Barron's : Miner’s Surge May Be Over if Copper Slides

Miner’s Surge May Be Over if Copper Slides
The metal’s price has risen 24%, with much of the recent gains attributable to speculators. If commodity prices fall, the miner’s stock will too.

As prices for metals zip higher, mining stocks are whooping it up.

Shares of the copper producer Antofagasta (ticker: ANTO.UK) stand out among the revelers, enjoying a year-to-date surge of more than 50%. Other miners in the FTSE 100 also boast sizable gains, ranging from about 13% for BHP Billiton (BLT.UK) to 33% for Fresnillo (FRES.UK).

“One hundred percent of the move is driven by commodity prices,” says Richard Knights, head of mining research at British brokerage Liberum. He then offers a warning: “If commodity prices start going down, the stocks are going to start going down, too.”

Copper prices have climbed 24% so far this year, while gold has gained 15% and silver, 11%. Analysts say the big drivers have been upbeat economic readings from China, the world’s biggest consumer of commodities, as well as rising confidence in the global economy. The dollar’s slump has helped a lot, too, making dollar-denominated metals cheaper for foreign buyers.

But a growing number of analysts are sounding an alarm, particularly about the gains for copper. The red metal’s advance has been overdone, and much of the run-up seems driven by speculators, they caution.

SO IT LOOKS LIKE TIME to consider taking profits in Antofagasta, which operates mostly in Chile. Its advance stems from the climb for copper prices that now appear on shaky footing, the bears say. A recent Barron’s story (“Copper Rally Could Lose Pep,” Aug. 5) suggested it might be better to wait and see if the optimism over copper is justified before joining the bullish crowd.

“More and more observers believe that prices are reaching speculative excesses, such as Codelco, for instance,” notes a recent report from a team of Commerzbank commodity analysts led by Carsten Fritsch. The Chilean state-owned company “claims that the copper price in particular is excessive, and that the price gains of recent months are unsustainable.” Codelco—its full name is Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile—is the world’s largest copper producer.

“There’s a good long-term story in copper,” Liberum’s Knights says, but the tale isn’t that appealing from now through 2019. “We’ve got two years of surpluses ahead, and if you combine that with the potential for slowing Chinese demand, then the price could come off relatively quickly,” he says. If copper falls, Antofagasta shares are likely to follow.

Knights’ colleague Ben Davis has a Sell rating on the stock, along with a price target of 4.20 British pounds ($5.41), implying a plunge of 60% from its recent £10.48.

The consensus among the 24 analyst teams covering Antofagasta is that it needs to cool off. The average price target is about £8, implying a fall of more than 20%, and just 16% of them have Buy or Overweight ratings on the stock, according to FactSet. Liberum’s model says copper needs to climb to about $3.53 a pound from its recent $3.10 to justify Antofagasta’s current price. The brokerage views that possibility as overly optimistic, which explains its case for selling or shorting the stock.

Leading indicators from China also signal that copper prices and Antofagasta shares could fall, according to Knights. Chinese housing sales have been easing, and credit growth has been slowing, he notes. Mining stocks “all move generally in the same direction to varying degrees, and certainly driving that in the past decade have been credit flows in China, and how that flows into housing and manufacturing investment,” he says.

Antofagasta doesn’t look like much of a bargain, as it trades at 25 times predicted forward-year earnings. That’s well above diversified miner Anglo American’s (AAL.UK) forward price/earnings ratio of eight, as well as BHP Billiton’s multiple of 15, though it’s below Randgold Resources’ (RRS.UK) 31.

In August, Antofagasta’s shares added significantly to their year-to-date gains, helped not just by copper’s advance but also by an upbeat first-half earnings report and a dividend hike. The company more than tripled its interim dividend payment, declaring a payout of 10.3 U.S. cents per share for the period, versus 3.1 cents a year ago. But Knights doesn’t sound that impressed about miners boosting or reintroducing their dividends.

