WSJ : The Loan That Fueled a Star Investor’s Risky ‘Illiquid’ Bets Northern Trus

The Loan That Fueled a Star Investor’s Risky ‘Illiquid’ Bets
Northern Trust lent to a fund of risky, hard-to-trade bets run by Neil Woodford, whose investment empire has stumbled in the face of client withdrawals and regulatory scrutiny

U.S. financial giant Northern Trust NTRS -0.14% could be on the hook for losses related to the unraveling of a star U.K. fund manager, in a case that is drawing attention to the dangers of hard-to-sell assets hiding inside retail investment products.

The Chicago-based bank lent £150 million ($190 million) to a fund managed by Neil Woodford, whose investment empire is in serious trouble as clients have fled and U.K. regulators have launched an investigation. The Northern Trust loan is backed mainly by private shares in risky young companies. The loans were disclosed in fund documents.

Northern Trust, Woodford Investment Management and the board of the Woodford Patient Capital Trust , the fund in question, declined to comment. Shares in Woodford Patient Capital Trust, which manages close to £1 billion in assets, have plunged by more than a quarter since early June.

Woodford’s problems come as several European fund managers have tripped up after straying too far into assets that are illiquid, or hard to buy and sell. Shares in French bank Natixis SA dropped sharply last week after a Financial Times report highlighted illiquid assets in a fund run by the bank’s H2O Asset Management arm. Switzerland’s GAM Holding AG is still recovering from a scandal at one of its credit funds that took concentrated bets in illiquid bonds, many of which were linked to a single group of companies.

Investors have taken more risks as a consequence of the low-yield environment, said Ryan Hughes, head of active portfolios at AJ Bell , a U.K.-based retail-focused fund distributor. “It becomes bad when managers get into things that they, or more likely their investors, don’t fully understand,” he said. He predicts similar incidents could arise in the future.
Mr. Woodford built a reputation for making winning, contrarian bets on large, unloved stocks over 25 years at U.S. company Invesco Perpetual. While there, he managed at his peak more than £30 billion. He avoided internet companies in the dot-com bust and steered clear of banks ahead of the 2008 financial crisis.

He struck out on his own in 2013. Since then, Mr. Woodford’s investment focus shifted toward unlisted stocks in companies with unproven technologies or pharmaceutical products.

Now his company, Woodford Investment Management, faces a battle to survive. In early June, it suspended withdrawals from its flagship £3.7 billion Woodford Equity Income Fund.

That mutual fund breached its own limits on unlisted stockholdings during 2018, according to the Financial Conduct Authority, the U.K. regulator. It is now investigating the events that prompted the fund to suspend withdrawals.

Northern Trust’s loan to the Woodford Patient Capital Trust is unusual. No other fund in the U.K. that invests in risky, early-stage companies uses any leverage at all, according to Britain’s Association of Investment Companies. Two similar U.K. trusts run by Baillie Gifford and Merian Global Investors said they expected their investments to generate high returns without leverage.

The U.K. trust sector in general has average leverage of 9% of net asset value. The Woodford Patient Capital Trust runs with leverage close to its limit of 20% net asset value.

Share-backed loans are normally low risk because listed equities can be sold swiftly to repay the debt. And the Northern Trust loan is backed more than six times by the fund’s assets. But more than three-quarters of those are either unlisted equities or listed stocks that don’t trade at all.

There are other risks. Many of the assets supporting Northern Trust’s loan are also held by Mr. Woodford’s bigger, suspended fund. That fund has promised to exit all its illiquid and unlisted holdings. As it sells, the value of companies in which the Patient Capital Trust also invests are likely to get hit.



Some of the biggest unlisted shares that both held in early 2019 included early-stage medical technology companies Oxford Nanopore, Proton Partners and Kymab.

The most recent published list of holdings from March and April 2019 showed that the Patient Capital Trust owned securities in 35 companies that the bigger suspended mutual fund also owned. They accounted for nearly 77% of the trust’s portfolio.

