a potential distribution deal with beIN Sports (subject to
regulatory approval) and new set-top boxes, we still unfortunately have few clues
about the Canal+ restructuring. 2016E could “lead to a significant decline in the
operating results” but we do not know the magnitude. Arguably, we have more
visibility on 2019E where management agreed with c. €700m of EBITA (we forecast
c. €600m). In conclusion, Vivendi is a stock with little visibility where management
states that growth will be stronger in 2017E/18E. The lack of visibility deserves a
discount in our view but Vivendi currently trades at 11x 2017E EV/EBITDA, a 10%
premium to the sector on 10x. We feel this is too generous but the dividend yield
(11% including announced extraordinary) and the buyback below €20 provides
downside protection. This is why we are Equal Weight. We lower our sum-of-the
parts to €19.00 owing to less value in quoted stakes and lower Canal+ valuationKepler
UMG was strong and Canal weak. Restructuring was stepped up at Canal.
UMG strong and Canal weak
Q4 earnings were something of a mixed bag, coming in ahead of forecast at UMG (EUR334m EBITA vs EUR305m forecast), but below-forecast at trouble Canal Plus (EUR96m loss vs. EUR45m loss forecast). The beat at UMG was driven by strong revenue growth (4% LFL vs 0% forecast), similar to what we saw from peers Sony and WMG in Q4 and only marginally boosted by one-off settlements. Excluding restructuring (EUR85m vs EUR28m in Q4 2014), Canal Plus's EBITA actually improved YOY by 20% in a quarter that traditionally generates losses due to seasonality.
Warns on Canal in 2016 as turnaround investments step up
The guidance, though, reflected the well-known difficulties at Canal Plus, with a heavy year of investment in content/technology, and an exclusive deal with BeIN Sports (details still unclear as it is being reviewed by the competition authority but it seems Canal will retain BeIN subscription revenues in return for payment of a minimum guarantee), designed to turn around the pay-TV business in France by 2018. The target is to improve EBITA versus 2015 underlying by more than EUR250m. How much will be reinvested and how big the hit to 2016 EBITA will be remains unclear. For now, we lower our 2016 EBITA forecast for Canal Plus by EUR100m.
We lower our EPS forecast by -8.6%, and remain buyers
For UMG, the guidance calls for for moderate growth in EBITA in 2016 and for an acceleration in growth in 2017 and thereafter as streaming (whose revenue growth accelerated in H2 from 35% to 50% following the Apple Music launch) continues to ramp up. On the back of this, and a stronger-than-expected end to 2015 , we raise our UMG forecasts by 5%. Overall, we lower our 2016 EPS forecasts by -8.6%. Though there is continued uncertainty over where Canal Plus's earnings may bottom, the difficulties in the domestic pay-TV business cannot come as a surprise. Turning it around is no easy matter in a market that is shifting towards on-demand, but we believe margins could settle in the 10-15% range at least after restructuring (vs 6.5% 2016E and peak of 14.6% in 2010), so we would use any weakness today as a buying opportunity. The last restructuring in 2006 saw margins drop from 6% to 2% before returning to 9% and 12% in the following two years. Vivendi also launched a bid for Gameloft at EUR6 per share (a meagre 10% premium, costing up to an additional EUR360m), possibly to put pressure on the Guillemot family to cede control of Ubisoft.