“It’s definitely incrementally positive for the equities’ stories,” he says. However, “they’re all on payout ratios now, so if you have a dividend reinstated, and the commodity price goes down, that dividend turns into a much smaller number next year, because earnings are much lower. Then, I would expect the stocks to go down.”

TechCrunch : Understanding Roku’s IPO and its growing platform revenues



From: LAURENT CHEKROUN (MAKOR SECURITIES LO) At: 09/02/17 18:42:27
Subject: Recode : Understanding Roku’s IPO and its growing platform revenues
In a pleasant Friday surprise, Roku dropped its S-1 document today, detailing its financial performance and corporate strategy.
The filing indicates that the company intends to raise $100 million in its debut. The figure is a widely-recognized placeholder number. The company could raise more or less in its IPO.
Follow Crunchbase News on Twitter & Facebook
As a private company, Roku raised more than $200 million.
The firm, whose IPO was widely anticipated at a valuation around $1 billion, is set to test the market’s waters when indices trade near record highs, video reigns supreme in the media landscape, and some tech offerings have done well. Others have struggled.
Before the weekend impends, let’s slice through how Roku makes money, how much money it makes, and what to make of it all.
How Roku Makes Money
Roku sells TV-focused streaming hardware to consumers, and it also works with content players to get their material in front of consumers. It also has an ad business. The latter two efforts fall under what Roku calls “platform revenue.”
The company’s mix of top-line sources is described in its S-1 in the following fashion:
We generate player revenue from the sale of streaming players and platform revenue primarily from advertising and subscription revenue share on our platform. We earn platform revenue as users engage with content on our platform and we intend to continue to grow platform revenue by monetizing our TV streaming platform.
Over time, Roku has increased the percent of its total revenue that comes from its platform business. In practice, it looks like this (via Jan Dawson of Jackdaw Research):
As we’ll see shortly, the mix shift in Roku’s revenue matters as one of the two sources has a far higher gross margin.
Driving the change, it seems, is that Roku drives more usage of its streaming service through partnered-hardware (TVs that run its software) instead of selling hardware over time. This means it can still drive new, active users and engaged hours while not being beholden to selling low-margin hardware.:

So Roku sells hardware for its streaming service, partners with TV manufacturers to sell Rock-powered hardware, drives revenue from partnered streaming companies, and sells ads.
Simple enough, really. How big is Roku? Let’s find out.
How Much Money Roku
Makes
Loses
Before we dive into the guts of the company, here are the big numbers.
The following chart from Roku’s S-1 shows its 2016 and 2015 fiscal years, and the results of the first half of 2017 compared to the first half of 2016 (calendar). Bear in mind that everything is in units of thousands, so a result of “$119,116” means $119,116,000. Let’s go:

The company’s revenue is expanding while its net losses fall thus far in 2017. The firm’s growth in the 2017 fiscal year came with slightly increased losses.
Roku grew 23 percent in the first two quarters of calendar 2017 compared to the year-ago period. That’s partially due to the company changing up how it brings in revenue. As such, the soft 23 percent figure is more nuanced than it might seem.
Mix Shift
The above-mentioned revenue mix shift makes Roku’s revenue a bit harder to track than it otherwise might be. The firm posted sequential-quarter declines in hardware sales, for example, from the first quarter of this to the second. And, in the second quarter, the firm also posted year-over-year declines in hardware income.
Suffice it to say that the company’s hardware business is in decline. Its platform revenue has grown consistently, however. Going back a few quarters (calendar), here are its results:
As you can see, that is steady revenue growth from Roku’s platform business, aside from the slight Q4 to Q1 dip. Holiday quarters for companies that sell advertisements often see a decline in certain incomes after the close of the holiday-focused fourth quarter. The decline for Roku was modest and quickly offset by growth in the second quarter.
How investors will read that remains to be seen, but the firm has shown dramatic growth of its platform revenue—nearly 100 percent year-over-year.
More broadly, in the quarter ending June 30, 2017, Roku put up $99.62 million in revenue, less than its $100.09 million derived from its first quarter and under its fourth quarter result of $147.34 million. The company, despite its sequential-quarter declines, grew compared to its year-ago periods in each of the last four quarters.
If investors are willing to give more credence to Roku’s growing platform incomes as indicative of its corporate future, the sequential declines may not matter.
And why might investors care a bit more about Roku’s platform revenue than its hardware incomes? Because the company generates the vast bulk of its gross margin from its platform revenue. Turning once again to Dawson of Jackdaw, the following chart shows precisely how the platform business is more gross profit than the hardware business for Roku:
That’s sharp. What should we make of the above?
What To Make Of Roku’s Finances
Roku must want out of the hardware business, at least as a leading revenue driver. It makes no money in that game. Notably, that makes it in a future-sense a nearly all-in OTT service that doesn’t generate its own content.
That isn’t a model that I would not have thought possible given the incredibly stiff arena of competition for content on the Internet today. Facebook is getting into a game that Netflix is pouring cash into, Amazon is playing, Apple is tinkering in the space, and Microsoft already picked up and dropped its video efforts.
I wonder if that fact might help Roku. It has distribution and content providers want access to audiences. That confluence could be, in part, why Roku’s ARPU is doing this:
That bodes well for the firm that, as we saw before, has a history of active user accretion. Quickly growing high-margin businesses are worth something after all.
What Roku is worth, however, is beyond me. With one revenue stream in decline, persistent losses, but big potential, the firm is going to be a fun one to price.
Hit up the S-1 for more, and send in your best finds.