Both funds also each hold or have held stakes in a series of other investment companies that in turn hold stakes in some of the same unlisted stocks that the Woodford funds own. These investment companies include Dublin-listed Malin Corp., Guernsey-listed Ombu Group, and London-listed companies IP Group PLC and Allied Minds PLC.

Further connecting the two funds: Earlier this year, the now-suspended Equity Income Fund received a 9% stake in Patient Capital Trust. In exchange, Patient Capital took on some of the mutual fund’s unlisted stockholdings.


Patient Capital Trust’s original rules called for no long-term borrowing and a limit of 60% of net asset value in unquoted stocks. That changed progressively, mainly during 2017, when the constraints were changed or ditched. The limit on unlisted shares was first lifted to 80% of net asset value, then again to 80% of gross asset value, the value of all assets before debt is subtracted.

That same year, Northern Trust doubled the size of the credit facility from £75 million to £150 million. It increased the interest rate on the loan slightly and doubled the fees it charged for separate administrative services, according to the trust’s annual reports.

wSJ : Is There a Big Short in Bitcoin? Trading activity has grown in CME’s bitco

Is There a Big Short in Bitcoin?
Trading activity has grown in CME’s bitcoin futures in recent months, along with the rebound in the cryptocurrency’s price

Hedge funds and other big traders are betting that bitcoin will fall, even as the digital currency has risen above $11,000 on a new wave of crypto-optimism.

That is the picture that emerges from bitcoin futures listed on CME Group Inc., CME -0.05% the biggest U.S. exchange operator. Futures are contracts that let traders bet on whether an asset—in this case, bitcoin—will rise or fall.

Hedge funds and other money managers held about 14% more bearish “short” positions in CME bitcoin futures last week than they did bullish “long” positions, according to a recent Commodity Futures Trading Commission report.


Other large traders were even more bearish. “Other reportables”—a loose category of firms that don’t necessarily manage money for outside investors—held more than three times as many short positions in bitcoin futures as long ones, the CFTC report shows.

So who is the optimist? The report shows it is mostly small investors taking the other side of the trade. Among traders with fewer than 25 bitcoin contracts, a category that likely captures many individuals placing bets in bitcoin, long wagers outnumbered short bets by 4 to 1.

“Traditional market participants may be more skeptical of [bitcoin] than millennial day traders,” said George Michalopoulos, a portfolio manager with Chicago fund manager Typhon Capital Management LLC, although he stressed that his views were speculative and that it is hard to know what is driving the CFTC’s numbers.

The CFTC report, which came out Friday, reflected the positioning of market players on June 18, when one bitcoin could buy around $9,000. The cryptocurrency was trading at $11,379.96 late Tuesday afternoon, up 4.6% from the day before.

Though it comes with a lag, the weekly CFTC report offers a glimpse into how various types of traders are positioned in bitcoin futures. Commodity traders closely follow similar CFTC reports on futures like crude oil, wheat and corn for hints of what is driving the market.


The CFTC data shows that hedge funds have been short bitcoin since February, though they recently pared their bearish bets.
On June 11, short bets among hedge funds outweighed long bets by 47%, a gap that narrowed to 14% the following week.
Such data don’t necessarily mean hedge funds are placing outright bets that bitcoin will drop. The short bets could also be part of hedging strategies: for instance, a fund with a portfolio of bitcoins might go short at CME as insurance against the value of bitcoin dropping.

Trading activity has grown in CME’s bitcoin futures in recent months, along with the rebound in bitcoin’s price. In May, average daily trading volume in the CME contract hit a record $515 million, the exchange operator says.

L. Asher Corson, a cryptocurrency analyst at Chicago proprietary trading firm Consolidated Trading, said traders who want to short bitcoin don’t have many choices besides CME.

One option is for them to borrow bitcoins from another trading firm, sell them and return an equivalent amount of bitcoins to that firm later—a process similar to how short selling works in stocks. But the difference is that, in the volatile bitcoin market, few firms are willing to offer that service to short sellers because of the risk of their customers defaulting, Mr. Corson said.

“CME right now is providing a unique ability for the larger players to have massive short positions with very low counterparty risk,” Mr. Corson said.

Volumes in CME’s bitcoin futures contract got a lift when a competing U.S. exchange operator that offered a similar contract, Cboe Global Markets Inc., recently discontinued it. Cboe’s last bitcoin futures contract expired last week.

But CME is set to face additional competition soon. Intercontinental Exchange Inc., owner of the New York Stock Exchange, is set to begin testing of a new bitcoin futures contract in July. LedgerX, a startup trading platform for bitcoin options, plans to launch its own futures on the cryptocurrency after the CFTC said Tuesday it had won approval to become a futures exchange. And a group of prominent financial firms, including TD Ameritrade Holding Corp. and Fidelity Investments, are backing a venture called ErisX, which plans to offer both futures and spot trading of cryptocurrencies.

Volumes in CME’s contract remain a fraction of the billions of dollars’ worth of daily activity in the bitcoin “spot” market, where actual units of the digital currency change hands. But some recent studies suggest that the size of the bitcoin spot market is inflated because of rampant fake trading at cryptocurrency exchanges.

That should prompt traders to take a closer look at CME bitcoin futures, analysts from JPMorgan Chase & Co. said in a June 14 report. As a regulated exchange, CME bars wash trading—in which traders engage in back-and-forth buying and selling to generate fake volume—and violators can be subject to both CME and CFTC fines. That makes CME’s volumes more trustworthy.

“The importance of the listed futures market has been significantly understated,” the JPMorgan analysts wrote.

FT : Bitcoin hurtles towards $13,000

Bitcoin hurtles towards $13,000

The price of bitcoin soared to its highest level since January 2018, as the cryptocurrency's recent rally shows little signs of fizzling out. 

In Asian trading hours on Wednesday, the price of bitcoin traded on the Bitstamp exchange rose as much as 10 per cent to as high as $12,935.58, putting the digital currency on track for its biggest one-day jump in more than a month. 

Bitcoin's value has now jumped for the last eight trading sessions in a row, bringing its overall return for the year to 250 per cent. Still, the digital currency remains some way below its peak of more than $19,000 reached at the end of 2017. 

Recent enthusiasm for bitcoin has been stoked by Facebook's foray into the world of cryptocurrencies, launching its own currency called Libra. The coin is designed as a means of payment and for international money transfers. Analysts are optimistic that Libra will help cryptocurrencies generally gain more mainstream acceptance. 

>>> Rafael, IAI merger inevitable 26 JUN 2019 A merger between Israeli defense c

Rafael, IAI merger inevitable
26 JUN 2019
A merger between Israeli defense companies Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and Rafael Advanced Systems is inevitable, Globesreported citing IAI chairperson Harel Locker.

Locker was cited as saying that there is not much logic in the two firms competing with one another in the sector of missiles, and that a merger between might be inevitable. Locker noted that these firms are the largest exporters in Israel, IAI exporting 80% of its production, and Rafel, 50%. There is a global trend for mergers, and the industry is becoming a place for giants.
IAI itself merged three of its divisions as part of the trend for consolidation in the sector. Rafael and IAI are already cooperating on many fields, such as for the Iron Dome, Locker continued.
A merger between the firms was previously entertained, though eventually taken off the agenda, the report said, adding that competition among the firms also emerged between Rafael and IAI to be the successful bidder to buy Aeronatuics.
The report suggested that the recent sale of IMI to Elbit Systems in the sector may provide the motivation for merger between the firms.

FT : Traders fear ‘avalanche’ of Pemex bond sales

Traders fear ‘avalanche’ of Pemex bond sales
Second downgrade would plunge Mexican oil company into junk territory


Fund managers fear an “avalanche” of selling of Pemex bonds if the strategically important Mexican oil company is hit by a second “junk” bond rating.