Recode : Understanding Roku’s IPO and its growing platform revenues

In a pleasant Friday surprise, Roku dropped its S-1 document today, detailing its financial performance and corporate strategy.
The filing indicates that the company intends to raise $100 million in its debut. The figure is a widely-recognized placeholder number. The company could raise more or less in its IPO.
Follow Crunchbase News on Twitter & Facebook
As a private company, Roku raised more than $200 million.
The firm, whose IPO was widely anticipated at a valuation around $1 billion, is set to test the market’s waters when indices trade near record highs, video reigns supreme in the media landscape, and some tech offerings have done well. Others have struggled.
Before the weekend impends, let’s slice through how Roku makes money, how much money it makes, and what to make of it all.
How Roku Makes Money
Roku sells TV-focused streaming hardware to consumers, and it also works with content players to get their material in front of consumers. It also has an ad business. The latter two efforts fall under what Roku calls “platform revenue.”
The company’s mix of top-line sources is described in its S-1 in the following fashion:
We generate player revenue from the sale of streaming players and platform revenue primarily from advertising and subscription revenue share on our platform. We earn platform revenue as users engage with content on our platform and we intend to continue to grow platform revenue by monetizing our TV streaming platform.
Over time, Roku has increased the percent of its total revenue that comes from its platform business. In practice, it looks like this (via Jan Dawson of Jackdaw Research):
As we’ll see shortly, the mix shift in Roku’s revenue matters as one of the two sources has a far higher gross margin.
Driving the change, it seems, is that Roku drives more usage of its streaming service through partnered-hardware (TVs that run its software) instead of selling hardware over time. This means it can still drive new, active users and engaged hours while not being beholden to selling low-margin hardware.:

So Roku sells hardware for its streaming service, partners with TV manufacturers to sell Rock-powered hardware, drives revenue from partnered streaming companies, and sells ads.
Simple enough, really. How big is Roku? Let’s find out.
How Much Money Roku
Makes
Loses
Before we dive into the guts of the company, here are the big numbers.
The following chart from Roku’s S-1 shows its 2016 and 2015 fiscal years, and the results of the first half of 2017 compared to the first half of 2016 (calendar). Bear in mind that everything is in units of thousands, so a result of “$119,116” means $119,116,000. Let’s go:

The company’s revenue is expanding while its net losses fall thus far in 2017. The firm’s growth in the 2017 fiscal year came with slightly increased losses.
Roku grew 23 percent in the first two quarters of calendar 2017 compared to the year-ago period. That’s partially due to the company changing up how it brings in revenue. As such, the soft 23 percent figure is more nuanced than it might seem.
Mix Shift
The above-mentioned revenue mix shift makes Roku’s revenue a bit harder to track than it otherwise might be. The firm posted sequential-quarter declines in hardware sales, for example, from the first quarter of this to the second. And, in the second quarter, the firm also posted year-over-year declines in hardware income.
Suffice it to say that the company’s hardware business is in decline. Its platform revenue has grown consistently, however. Going back a few quarters (calendar), here are its results:
As you can see, that is steady revenue growth from Roku’s platform business, aside from the slight Q4 to Q1 dip. Holiday quarters for companies that sell advertisements often see a decline in certain incomes after the close of the holiday-focused fourth quarter. The decline for Roku was modest and quickly offset by growth in the second quarter.
How investors will read that remains to be seen, but the firm has shown dramatic growth of its platform revenue—nearly 100 percent year-over-year.
More broadly, in the quarter ending June 30, 2017, Roku put up $99.62 million in revenue, less than its $100.09 million derived from its first quarter and under its fourth quarter result of $147.34 million. The company, despite its sequential-quarter declines, grew compared to its year-ago periods in each of the last four quarters.
If investors are willing to give more credence to Roku’s growing platform incomes as indicative of its corporate future, the sequential declines may not matter.
And why might investors care a bit more about Roku’s platform revenue than its hardware incomes? Because the company generates the vast bulk of its gross margin from its platform revenue. Turning once again to Dawson of Jackdaw, the following chart shows precisely how the platform business is more gross profit than the hardware business for Roku:
That’s sharp. What should we make of the above?
What To Make Of Roku’s Finances
Roku must want out of the hardware business, at least as a leading revenue driver. It makes no money in that game. Notably, that makes it in a future-sense a nearly all-in OTT service that doesn’t generate its own content.
That isn’t a model that I would not have thought possible given the incredibly stiff arena of competition for content on the Internet today. Facebook is getting into a game that Netflix is pouring cash into, Amazon is playing, Apple is tinkering in the space, and Microsoft already picked up and dropped its video efforts.
I wonder if that fact might help Roku. It has distribution and content providers want access to audiences. That confluence could be, in part, why Roku’s ARPU is doing this:
That bodes well for the firm that, as we saw before, has a history of active user accretion. Quickly growing high-margin businesses are worth something after all.
What Roku is worth, however, is beyond me. With one revenue stream in decline, persistent losses, but big potential, the firm is going to be a fun one to price.
Hit up the S-1 for more, and send in your best finds.

Recode.net :A Roku IPO problem: Netflix and YouTube are huge on Roku, but they d

A Roku IPO problem: Netflix and YouTube are huge on Roku, but they don’t make Roku any money
The streaming video box company wants to be a streaming video services company. But someone has to pay them for that.

Roku has spent the last few years fighting for your living room against fearsome competitors — Google, Apple and Amazon — and it has more than held its own. Now it gets a payoff, via an IPO.
The pitch to investors: Get a piece of the next generation of the cable TV business, where video programmers who want to reach a huge audience will pay Roku to reach them.
A red flag for investors: Some of Roku’s biggest programmers don’t make Roku any money at all.
Let’s back up. Roku is going public as it moves from a low-margin business — selling video streaming devices — to a potentially high growth, high-margin business — taking a cut of advertising and subscription fees programmers generate using its devices.
First the good news: For now, Roku’s strategy of pushing its prices down has helped it compete against very deep pocketed rivals. In the first half of this year, it saw a 37 percent increase in device sales, led by its $30 Roku Express stick.
That cost its device business — Roku calls it its “player” business — both revenue and gross profits: They are down 2 percent and 28 percent, respectively.
Roku says it’s ok with that. All of those new devices helped its services business — Roku calls it its “platform” business — bump up revenue by 91 percent, while gross profit jumped 104 percent.
And Roku has been at this for several years. It now has 15.1 million monthly users, up from 4.8 million three years ago. And it is generating an average of $11.22 in service revenue for each one of them, up from $4.65 per user three years ago.
It’s certainly possible those trend lines continue. Then again, once you have a Roku box, or a TV running Roku’s software, it’s entirely possible to use Roku as a consumer, or as a programmer, without generating any extra revenue for the company.