The state-owned group, which has $80bn of hard-currency bonds outstanding, was downgraded this month to BB+, below investment grade, by Fitch Ratings, which cited its “deteriorating credit profile” amid sharp slides in oil production and reserves.

A second downgrade to junk, or high-yield status, by a major rating agency could lead to a wave of forced selling by investment funds and mandates only permitted to hold investment-grade debt.

With Moody’s currently having Pemex one notch above junk, and with a negative outlook, that could happen at any point.

“If Moody’s tripped over the threshold in six or 12 months, that would cause an avalanche of selling,” said Marton Huebler, assistant portfolio manager at Fidelity International.

“We could see considerable selling,” added Siddharth Dahiya, head of emerging market corporate debt at Aberdeen Standard Investments. “It seems quite likely that Pemex will get downgraded by Moody’s at some point. We just don’t know whether it’s this month or in six months.”

Given the sheer size of Pemex’s debt load, it would be the largest “fallen angel” to tumble into the high-yeld emerging market basket ever, displacing Brazilian counterpart Petrobras, which caused shockwaves when its $50bn bond pile was downgraded to junk status in 2015 amid the sprawling Lava Jato corruption scandal.

“We have seen this movie before and it was called Petrobras, and Pemex is bigger,” said Bryan Carter, head of emerging market debt at BNP Paribas Asset Management. “It will have an enormous displacement effect on portfolios, on the asset class, on benchmarks.

“People say it’s priced in, but we always have forced sellers and it always gets ugly. It’s fairly clear that’s where we are heading with Pemex, so get ready.”

Estimates of likely forced selling swirling around the market range from $10bn to $15bn. Little of this is believed to have occurred as yet, however, despite Pemex’s benchmark 2029 bond yield rising to 7.04 per cent, from 6.51 per cent before the Fitch downgrade, and its five-year credit default swaps jumping to 210 basis points over those of Mexico for the first time since February 2016, when oil prices were languishing at $35 a barrel, shown in the first chart.


“We have started to see some forced selling. I have heard about $1bn has been sold. So we can expect another $10bn of dollar-based investment grade holders who cannot keep it through a second downgrade,” said Daniela Savoia, EM credit analyst at Fisch Asset Management.

Mr Huebler put the likely forced selling from investment-grade only holders lower, at $6bn to $12bn, but still said this would be “extreme” for a single company’s bonds.

“It would be roughly the same order of magnitude of Petrobras in 2015. Petrobras sold off enormously, spreads went to 700-800bp, they doubled or tripled, at the short end of the credit curve at least, so the technical effect of forced sellers being forced to dump their holdings in a few weeks was quite extreme,” said Mr Huebler of an episode that saw Petrobras’ bond yields surge as high as 14.7 per cent.

Ms Savoia feared the market impact could be greater still for Pemex’s $17bn of euro-denominated bonds, given the comparatively small size of the euro-based EM high-yield market.

“We have already seen what it looks like when a big euro issuer becomes a fallen angel. We went through that with Petrobras. It’s the Petrobras issue times 10, or whatever it is,” said Mr Carter.

“There is always a reluctance among investors to sell,” before a second downgrade, particularly on the part of funds and investment mandates that are constrained by a need to maintain a low tracking error with respect to the underlying index, he added.

Most investors now believe it is a question of when Moody’s downgrades Pemex to junk status, rather than if.

Francisco Campos-Ortiz, Latin America economist at PGIM Fixed Income, said the oil company’s credit fundamentals had gradually deteriorated in recent years amid a heavy tax burden; insufficient investment in exploration, production, and refining capacity, which has led to declining output of oil, gas, petrochemicals and fuels; and a “relentless” increase in leverage.

Crude production, 2.3m barrels per day in 2015, is likely to be just 1.6m bpd this year, according to Morgan Stanley, while reserves have tumbled from 22 years of production in 2004 to nine years and investment in exploration and production has crashed from $27bn in 2014 to $11.1bn last year.