FT : Imagination: graphic warning, Rise of 82% in licensing revenue bodes well f

Imagination: graphic warning
Rise of 82% in licensing revenue bodes well for upcoming sale

Relying on the patronage of the world’s biggest company is a high-wire act. Selling graphics chip designs to Apple made Imagination Technologies one of the UK’s biggest tech companies. Apple’s decision to terminate the relationship has more than halved the value of the shares and forced the sale of the company. A return to profit will counteract neither but it could mean a better deal for shareholders.

Full-year results published on Tuesday validate Imagination’s decision to focus on its core businesses following a lossmaking acquisition spree. Revenues beat expectations, increasing nearly a fifth to £145m and pre-tax profits of £2.4m have supplanted last year’s losses.

None of this changes the company’s central problem of losing a customer responsible for half of all revenue. Imagination has no cash as a cushion against Apple’s decision to replace its chip designs in iPhones and iPads with in-house technology. A formal dispute process is going nowhere. Imagination, worth more than £1.5bn five years ago, now has a market value just under £430m.

Still, licensing revenue rose 82 per cent on the previous year — proof of demand from other customers. That bodes well for the upcoming sale. But comparisons with UK chip designer Arm’s sale to Japan’s SoftBank for £24bn — an enterprise value of 20 times the company’s sales — are overly ambitious. Similarly sized Ceva, which has not been taken over, is a more realistic comparison. It trades at around 10 times EV to sales. Take out the half of sales dependent on Apple, and that would price Imagination at around £2.40 per share. It is currently trading at about £1.50.

It all depends who bids. Mooted names include Intel, whose Mobil Eye car sensor subsidiary uses Imagination’s technology, Chinese company Tsinghua Unigroup and Qualcomm (which is itself in dispute with Apple). More bids should mean a higher price. Shareholders cannot expect the £6 per share high of 2012. But £2 or more looks plausible.

FT : Vince Cable raises doubts about Brexit ever happening

Vince Cable raises doubts about Brexit ever happening

There is a growing possibility of a second referendum on Britain leaving the EU as tensions grow within the Conservative and Labour parties about the likelihood of a beneficial Brexit deal being achieved, Liberal Democrat leader Vince Cable has said.

In a debate at the FT Weekend Festival held at Kenwood House in North London on Saturday, Mr Cable said: “I think there is more than a possibility that Brexit may never happen.

He added: “The balance of probability is still that it does, but there is a strong possibility of it being stopped because tensions within and between major parties are so large, that one or other may want to let the public decide on the facts whether this is something they want to go ahead with.”

Mr Cable, who became leader of the pro-EU Lib Dems at the age of 74, promising voters an “exit from Brexit,” was replying to a point made by pro-Brexit Conservative MEP Daniel Hannan who argued that Brexit would happen, but in a gradual and low-impact way.

Mr Hannan said: “The day after Brexit is going to look very much like the day before. It’s going to be a process. We will still have all the same rules and regulations we’ve assimilated for 44 years, but that’s the day the divergence can begin.”

Mr Hannan added that Britain would not be damaged by losing its access to the EU single market as it could have a “Swiss-style” deal that “keeps the essence of the single market,” despite not being a member. He also argued that leaving the EU would allow Britain to look towards a “more global future,” and strengthen trade links with non-EU economic powers.

Mr Cable, who has a reputation for being one of the most financially literate critics of British governments since 1997, argued there was “a real risk of a train crash” because it had become apparent the UK government was “woefully unprepared” for the Brexit negotiations that started with the EU in June.

The Lib Dem leader said that prime minister Theresa May was struggling to prove Britain could strike good trade deals with non-EU economic powers.

“We’ve just seen in the last few weeks how absurd this is,” he said. “The PM has gone off to Japan to negotiate some special trade deal and they have said they would much rather deal with the EU.

Mr Cable said that the government had asked India for a special deal on whisky and financial services, and that India had asked for more visas.

“To which [Mrs May] said, ‘sorry we can’t, we are trying to keep people out,’ and the Indians said, ‘get on your bike’,” Mr Cable said.

Mr Hannan countered that it was normal for people to feel pessimistic about the future and that Britain had a chance of keeping the advantages of staying in the EU single market in the way Switzerland has.

“We are a country of 65m people, an existing [EU] member state, a G7 country. I can’t believe that we can’t get a similar deal,” he said.

In an earlier session at the Festival on fake news and social media, BuzzFeed UK editor Janine Gibson and Newsnight presenter Evan Davis discussed the polarisation of politics in a post-truth era with Financial Times editor Lionel Barber.

Ms Gibson argued that Donald Trump’s presidential election victory was enabled by the US news audience having split into distinct information consumption spheres.

“During an election campaign when the New York Times publishes a piece with maybe 162 examples of Donald Trump being mendacious,” she said, a large part of the non-NYT reading US audience would not have noticed. “So Breitbart News jumps up and goes “Hillary Clinton! Emails!” and that grabs the attention. That is polarisation.”

Mr Barber said that polarisation of information and opinion had begun with the advent of Fox News and other cable news channels in the US, which “has been exacerbated by technology because it can amplify that phenomenon and it is incredibly good at picking out select groups.”

Mr Davis argued that the Facebook audience often knew to be selective about what they believed on the social platform, which has been used by some sites to spread fake news.

Ms Gibson countered: “I don’t believe people are always genuinely as sophisticated as that,” adding that some younger readers “do not know brands” enough to differentiate between trusted news brands and newer sites that may not be publishing truthful reports.

An FT reader asked whether think tanks whose funding was not transparent were exacerbating the fake news phenomenon. Ms Gibson said that when she was deputy editor of the Guardian, she had been taken in by a think-tank with an unknown agenda after NSA whistleblower Edward Snowdon provided the Guardian with top secret documents leading to revelations about surveillance of internet and phone communications

“On the Snowdon story, one [think-tank] said: ‘We want to do a day’s debate on the issues of privacy and national security.’ We took part and we worked with them for a really great seminar, and at the end I realised that the think-tank was funded entirely by [rightwing US billionaires] the Koch brothers,” Ms Gibson said.

The Kochs “were probably the Guardian’s ideological worst enemies . . . We spent an entire day doing a think-tank with them,” she added.

Vince Cable on Brexit, ballroom dancing and keeping his balance

FT : The billion-dollar grey market in watches upsets big brands

The billion-dollar grey market in watches upsets big brands
Manufacturers are fighting unofficial sellers, but they may finally have to embrace them

No one is immune to a bargain — not even those who can spend £30,000 on a watch. At Watches of Switzerland, an authorised dealer, an Audemars Piguet Royal Oak automatic in rose gold sells for £42,600, but the same watch is on offer at website Chrono24 — on the “grey market” of unauthorised sales — from US dealer Watch My Diamonds for $34,850 (£27,227). Impossible to ignore, the grey market is becoming a powerful force in the watch industry.

Unauthorised watch dealers such as Jomashop.com, Authenticwatches.com and IconicWatches.co.uk discreetly buy stock that authorised dealers have failed to sell, and offer them at a lower price, often with an equivalent warranty. Chrono24, an online marketplace similar to eBay where dealers and consumers can meet, is another heavyweight in the sector, with more than 10m monthly visits. Discounts of 30-40 per cent on new TAG Heuer, Breitling and Rolex watches, delivered overnight and offering responsive customer service, appeal to price-conscious shoppers.

The term is not necessarily loved. “You can call it the grey market, but at the end of the day it’s the same watch for a lot less,” says Peter Grant, general manager of Authenticwatches.com, which lists 10,000 watches. (The company declined to give its revenues.) “The number one driving factor is price, the number two is accessibility and service.”