“A heavy tax burden means it cannot be free cash flow positive under any oil price scenario that we view as plausible. Pemex’s current financial structure is unsustainable,” the bank said.

In the statement accompanying its downgrade, Fitch said Pemex’s “standalone credit profile” — ie if it did not have the potential support of the Mexican government, its 100 per cent owner — was CCC, deeply into junk territory, as the “very high level of transfers from Pemex to the Mexican government continues to significantly pressure Pemex’s cash flow generation and reinvestment ability”.

The big unknown is what help Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Mexico’s president, who sees Pemex as a key pillar of the economy, is able and willing to provide.

“Even with its deteriorating credit fundamentals, the market has largely given Pemex the benefit of the doubt based on the assumption that its strategic importance to Mexico would force the government to do whatever necessary to fully bail out the company, if needed,” said Mr Campos-Ortiz.

The attempts to shore up Pemex so far, in the form of cash injections and tax relief, are described by Morgan Stanley as “timid” efforts “that failed to please markets”.

“I think Pemex is a priority for the government. It’s something Amlo [Mr López Obrador] has stated regularly and consistently. He sees it as a symbol of the government in many ways,” said Ms Savoia.

“But help is going to come in his own way. So far we haven’t seen a capital increase that I think the market was waiting for. That’s something that the rating agencies would like to see.”

Mr Huebler said he expected tax cuts of $7bn-$8bn to allow Pemex the cash flow to invest, although the path to this was not straightforward.

“The government has to be able to support Pemex in order for it to be able to maintain its critical level of capex, but to do that it will have to increase debt, which Amlo promised never to do, or raise taxes, which he also promised not to do,” he added.

Barring a meaningful cut in taxation, so that Pemex does not have to borrow to meet its fiscal commitments, Morgan Stanley argued “a move toward more explicit guarantees for the Pemex bonds may be required,” even though the government has ruled out such a guarantee at this stage, said Ms Savoia.

Any debt guarantees or meaningful financial support would weaken the federal government’s own finances, however, potentially threatening its own credit rating, which was also downgraded by Fitch earlier this month, to BBB, two notches above junk.

Morgan Stanley estimated that Pemex would ultimately need funding of around $15bn a year at today’s oil price and production levels, approaching 1.5 per cent of Mexico’s GDP.

Some see this as a problematically large commitment. “We have five years of López Obrador’s policies here. My base case is that Mexico loses investment grade by the end of that,” said Mr Carter.

Such sentiment is leading some investors to enter a potentially surprising pair trade — long Pemex bonds, short Mexican sovereign debt.

“We are overweight Pemex versus the Mexican government because we think the government support will be very strong,” said Mr Huebler, who argued that it made sense for the federal government to take on board more of the combined financial burden.

“Mexico is still high BBBs, so a 1-2 notch downgrade wouldn’t hurt them as much as Pemex going from investment grade to high yield,” he said.

PGIM Fixed Income also has a long-term strategy of being overweight Pemex debt, underweight Mexican sovereign paper, in the belief that the yield gap between the two will eventually become compressed “as Mexico and Pemex become more closely linked”.

A number of hedge funds have also entered the same pair trade in the wake of the widening of Pemex’s spread over the sovereign, said Ms Savoia, although Fisch sold its position at the beginning of the year.

David Spegel, founder of Fundamental Intelligence, a consultancy, said the blowout in Pemex’s credit default swaps implied the market was already pricing in a downgrade to B+, “so, at the worst, for Standard & Poor’s, a six-notch downgrade, for Fitch a three-notch downgrade”.

“Ratings are meant to see through cycles and be long term so I would not expect a sudden three to six-notch downgrade by any of them,” Mr Spegel said. “But downgrades are imminently probable, more likely two notches and possibly more in the coming months depending on action taken to shore up Pemex’s balance sheet.”

“It’s very messy,” added Mr Carter. “We are going to have too many sellers relative to buyers at the beginning and it’s going to take some time to get resolved.”