The grey market is “growing massively” based on the number of products on their sites and their search penetration, according to Brian Lee, associate director at L2, a business intelligence service. Online is “the first touchpoint in the search. A lot of brands don’t list the price still, so then people will go to the grey market” to find a watch price and often end up buying there, he says.

The overall global watch market is worth $62.5bn, according to Euromonitor, and the grey market largely affects the higher end of mechanical or designer watches. These have had two terrible years: according to the Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry (FHS), exports of Swiss watches fell 12.6 per cent to SFr19.4bn ($20.3bn) between 2014 and 2016. They have risen 0.7 per cent this year so far.

In this difficult period for the industry, the grey market has come to account for about 20 per cent of the global market for watches that retail for above $5,000, according to Jon Cox, an analyst at Kepler Cheuvreux in Zurich. Previously, the grey market was about 10 per cent of the global total, he adds.

“It does provide a useful function, no matter what some of the producers say: it does allow them to discreetly turn a blind eye to some of their retail partners getting rid of non-moving stock and replenishing with parts that are growing faster,” he says. He notes that Richemont has been an exception, seeking to stamp out the grey market by buying back (and destroying) stock in Asia.

Grey-market websites are “second-hand dealers”, says Raynald Aeschlimann, chief executive of Omega, dismissively, noting that manufacturers will not uphold the warranty if bought on the grey market. But brands are in a quandary too: they are unwilling to penalise their distributors who sell on watches, nor do they wish to compete with them online. Moreover, the grey market is as much of a solution (to overstocking) as it is an attack (on price integrity). How brands deal with the machinations of the grey market is of great importance.

These are no small businesses. Chrono24, where (mostly) unauthorised dealers offer watches, has listings for more than 300,000 new and used timepieces with a value of €2.5bn. The most popular watches on Chrono24 are Rolexes, says Tim Stracke, co-chief executive, with an average selling price of €6,000. It does not pitch itself as a discount site: there is no “redlining”, an industry term for highlighting of discounts, though a search will show you the lowest offers.

Mr Stracke expects the site, which is based in Karlsruhe, Germany, will have about €1bn in transactions this year and will double that in five years’ time. (Grey market dealer Jomashop.com had sales of $269m last year, according to a person close to the company.)

Like fellow internet businesses, Chrono24 garners plenty of data from its almost 1m registered shoppers, who can place watches on a personal clipboard. “We know a lot about the users,” Mr Stracke says. “We know from previous visits what they like and dislike, we know how many years you’ve been with us, we know what you’ve bought before, sold before, what you’ve looked at before.” These data are useful for algorithm-driven recommendation engines, suggesting further appealing purchases.

The business makes money by charging a monthly fee for dealers to list watches on the site, from €69 a month up to several thousand euros for those with over 1,000 watches on its site. Dealers pay a 3.5 per cent transaction fee and private sellers are charged 2.85 per cent on their purchases. Mr Stracke says Chrono24’s “core business is very profitable”, although investment in growth means earnings are “slightly negative” — a situation familiar to other internet businesses.

How the grey market finds its watches is a point of contention. Industry figures say watches come from authorised dealers around the world who are struggling to sell timepieces — official sales in Hong Kong, for example, fell 25 per cent in 2016, according to the FHS, and left retailers with a glut. One grey-market executive says his site often buys watches at the end of the quarter, when brand managers, seeking to meet their sales targets, are forcing retailers to take additional stock.

Even authorised dealers see the advantage of the grey market: one watch company executive says its retailers buy on the grey market to build their own stock of popular items cheaply.

Watch brands are publicly strict about trying to stem this trade. Several say they will penalise or even cut off authorised dealers if they find them selling to the grey market, and one grey-market dealer says he has seen threatening letters from brands to retailers. “We protect our suppliers’ identity, it’s the number one thing we do,” says Mr Grant of Authenticwatches.com, adding that his site typically buys in bulk from authorised watch dealers in the US who are struggling to shift stock. (Dealers can sell within the authorised network.)

But brands will not necessarily take action to stop it. An executive at a mid-sized luxury watch brand says the only way to avoid its items entering the grey market is to buy back unsold stock from its dealers, which larger brands are not willing to do. Sometimes, in fact, brands perpetuate it: they themselves sell unsold and obsolete stock directly to the grey market, another senior watch executive says.

Some watch dealers even buy in one country where a product may be in oversupply, and thus cheaper, and sell in another country with greater demand and a higher price point. “The biggest areas [of supply] are still very much in Asia and you are seeing that [Asian watch retailers] are talking about controlling their stock levels. All the brands are taking a much more stringent view on this,” says John Guy, head of European luxury at Mainfirst Bank.

“At the end of the day, you can try to control the dealer but they do what they want to do,” says Theo Staub, chairman of watch brand Moritz Grossmann. “The tools you have when you sell to the dealer are quite limited.”

If watch brands are serious about stopping the flow of their products on to the grey market, diminishing both their profit and their control, they can apply legal threats at several points.

The first is for a brand to police its own retailers. If it has a selective distribution system that prohibits retailers selling outside its network, the brand could sue for breach of contract, says Julia Dickenson, a senior associate at law firm Baker McKenzie, who works with luxury brands. “But practically speaking, those retailer relationships are often important, long-term and valuable . . . so some brands may well take a view they don’t want to be as strict as they could be if they have seen leaks coming from them.”

Moreover, the brands may not know where the leaks are coming from in the first place as traceability can be difficult, she adds.

Targeting the unauthorised dealers is often more palatable. This is most easily done by finding those grey-market vendors who buy products outside of the European Economic Area and sell within the EU, infringing the brand’s trademark, according to Ms Dickenson. If the watch is both bought and resold in the EU by unauthorised dealers in a way that could damage the brand’s reputation, then it may also be able to claim a breach of its trademark rights.

Using unfair competition law which strongly upholds the rights of brands could also be an option, while the law of tort could cover unlawful interference with contract and profiting from a breach of contract.

The difficulty for watch brands comes in the online market, where the courts and competition authorities are still catching up. Whether or not a brand can prevent their authorised retailers selling through an online marketplace is still uncertain. In July, a case before the European Court of Justice (Coty Germany v Parfümerie Akzente) came out with a non-binding opinion that beauty brand Coty can prevent the German retailer from selling its items on online marketplaces. A ruling is expected in the coming months.

Watch brands may have to join the grey market if they cannot beat it. The scale of Chrono24’s audience and the data the company has on it are driving reticent watch companies to work with them directly, says Mr Stracke. This does not necessarily means brands will lower their prices but does help them retain control of their image.

“The top, top brands are in a very open dialogue with us right now. They are very conservative, they are not ready to put their brands on our platform, but most of the top brands, and I’m talking about chief executives of the top brands, are meeting us here in our office, talking with us and discussing ways to partner,” Mr Stracke claims.

One brand that has decided to work with the grey market is Frederique Constant, whose “affordable luxury” timepieces start from around $870. “We have been feeling the impact for two or three years that the grey market is getting stronger and stronger,” says Niels Eggerding, vice-president of sales at Frederique Constant. “It’s very hard to control your brand against that,” he says, with thousands of points of sale and distributors all potentially leaking.

That was part of the reason why, since March 2017, the brand has been selling on Chrono24 within its own boutique, at its regular prices. It is the highest-profile of the watch names there and is offering some of its timepieces at full price, alongside accessories, a company history and videos about its smartwatch. Mr Eggerding hopes that working with Chrono24, rather than against it, will help in “educating our consumers a bit better”. But the same watches will probably be available through other dealers on the site, no doubt at a discount to the brand’s preferred price.

“People say, ‘Oh, you’re really progressive,’ or people say, ‘You’re crazy to be on this platform with such a high-end product,’” says Mr Staub of Moritz Grossmann, which also has a Chrono24 “boutique”. The brand, which makes two-thirds of sales in traditional stores, has been “positively surprised” by early sales and expects rivals to follow it.

If they do, they will regain some profit and perhaps a degree of control in the unwieldy online marketplace — but at the risk of looking like they have capitulated to those who have made millions from ignoring their rules.